The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court in this case stemmed from district court decisions regarding an uninsured motorist claim between Plaintiffs-Appellants Sam and Deva Ferrell and Defendant-Respondent United Financial Casualty Company (United Financial, d.b.a. Progressive Insurance Company). The parties underwent arbitration, and the Ferrells subsequently filed a petition that sought confirmation of the arbitration award and an award of costs and attorney fees. The district court ordered confirmation of the arbitration award and interest based upon an agreement of the parties. On the issue of attorney fees, the district court found that arbitration began five months prior to the amendment of I.C. 41-1839 which explicitly allowed attorney fees in arbitration, and therefore the statute as it existed did not provide for attorney fees in this case. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case back to the district court. View "Ferrell v. United Financial Casualty Co." on Justia Law

The O'Neals appealed a circuit court order that granted Bama Exterminating Company, Inc.'s motion to compel arbitration. The dispute arose shortly after the O'Neals closed on the purchase of a house. As part of the loan disclosures, Bama Exterminating prepared an inspection report that the house was termite-free. The report did disclose a prior infestation at the house's carport from several years earlier. Mr. O'Neal signed the report right below the arbitration provision. Two weeks after closing, the O'Neals discovered "bugs" in the walls. They called Bama Exterminating who confirmed that the bugs were termites. The O'Neals then sued Bama Exterminating alleging negligence, wantonness and breach of contract. Bama Exterminating answered their complaint with the affirmative defense of the arbitration clause in the inspection report. The parties moved toward trial in the circuit court. When mediation failed, Bama Exterminating moved the court to compel arbitration. The O'Neals argued that the exterminator waived its right to compel arbitration by its participation in the litigation process. The Supreme Court found the exterminator did not waive its right to compel arbitration, and therefore affirmed the circuit court's decision to grant the company's motion. View "O'Neal v. Bama Exterminating Company, Inc. " on Justia Law

Dorchester appealed from the district court's dismissal of its complaint against BRJ for lack of personal jurisdiction. Dorchester initially filed suit against BRJ for breach of contract and fraud based on BRJ's purported failure to honor an irrevocable letter of credit. The court vacated and remanded, concluding that Dorchester made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over BRJ and, therefore, carried its burden in the absence of an evidentiary hearing or trial on the merits. View "Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A." on Justia Law

Defendant's employer had insurance through American States Insurance Policy (ASIC). After Defendant was involved in a car accident, Defendant sent ASIC written notice of a potential claim under ASIC's uninsured/underinsured (UM/UIM) coverage. ASIC did not formally deny the claim but, rather, responded with a declaratory-judgment action, asserting that because Defendant had failed to undertake legal action or to make a written demand for arbitration against ASIC within three years from the date of the accident, her UIM claim against ASIC was time-barred. The U.S. district court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of ASIC, determining that the three-year limitations period set forth in the policy did not violate public policy. On appeal, the court of appeals certified a question of law to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, which answered by holding that Rhode Island would not enforce the contractual limitations clause in this case because it began to run on the date of the accident rather than the date the insurance contract was breached and was shorter than the statutory limitations period. View "Am. States Ins. Co. v. LaFlam" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between Johnny Hughes and his parents, Jack and Shirley Hughes, regarding borrowed money, the partition of jointly owned real property and accompanying water rights, and a contested pasture lease. The district court ruled in favor of Johnny on all of the issues except for the water rights. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the jury's determination that Johnny paid interest on a promissory note executed in favor of Jack and Shirley in 1989 restarted the statute of limitations on the note, and therefore, the matter was remanded to consider the amount of principal and interest Johnny owed on the note; (2) the partition agreement between the parties dissolved whatever right Jack and Shirley may have possessed in a life estate on a house on the land Johnny received pursuant to the agreement or to insurance proceeds Johnny received after the house was destroyed by fire; (3) Jack was entitled to an easement for stock water across Johnny's property; and (4) the arbitrator who arbitrated the pasture lease did not exceed his authority or miscalculate damages. View "Hughes v. Hughes" on Justia Law

The Maine Labor Relations Board determined that firefighters for the City of Augusta who retired after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement between the City and the firefighters union were entitled to retiree health insurance benefits under the expired agreement's terms. The Board based its decision upon its determination that the retirement benefits were part of the static status quo that must be maintained during continuing negotiations. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board did not err in concluding that the City must continue to pay the retirees retiree health insurance benefits during negotiations in order to maintain the static status quo. View "City of Augusta v. Me. Labor Relations Bd." on Justia Law

The Oklahoma Supreme Court accepted a certified question of state law from the Tenth Circuit federal appellate court. Two excess insurers for the Grand River Dame Authority (GRDA) had a dispute concerning the application of equitable subrogation. The question centered on whether a second-level excess insurer could invoke equitable subrogation to recover money it became liable to pay because of an agreement GRDA had with its first-level insurer. GRDA and the first-level insurer agreed to include losses under a policy that was outside that policy's year and that triggered the second-level insurer's coverage for that year. Upon review, the Oklahoma Court held that the second-level insurer could invoke equitable subrogation notwithstanding GRDA's release of the first level insurer. View "Steadfast Insurance Co. v. Agricultural Ins. Co" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, injured on an oil and gas rig, filed suit against various third parties - including TESCO and TESCO employee Jeffrey Anderson - after recovering workers' compensation benefits from his employer, DeSoto. SWE was the owner/operator of the oil and gas well. The court concluded that the SWE contract did not establish that the common law duty of care Anderson owed plaintiff extended to preventing unforeseen injuries caused by DeSoto's failure to follow SWE's safety rules; Anderson and TESCO had no duty to foresee that injury to a DeSoto employee would occur because other DeSoto employees not under defendants' control had failed to exercise their duty of care; ordinary care did not require Anderson to foresee that his encouraging word would cause a DeSoto driller to do something he had not already decided, indeed, been ordered to do; and the amount of encouragement Anderson gave the DeSoto driller was insubstantial. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking an expert report submitted by plaintiff and in denying the motion to amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Williams v. Chartis Casualty Co. et al." on Justia Law

Triple A, a Michigan corporation, has offices in Dearborn, Michigan, the Congo (previously known as Zaire), and Sierra Leone. In 1993, Zaire ordered military equipment worth $14,070,000 from Triple A. A South Korean manufacturer shipped the equipment to Zaire at Triple A’s request. For 17 years, Triple A sought payment from Zaire and then the Congo without success. In 2010, Triple A sued the Congo for breach of contract. The district court dismissed the case, citing lack of jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1602. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, citing the language of the Act, under which federal courts have jurisdiction “in any case in which the action is based upon” the following: [1] a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state; or [2] upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or [3] upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States. View "Triple A Int'l, Inc. v. Democratic Republic of the Congo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Hawaii non-profit corporation, entered into a lease agreement with Defendant, the trustee of a trust. Plaintiff subsequently began renting cabins on the property to the public. After a dispute arose between the parties regarding the terms of the lease, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment that its commercial uses of the property and rental of cabins to the public was permitted under the lease, among other things. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff's claim regarding cabin rentals but granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on Defendant's counterclaims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacated summary judgment as to the issue of cabin rentals. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the ICA regarding cabin rentals, holding that the portion of the lease delineating permissible uses of the property was ambiguous; and (2) reversed the ICA's judgment regarding Defendant's counterclaims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment because the issue of whether Plaintiff was prohibited by the lease from renting cabins to the general public had yet to be resolved on remand. Remanded. View "Hawaiian Ass'n of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Wong" on Justia Law