Anadarko appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Williams Alaska, arguing that Williams Alaska ignored the parties' agreements to pass through shipping credits on purchased oil. The court, construing the effect of the agreements in light of the contract and the parties' course of performance, concluded that the judgment for Williams Alaska could not stand; the agreements required Williams Alaska to remit any Quality Bank credits it received for the crude oil purchased under the contract; the court rejected Williams Alaska's contention that the obligation to remit the credits expired upon the termination of the agreement; Anadarko filed suit within the four-year statute of limitations and its suit was not time-barred; and Anadarko was entitled to interest on the unpaid Quality Bank credits from the time of breach. Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered judgment in favor of Anadarko, remanding for further proceedings. View "Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their complaints alleging that defendants failed to compensate them for work performed during meal breaks, before and after schedule shifts, and during required training sessions. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal with prejudice of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., gap-time, conversion, estoppel, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961, claims. The court remanded, however, the FLSA and New York Labor Law claims, the NYLL gap-time claims, the breach of express and implied oral contract claims, the breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, the quantum meruit claims, and the unjust enrichment claims for amended pleading. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Nakahata, et al. v. New York-Presbyterian HealthCare System, Inc. et al." on Justia Law

Amjad Tufail leased property to Midwest Hospitality pursuant to a lease agreement. The City Board of Zoning Appeals ultimately approved Midwest's application for a special use permit to operate a Church's Chicken fast-food restaurant with a drive-through on the property but placed conditions on the permit. Midwest subsequently notified Tufail that it was no longer responsible for lease payments because Tufail made a false representation to Midwest regarding the terms of the lease. Specifically, Midwest contended that Tufail represented that Midwest may not be prevented from using the property for certain specified purposes. Tufail brought this breach of contract action against Midwest. Midwest counterclaimed for breach of contract, deceptive advertising, and unjust enrichment. The trial court ruled in favor of Tufail. The court of appeals reversed, determining that Midwest's early termination of the lease was justified by Tufail's misrepresentation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Tufail's representation was not false where (1) the representation did not include any use of the property as a Church's Chicken fast-food restaurant with a drive-through; and (2) the circuit court found Midwest was not prevented from using the property for the uses specified in the lease. Remanded. View "Tufail v. Midwest Hospitality, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was a court of appeals' finding that Wachovia Bank, N.A. committed the unauthorized practice of law in closing a home equity loan in 2001. In 2001, Michael Coffey obtained a home equity line of credit from the Bank, using a Hilton Head Island home as collateral. While the mortgage documents the Bank prepared contained language that Michael owned the home, he was not on the title to the home. It belonged to his wife Ann alone. Ann did not sign the line of credit papers. The money was used to purchase a sailboat, the title of which placed in the name of A&M Partners, a company both Michael and Ann jointly owned. Michael made payments on the boat from a personal checking account. He died in 2005, and Ann continued to make payments from the same personal checking account until she decided to sell the boat through a broker. The Broker checked the status of the Bank's loan. It informed Ann that there was no lien or mortgage on the boat. Believing that the boat was then paid for, she sold the boat in 2006 and stopped making payments. Six months later, the Bank filed a foreclosure action against Michael's estate. Ann moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted her motion for summary judgment, citing the Bank's failure to perform due diligence to see that Michael did not own the property the Bank used as collateral for the loan. Finding that the Bank never held a valid mortgage, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant summary judgment. View "Wachovia Bank v. Coffey" on Justia Law

Doctor, a licensed podiatrist, was driving alone in her husband's vehicle when she was injured in a collision caused by an underinsured motorist. Doctor sought payment from Peerless Indemnity Insurance Co. and Peerless Insurance Co. (collectively, Peerless), who issued business owner's and excess/umbrella policies to Doctor's podiatric practice (Lake Region). Peerless sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court that it had no duty to pay for Doctor's injuries or damages. The district court granted summary judgment for Peerless. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Maine's uninsured/underinsured motorist statute did not apply to the Peerless policies issued to Lake Region, thus precluding Doctor's recovery from Peerless. View "Peerless Indem. Ins. Co. v. Frost " on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals comprised two putative class actions brought by skycaps affiliated with two major airlines. After Defendants, the airlines, each introduced a $2 per bag fee for curbside service for departing passengers at airports that did not inure to the benefit of the skycaps, Plaintiffs sued the airlines for unjust enrichment and tortious interference, among other claims. The district court dismissed the unjust enrichment and tortious interference claims as preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA). Plaintiffs appealed, contending that the ADA does not preempt common-law claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed after an analysis of statutory language, congressional intent, and case law, holding that the ADA preempted Plaintiffs' common-law claims. View "Brown v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

The Leonards entered into contracts with Centennial for the sale of a log home kit and construction of a custom log home. The Leonards later released Centennial from any claims for damages for defective construction or warranty arising out of the home's construction. Greg and Elvira Johnston held a thirty-six percent interest in the property at the time the release was signed. Eventually, all interest in the property was transferred to the Elvira Johnston Trust. A few years later, because of a number of construction defects affecting the structural integrity of the house, the Johnstons decided to demolish the house. The Johnstons sued Centennnial for negligent construction, breach of statutory and implied warranties, and other causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment for Centennial, finding that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and were waived by the Leonards' release. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court's ruling that the Johnstons' claims were time-barred and directed that the decision on remand apply only to the interest owned by the Johnstons at the time the release was executed; and (2) affirmed the district court's conclusion that the release was binding on the Leonards' sixty-four percent interest, later transferred to the Trust. View "Johnston v. Centennial Log Homes & Furnishings, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, FIA Card Services, filed a complaint against Defendant to recover damages for Defendant's unpaid credit card account. The district court subsequently entered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment, holding that Plaintiff, as the moving party and party with the burden of proof at trial, failed to establish that there was no dispute of material fact as to each element of the cause of action where the record did not sufficiently establish either the existence of Defendant's credit card account or that Plaintiff was the owner of that account. Remanded. View "FIA Card Servs., N.A. v. Saintonge" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned a house trailer on a leased lot in Defendants' trailer park. Plaintiffs desired to sell their trailer to a third party, which required a transfer of the lot lease to the purchaser. Defendants refused to approve the lease transfer unless Plaintiffs agreed to pay for the removal of an abandoned oil tank on the leasehold. Plaintiffs filed this action for damages and injunctive relief, contending Defendants' demands violated the lease agreement. More than one year after Plaintiffs served discovery requests, Defendants moved to dismiss the action with prejudice for failure to prosecute. The Court of Chancery granted the motion, holding that because Plaintiffs declined the opportunity to go forward, the case was dismissed with prejudice. View "Valdes v. MCH Mariner's Cove, LLC" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between Elm Ridge Exploration Company, LLC, an operator of oil and gas leases in New Mexico, and Fred Engle, who owned a majority of those leases. Elm Ridge sought to recover drilling expenses by foreclosing on Engle's lease interests. Engle counterclaimed, arguing that Elm Ridge had no authority to operate, and broadly that Elm Ridge breached its contractual and fiduciary duties. Engle also filed a third-party complaint against the previous operators, Central Resources, Inc. and Giant Exploration & Production Company. The district court dismissed two counts on Engle's counterclaim against Elm Ridge and the third-party complaint on statute of limitations grounds. After a trial on Engle's remaining counterclaim count (breach of contractual and fiduciary duties), a jury found that Elm Ridge breached the Operating Agreement and could not recover drilling expenses. The jury found that Engle still owed Elm Ridge for other drilling costs. The district court calculated Engle's share of the costs not attributable to the breach, and held Elm Ridge was entitled to a foreclosure order. Both parties appealed. Finding no error in the district court's calculation or ultimate disposition of the case, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Engle v. Elm Ridge Exploration Co." on Justia Law