In this case from the Supreme Court of North Dakota, Ryan Kratz, who had entered into a purchase agreement to buy a business and building from Donald and Carol McIlravy, failed to make the agreed-upon payments. The McIlravys initiated two eviction actions, and a separate action seeking damages, cancellation of the contract, and release of funds held in a trust account. The district court initially dismissed one of the eviction actions, but eventually ruled in favor of the McIlravys, awarding them damages and ordering release of the trust funds. Several years later, Kratz filed a motion under Rule 60(b), alleging the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the eviction actions and seeking to vacate or void all findings, conclusions, and orders, except the dismissals of the eviction actions. The district court denied this motion and awarded attorney’s fees to the McIlravys.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that Kratz's appeal was limited to the judgment denying his Rule 60(b) motion and that the motion was timely. The court determined that the district court had jurisdiction over the eviction cases and that any violation of N.D.R.Ct. 7.1(b)(1) was harmless error. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees. Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the lower court. View "Don's Garden Center v. The Garden District" on Justia Law

In a contractual dispute between Blueacorn PPP, LLC and Paynerd LLC, Paynerdier LLC, Matthew Mandell, and Taylor Hendricksen, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware denied the defendants' motion to dismiss Blueacorn's complaint for negligent misrepresentation. The defendants argued that there was no equity jurisdiction because there was no fiduciary or special relationship between the parties, and the relationship was governed by commercial contracts negotiated and performed at arms' length. However, Blueacorn claimed that Pay Nerd had a pecuniary duty to provide accurate information which they breached by supplying false information, and Blueacorn suffered a pecuniary loss due to reliance on that false information.The court found that Blueacorn had sufficiently alleged misrepresentation by claiming that the defendants' false statements were made with the intention of inducing a buyer to form a new company to engage in business with the seller. The court also noted that Blueacorn's claim of negligent misrepresentation had been pled with enough particularity as required by Rule 9(b). However, the court also expressed reservations about whether Blueacorn had pled a pecuniary interest strong enough to invoke equity jurisdiction based on negligent misrepresentation, noting that nearly every party involved in a business contract dispute would have a pecuniary interest in the transaction. Despite this, the court decided not to dismiss the claim at this stage, citing the interest of judicial economy. The court left open the possibility of revisiting the motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the trial. View "Blueacorn PPP, LLC v. Pay Nerd LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of North Dakota considered an appeal and cross-appeal related to a dispute over three contracts for deed between LAWC Holdings, LLC, and Vincent Watford, L.L.C. The court affirmed the lower court's findings that Vincent had breached the contract for deed on one of the parcels of land, and that specific performance was an appropriate remedy. The court also affirmed the lower court's decision that LAWC was the prevailing party and was thus entitled to attorney’s fees. However, the court denied LAWC's claim for damages as LAWC was not entitled to both performance of the contract through specific performance and damages for Vincent's breach of contract. The court also concluded that LAWC was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees on appeal. The case was remanded to the lower court to determine a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees on appeal. The court did not address LAWC's cross-appeal regarding title to the other two parcels as it was determined that LAWC had waived this cross-appeal. View "LAWC Holdings, LLC v. Vincent Watford, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals considered an indemnification case between Nissan, an automobile manufacturer, and Continental, a brake parts supplier. Nissan sought indemnification from Continental for a $24 million jury award and $6 million in attorney fees and costs resulting from a products liability lawsuit in California. The lawsuit arose after an accident involving a Nissan vehicle, with the jury finding that the design of the vehicle’s braking system caused harm to the plaintiffs. Nissan argued that a provision in their contract with Continental obligated Continental to indemnify them for the jury award and litigation costs. Both the district court and the Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the contract required Nissan to show that a defect in a Continental-supplied part caused the injury, which Nissan failed to do. The Appeals Court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Continental. View "Nissan North America, Inc. v. Continental Automotive Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

In a dispute between ORP Surgical, LLC (ORP), and Howmedica Osteonics Corp., also known as Stryker, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's ruling. ORP and Stryker, both involved in medical device sales, had a successful business relationship under two sales contracts, the Joint Sales Representative Agreement (JSRA) and the Trauma Sales Representative Agreement (TSRA). The relationship soured when Stryker terminated the JSRA and hired one of ORP's sales representatives, and later, when ORP terminated the TSRA, Stryker hired a dozen of ORP's representatives. The district court ruled in favor of ORP, finding that Stryker breached the sales contracts and owed ORP damages, attorneys’ fees, sanctions, and costs. On appeal, Stryker challenged the rulings on the breach of contract claims, the attorneys’ fees award, and the nominal damages award. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s holdings on the breach-of-contract claims but reversed its award of attorneys' fees under the indemnification provision. It also affirmed the award of nominal damages for Stryker's breach of the non-solicitation/non-diversion provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "ORP Surgical v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp." on Justia Law

The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a decision by the Court of Appeals, ruling that the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying an order as a final partial judgment under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. The case arose from a dispute between the City of Elk River and Bolton & Menk, Inc. over a large construction contract for a wastewater treatment plant improvement project. The City sued Bolton for alleged breach of contract and professional negligence. Bolton responded by filing a third-party complaint against three other parties involved in the contract. The district court dismissed Bolton's third-party complaint and Bolton sought to have the dismissal order certified as a final judgment for immediate appeal. The district court granted this certification, but the Court of Appeals dismissed Bolton's appeal, determining that the district court had abused its discretion in certifying the order as a final judgment. The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the district court had offered valid reasons for its certification, including that the third-party claims presented distinct issues from the principal claims and that the case was in its early stages at the time of certification. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "City of Elk River vs. Bolton & Menk, Inc." on Justia Law

Two online fundraising companies, Snap! Mobile, Inc. ("Snap") and Vertical Raise, LLC ("Vertical Raise"), were involved in a dispute. Snap accused Vertical Raise and its CEO, Paul Landers, of poaching its sales representatives and customers, which violated non-compete and confidentiality provisions in the former sales representatives’ employment agreements with Snap. The trial court granted Snap a preliminary injunction to prevent further violations and partially ruled in Snap's favor on some claims. A jury trial on damages resulted in an award of $1,000,000 to Snap. However, the trial court increased the award to $2,310,021. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the trial court's award of discretionary costs for expert witness fees but reversed the trial court’s order granting an additur or new trial. The Supreme Court ordered the trial court to enter a judgment consistent with the original jury award. The Supreme Court also reversed the trial court’s decision granting Snap a permanent injunction. In a separate contempt proceeding, the Supreme Court affirmed the contempt court's decision to dismiss contempt charges against Vertical Raise and Paul Croghan, a former Snap employee. The contempt court had determined the preliminary injunction was vague, overbroad, and unenforceable. View "Snap! Mobile v. Vertical Raise" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between a homeowner, Mario Rodriguez, and his insurance company, Safeco Insurance Company of Indiana. After a tornado damaged Rodriguez's home, Safeco issued a payment of $27,449.88, which Rodriguez accepted. Rodriguez's counsel then informed Safeco that it owed an additional $29,500 and threatened to sue. Rodriguez sued Safeco, bringing several claims, including breach of contract and statutory claims under the Insurance Code. Safeco invoked the insurance policy’s appraisal provision and subsequently issued a check to Rodriguez for $32,447.73, which it viewed as full payment of the appraisal amount due under the policy. Safeco also paid an additional $9,458.40, which it claimed would cover any interest possibly owed on the appraised amount.The Supreme Court of Texas was asked to answer a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: “In an action under Chapter 542A of the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act, does an insurer’s payment of the full appraisal award plus any possible statutory interest preclude recovery of attorney’s fees?” The Supreme Court of Texas held that the answer is yes. When an insurer has fully discharged its obligations under the policy by voluntarily paying the appraised amount, plus any statutory interest, in compliance with the policy’s appraisal provisions, section 542A.007 of the Insurance Code prohibits an award of attorney’s fees. This is because there is no remaining “amount to be awarded in the judgment to the claimant for the claimant’s claim under the insurance policy,” which means no attorney’s fees are available under section 542A.007(a)(3)’s formula. View "RODRIGUEZ v. SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF INDIANA" on Justia Law

The Indiana Supreme Court heard a case involving a dispute between Tonia Land and the IU Credit Union (IUCU). When Land became a customer at the credit union, she was given an account agreement that could be modified at any time. Later, when she registered for online banking, she accepted another agreement that allowed the IUCU to modify the terms and conditions of the services. In 2019, the IUCU proposed changes to these agreements, which would require disputes to be resolved through arbitration and prevent Land from initiating or participating in a class-action lawsuit. Land did not opt out of these changes within thirty days as required, which, according to the IUCU, made the terms binding. However, Land later filed a class-action lawsuit against the credit union, which attempted to compel arbitration based on the addendum.The court held that while the IUCU did provide Land with reasonable notice of its offer to amend the original agreements, Land's subsequent silence and inaction did not result in her assent to that offer, according to Section 69 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. The credit union petitioned for rehearing, claiming that the court failed to address certain legal authorities and arguments raised on appeal and in the transfer proceedings.Upon rehearing, the court affirmed its original decision, rejecting the credit union's arguments. However, the court also expressed a willingness to consider a different standard governing the offer and acceptance of unilateral contracts between businesses and consumers in future cases. The court found no merit in the credit union's arguments on rehearing and affirmed its original opinion in full. View "Land v. IU Credit Union" on Justia Law

In this case, Epochal Enterprises, Inc., also known as Divine Orchids, entered into a commercial lease agreement with LF Encinitas Properties, LLC and Leichtag Foundation. The lease included a limitation of liability clause which stated that the defendants were not personally liable for any provisions of the lease or the premises, and the plaintiff waived all claims for consequential damages or loss of business profits. After the plaintiff sued the defendants, a jury found the defendants liable for premises liability and negligence.The jury awarded the plaintiff damages for lost profits and other past economic loss. However, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), reasoning that the lease agreement’s limitation of liability clause prevented the plaintiff from recovering the economic damages the jury awarded.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, reversed the order granting JNOV in the defendants' favor, finding that the limitation of liability clause did not bar plaintiff’s recovery of damages. The court reasoned that the jury's award of damages necessarily implied a finding of gross negligence on the part of the defendants, which would be outside the scope of the indemnification clause. Further, the court held that the limitation of liability clause was void to the extent that it sought to shield the defendants from liability for their violations of the Health and Safety Code, as it violated public policy under Civil Code section 1668.On the defendants' cross-appeal regarding the damages award, the court affirmed the denial of the defendants' motion for partial JNOV, finding that substantial evidence supported the damages award. The court concluded that the jury could reasonably interpret the term "other past economic loss" on the verdict form as a different form of lost profits, and that the evidence presented to the jury provided a reasonable basis for calculating the amount of the plaintiff's lost profits. View "Epochal Enterprises, Inc. v. LF Encinitas Properties, LLC" on Justia Law