After John Irvine died, the proceeds from three of his investment accounts were paid to his estate. John's mother, Va Va, sought a declaratory judgment that she was the sole beneficiary of all three accounts. John's stepson, Michael, opposed the action. Both Va Va and Michael filed summary judgment motions. Va Va argued that John intended to benefit his estate under the laws of intestacy, not under the terms of his 1983 will, which included Michael as a beneficiary, and that John intended for her to be the contingent beneficiary for all three accounts. To support her contention, Va Va offered testimony from John's financial planner, who testified that he erroneously believed that John did not have a will when he executed beneficiary designation forms for a number of accounts. Va Va argued that the written contracts should be reformed for mutual mistake. The district court concluded that Michael was entitled to summary judgment under the contract terms and that no legal basis existed to require reformation of the contracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that (1) the contracts could not be reformed; and (2) proceeds from John's investment accounts were properly paid to his estate. View "Estate of Irvine v. Oaas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, which owned and operated a ranch, hired Defendant as a custom seeder to seed a barley crop grown under a contract with Circle S Seeds of Montana, Inc. The crop could not be harvested on schedule, and a heavy October snow later destroyed the crop. Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract, alleging that crop did not ripen in time because of improper seed placement. The district court denied and dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's breach of contract claim, concluding that Defendant did not materially breach its contract with Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding Defendant did not breach the contract by failing to object to rocky field conditions or by failing to achieve uniform depth of seed placement. View "CNJ Distrib. Corp. v. D & F Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

This case presented an issue of first impression for the Supreme Court: the allocation of defense costs incurred by the common insured of several carriers. Specifically, the issue was whether one insurer with an obligation to indemnify and defend the insured had a direct claim for contribution against its co-insurer for defense costs arising from continuous property damage litigation. Furthermore, the Court considered whether such a claim was extinguished when the insured gave up its claims against the co-insurer in a release negotiated and signed only by the insured and the co-insurer. The dispute arose from construction litigation brought by the Township of Evesham against a contractor, Roland Aristone Inc. for property damage. Although plaintiff, OneBeacon Insurance Company paid half of Aristone's legal fees and defense expenses, Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Insurance Company, which also insured Aristone, initially disclaimed coverage and did not pay any of Aristone’s defense costs. The Appellate Division affirmed the portion of the trial court’s decision allocating defense costs among the several insurers. It recognized OneBeacon’s claim for contribution against PMA and affirmed the trial court’s holding that OneBeacon’s claim was not extinguished by the release negotiated by Aristone and PMA. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that, in light of each insurer’s obligation to indemnify and defend Aristone for a portion of the period in which the continuing property damage occurred, the trial court properly held that OneBeacon had a contribution claim against PMA. View "Potomac Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Pa. Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In connection with construction of a pipeline to ship natural gas from Wyoming to Eastern Ohio, Rockies Express and Minerals Management Service (MMS), within the Department of the Interior, entered into contracts containing Royalty-in-Kind (RIK) provisions. Under the RIK program, the government receives its royalty for mineral resources extracted under federal leases “in kind,” i.e., in natural gas, rather than in cash, 30 U.S.C. 192; 42 U.S.C. 15902(b). In exchange, the government makes monthly payments to ensure that a certain quantity of the mineral resources is made available for its purposes. The government then enters into processing and transportation contracts to sell the mineral royalties, often at a substantial profit over royalties received in cash. The Civilian Board of Contract Appeals determined that MMS had materially breached the contract, but that Rockies Express was only entitled to damages that had accrued before the Secretary of the Interior announced a decision to phase-out RIK contracts. The Federal Circuit affirmed that MMS materially breached the contract, but reversed the decision to limit damages. Rockies Express is entitled to compensatory damages to put it in as good a position as that in which it would have been put by full performance of the contract. View "Rockies Express Pipeline, LLC v. Salazar" on Justia Law

Satyam approached the Trust about forming a joint venture to provide engineering services to the automotive industry. Satyam represented that it was an IT-services provider with a base of automotive customers, that it was publicly-traded, audited, and financially stable. The Trust formed VGE, a separate legal entity; in 2000, VGE and Satyam formed SVES under the laws of India; VGE contributed $735,000. VGE and Satyam signed agreements calling for binding arbitration. In 2005, Satyam initiated arbitration. VGE counterclaimed that Satyam had breached its obligations. The arbitrator rejected VGE’s counterclaims, found that Satyam never competed with SVES, and found an event of default entitling Satyam to purchase VGE’s shares in the joint venture for book value. Satyam filed an enforcement action. The district court ordered VGE to comply with the award. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Following a 2007 contempt proceeding, VGE complied. In 2010, VGE and the Trust sued, alleging that, starting before the joint venture, Satyam engaged in a massive fraud scheme about its financial stability, and claiming civil violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961–1968. The district court dismissed, based on res judicata defense, and denied leave to amend. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The complaint adequately alleged that Satyam wrongfully concealed the factual predicate to claims, so the defense of claim preclusion does not apply. View "Venture Global Eng'g, LLC v. Satyam Computer Servs., Ltd." on Justia Law

Deutsche Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure against Wilk, 14 M.R.S. 6321, attaching documents, including a 2005 mortgage ($459,375) from Wilk in favor of the original lender’s nominee, MERS; a 2008 assignment from MERS to IndyMac; and a 2010 assignment by the FDIC, as the receiver for IndyMac, to Deutsche Bank. Trial evidence included a 2011 assignment from OneWest Bank to Deutsche Bank, executed approximately two weeks prior to the FDIC conveyance to OneWest Bank, purporting to grant “all interest” OneWest Bank then held in the mortgage to Deutsche Bank. On cross-examination, Deutsche Bank’s only witness confirmed that the assignment from OneWest Bank to Deutsche Bank was prior in time to the assignment from the FDIC to OneWest Bank. Deutsche Bank did not introduce the 2010 mortgage assignment, which it had attached to the complaint and which purported to transfer the mortgage from the FDIC to Deutsche Bank. The court entered a judgment of foreclosure. The Maine Supreme Court vacated, holding that Deutsche Bank failed to prove that it is the assignee of the mortgage. View "Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Wilk " on Justia Law

GM provides its salaried retirees with continuing life insurance benefits under an ERISA-governed plan. MetLife issued the group life insurance policy and periodically sent letters to participants advising them of the status of their benefits. The plaintiffs, participants in the plan, allege that those letters falsely stated that their continuing life insurance benefits would remain in effect for their lives, without cost to them. GM reduced their continuing life insurance benefits as part of its 2009 Chapter 11 reorganization. The plaintiffs sued MetLife under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(2) & (a)(3) and state law. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. MetLife did not tell participants that the benefits were fully paid up or vested upon retirement, but that their benefits would be in effect for their lifetimes, which “was undeniably true under the terms of GM’s then-existing plan.” The court rejected claims of estoppel, of breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, breach of plan terms, and restitution. View "Merrill Haviland v. Metro. Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Malyevac and ADI entered into an agreement under which Malyevac sold ADI's computer products and services to its customers. The agreement contained noncompete, non-solicitation, non-disclosure, and return of confidential information provisions. A few months after entering into the agreement, Malyevac resigned. ADI filed a complaint, alleging that Malyevac was violating the agreement by performing work and services and selling products in direct competition with ADI, by engaging in other prohibited activities, and by failing to return confidential information. Malyevac claimed that the provisions were overbroad and unenforceable. The trial court sustained a demurrer without granting ADI leave to amend its complaint. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the merits of the claim cannot be determined on a motion for dismissal. View "Assurance Data, Inc. v. Malyevac" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are the estranged great grandchildren of Elsie and legatees to one half of her residuary estate under a will dated 2004 and admitted to probate following Elsie's death in 2010. The defendants are Audrey, Elsie's sister and legatee to the remaining half of her residuary estate, and Elsie’s former neighbors, Toni, Bruce, and Mike. Elsie's will nominated Toni as executrix; Toni and Audrey took possession of significant assets from Elsie during Elsie’s life. Toni and Bruce began providing assistance to Elsie and her husband in 2004 under a contract providing that Toni and Bruce would be paid $500 per week and would receive $8000 for assistance given in the past. The agreement provided that Toni and Bruce would be paid from her estate, rather than during her lifetime. The trial court found that that Toni, while acting as an agent under the power of attorney, did not arrange for Elsie’s assets to pass at death to the defendant, that the assets in question were retitled by Elsie personally. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Toni was in a confidential relationship with Elsie and the burden was on the defendants to rebut the presumption that the transactions were the result of undue influence. View "Ayers v. Shaffer" on Justia Law

In 2008 and 2009, Dr. Raley was employed by Minimally Invasive Spine Institute, PLLC (MISI), a medical practice owned and managed by Haider. Raley claimed MISI had failed to pay him all the money he earned and filed suit in 2010, claiming breach of contract and breach of implied contract against MISI. In Count II, Raley sued MISI as well as Haider, alleging that Haider wrongfully distributed money from MISI to himself, depleting MISI of funds in violation of Code § 13.1-1035, which governs distributions made by Virginia LLCs. The trial court agreed that Raley, who was not a member of MISI, could not bring a cause of action under Code § 13.1-1035, and dismissed Raley’s Count II claim. Raley was awarded $395,428.70 plus interest against MISI., but has been unable to collect the judgment. He filed a garnishment proceeding, naming Haider as the garnishee. Raley also filed a second complaint against Haider, Minimally Invasive Pain Institute, PLLC (MIPI) and Wise, LLC (Wise). The cases were consolidated. The trial court dismissed all counts, based upon the dismissal with prejudice of Count II of the original case. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding that res judicata does not bar claims against MIPI and Wise and Raley’s Count I or garnishment claims against Haider, but does bar other claims against Haider. View "Raley v. Haider" on Justia Law