John Hardy leased part of land to Littlebrook Airport Development Co. (LADC). John Hardy died, leaving his wife Jean as the sole surviving owner of the leased property. In 2005, Jean sold the leased property to and assigned her interest in the lease to Littlebrook Ventures (LV), which executed a mortgage in Hardy's favor. Pursuant to the mortgage LV agreed not to modify the lease without Hardy's prior consent. LADC then assigned its interest in the lease to Windmill USA. Windmill and LV purported to amend the lease in accordance with a previously executed declaration amendment. LV later conveyed the property back to Hardy by a deed in lieu of foreclosure. Hardy purchased the property at a foreclosure sale and conveyed it to Sweet Peas, LLC. Littlebrook Airport Condominium Association then brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment clarifying the rights of the parties pursuant to the lease. At issue was the effectiveness of the unrecorded amendment to the lease that violated the recorded mortgage covenant. The superior court concluded that the lease amendment was effective. The matter came before the Supreme Court on report. The Court discharged the report, concluding that acceptance of the report would improperly place the Court in the role of an advisory board. View "Littlebrook Airpark Condo. Ass'n v. Sweet Peas, LLC " on Justia Law

Sweet Valley Missionary Baptist Church filed a complaint against its insurance carrier, Alfa Insurance Corporation. Based on Sweet Valley’s failure to cooperate in discovery, the trial court entered an order of dismissal. Sweet Valley then filed a motion to set aside judgment, or, in the alternative, a motion for new trial. The trial court denied the motion, and, in response, Sweet Valley filed a second complaint against Alfa the same day. The trial court dismissed the second claim based on the expiration of the statute of limitations. Sweet Valley appealed. On rehearing, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. Alfa filed a petition for writ of certiorari, and the Supreme Court granted it. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a motion filed pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) tolls the applicable statute of limitations, and it reversed the decision of the trial court. View "Sweet Valley Missionary Baptist Church v. Alfa Insurance Corporation" on Justia Law

This case involved an uninsured motorist benefits claim filed in connection with injuries allegedly sustained by the appellant in a 2001 motor vehicle accident. Appellant was driving a truck insured by Harleysville Insurance Company when he rear-ended another vehicle. The police report contained no mention of a phantom vehicle being involved in the accident. Appellant later reported the accident to his employer, explaining he momentarily took his eyes off the road, and when he looked again, a vehicle was stopped in front of him; he was unable to stop and rear-ended the vehicle. Twenty days later, appellant completed a written Workers’ Compensation Employee’s Statement in which he reported the accident occurred due to the other vehicle stopping suddenly in front of him. But again, no phantom vehicle was reported. Over eight months later, appellant filed a claim for uninsured motorist benefits, alleging the accident was caused by a phantom vehicle pulling out in front of the other vehicle, causing appellant to stop suddenly. Harleysville denied appellant’s claim and sought a declaratory judgment that he was not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits. The Superior Court reversed the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, which held appellee Harleysville Insurance Company did not suffer prejudice as a result of appellant’s failure to report the phantom vehicle within a 30-day time requirement established by the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL). Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court decision. View "Vanderhoff v. Harleysville Ins. Co." on Justia Law

James Leach, IDA Marketing Corporation, and IDA of Moorhead Corporation appealed a judgment holding them jointly and severally liable to Reed Danuser for claims involving Danuser's termination as president and chief executive officer of the corporations and Leach's breach of a fiduciary duty to Danuser and requiring IDA Moorhead to pay Danuser for loans he made to IDA Moorhead. Upon careful analysis of the inter-company agreements and facts presented at the district court, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding: (1) James Leach was responsible for freezing out Danuser's interests in the corporations, which, as found by the court, involved more than just the wrongful termination of Danuser's employment; (2) Leach was not a party to a stock buy-sell agreement, and under the circumstances of this case as found by the district court involving the freeze out of Danuser's interests in the intertwined corporations, the court's determination of damages was not a misapplication of the law and was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable; (3) both James Leach and IDA Moorhead gained from James Leach's actions, which were attributable to the corporation. The district court decided James Leach had control of the corporations when he breached his fiduciary duties to Danuser. Therefore, the district court did not misapply the law in deciding James Leach and the corporations were jointly and severally liable for Danuser's damages and the court's decision was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. View "Danuser v. IDA Marketing Corp." on Justia Law

Motor Carriers filed suit against defendants under 49 U.S.C. 13706(b) of the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act. At issue was whether, absent a federal tariff, federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over a motor carrier's breach of contract claim against a shipper for unpaid freight charges. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal under the Act, finding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "Gaines Motor Lines, Inc. v. Klaussner Furniture Ind." on Justia Law

Thomas Warner filed a complaint against Robert and Rebecca Hanke for conversion and negligence after Robert Hanke asserted ownership over some personal property Warner was storing on the Hanke's property. At the time the action was filed, Robert and Rebecca Hankes maintained home insurance coverage from a subsidiary of Horace Mann Insurance Company. The Hankes filed a claim with Horace Mann to request a defense against Warner's suit. Horace Mann filed a declaratory judgment action requesting a determination whether the insurance policy required Horace Mann to defend the Hankes. The district court concluded that Horace Mann did not owe coverage to the Hankes for the Warner dispute. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the district court (1) properly determined that the Hankes' insurance policy failed to cover the Warner dispute; (2) correctly determined that Horace Mann's decisions to provide a defense and to pay the settlement of Warner's claims nevertheless allowed Horace Mann to pursue reimbursement for the Hankes' share of the settlement; and (3) abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to Horace Mann. View "Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Hanke" on Justia Law

Defendants, an attorney and a law firm, structured a tax-deferred exchange for Plaintiffs, a husband and wife and the cattle ranch they owned. It was later determined that the exchange did not qualify for deferred tax treatment under 26 U.S.C. 1031, resulting in significant tax liability for Plaintiffs. Defendants filed an action against Defendants for professional negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and misrepresentation. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants on all claims on grounds that Plaintiffs' claims were time barred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiffs' tort claims were timely filed, and the issue of whether Plaintiffs' timely filed their misrepresentation claim was a question of material fact to be resolved by a jury; (2) Plaintiffs properly stated a claim for breach of contract and the claim was not time barred; and (3) the district court erred in granting Defendants a protection order to prevent discovery of alleged work product and attorney-client communications, as further analysis and fact finding were necessary to determine which documents were discoverable and which qualified for work product or attorney-client protection. Remanded. View "Draggin' Y Cattle Co., Inc. v. Addink" on Justia Law

After purchasing a car from Defendant, a car dealership, Plaintiff discovered that the car had extensive problems. Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging that advertising the car as a "Sporty Car at a Great Value Price" violated the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act and that the salesperson's representation to her that the car would "just need a tune-up" was fraudulent. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court correctly found that Defendant's advertisement was classic puffery, which was fatal to Plaintiff's deception claims; but (2) Plaintiff established an issue of material fact as to her fraud claim based on the salesperson's statements. Remanded. View "Kesling v. Hubler Nissan, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Enerlex, Inc. offered to purchase plaintiffs'-appellees' mineral interest. At the time, plaintiffs did not know that their Seminole County mineral interests were included in a pooling order or that proceeds had accrued under the pooling order. Defendant admitted it knew about the pooling order and the accrued proceeds but did not disclose these facts in making the purchase offer. Plaintiffs signed the mineral deeds which defendant provided and subsequently discovered the pooling order, the production, and the accrued proceeds. Plaintiffs sued for rescission and damages, alleging misrepresentation, deceit and fraud. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the summary judgment. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded defendant obtained the mineral deeds from plaintiffs by false representation and suppression of the whole truth. Defendant was therefore liable to plaintiffs for constructive fraud. Rescission was the appropriate remedy for defendant's misrepresentation and constructive fraud. Therefore, the Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the district court's judgment. View "Widner v. Enerlex, Inc." on Justia Law

After Page and SNAP sued Owl for breach of contract, Owl counterclaimed for breach of the same contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Owl on all claims and the counterclaim. Owl elected not to pursue damages on its counterclaim at that time. The court dismissed with a condition that if any aspect of the rulings are reversed or modified, by any appellate court, Owl can reassert the counterclaim following remand. The plaintiffs agreed not to assert any defense based on the passage of time.” The parties appealed. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the conditional dismissal did not create a final order under 28 U.S.C. 1291. An appellate court must be able to determine at the time of appeal whether a final, litigation-ending decision has been entered. View "Page Plus of Atlanta, Inc. v. Owl Wireless, LLC" on Justia Law