Plaintiff sold fine art and antiques at public auctions. Plaintiff permitted absentee bidding in addition to traditional in-person bidding. In 2008, Defendant submitted a signed absentee bidder form and submitted a $400,000 bid on a certain item. Defendant successfully outbid a competing bidder, and the chief clerk recorded the winning bid on Plaintiff's clerking sheet. After Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff for the item, Plaintiff commenced this action for breach of contract, seeking damages, including the bid price and the buyer's premium. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. At issue in this case was whether the clerking sheet and related bidding documents satisfied the Statute of Frauds. Supreme Court granted summary judgment to Plaintiff on liability. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff complied with the statutory requirement of a writing in support of its breach of contract claim, thus establishing an enforceable agreement. View "William J. Jenack Estate Appraisers & Auctioneers, Inc. v. Rabizadeh" on Justia Law

The Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC) approved a contract for the purchase of substitute natural gas and directed the procedure for resolving future related disputes. The court of appeals reversed the IURC's approval of the contract because a definition term in the contract deviated from the required statutory definition. The parties to the contract subsequently amended the contract to delete the language that the court of appeals found improper. The Supreme Court vacated the reversal of the IURC's order, held that the amended contract that corrected the definitional error rendered the definitional issue moot, and summarily affirmed the court of appeals as to all other claims. View "Ind. Gas Co., Inc. v. Ind. Fin. Auth." on Justia Law

When Plaintiff retained a Maine law firm to represent him in a legal action, he signed an attorney-client engagement letter that contained an arbitration provision. Plaintiff later sued the law firm and individual defendants (collectively, Defendants) for malpractice and violations of Maine's Unfair Trade Practices Act. Defendants moved to compel arbitration and dismiss the action. The district court granted the motion under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred in enforcing the arbitration clause. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting the motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the action, as (1) Maine professional responsibility law for attorneys permits arbitration of legal malpractice claims so long as there is no prospective limitation on the law firm's liability; and (2) Maine law, like the FAA, is not hostile to the use of the arbitration forum, and Maine would enforce the arbitration of malpractice claims provision in this case. View "Bezio v. Draeger" on Justia Law

After plaintiff purchased a background check and report from Intelius on the Internet, plaintiff discovered that Adaptive, a separate company from Intelius, had been charging his credit card each month for a Family Safety Report. Plaintiff and others filed suit against Intelius in state court. Intelius then filed a third-party complaint against Adaptive. Adaptive filed a motion to compel arbitration of both Intelius's and plaintiff's claims. The court held that plaintiff did not enter into a contract with Adaptive to purchase the Family Safety Report, and did not enter into a contract with Adaptive to arbitrate. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to compel. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Lee v. Intelius Inc." on Justia Law

Phusion manufactures and distributes an alcoholic beverage called “Four Loko.” Its original formula contained energy stimulants, such as caffeine, guarana, taurine, and wormwood. Phusion purchased a commercial general liability insurance policy and a umbrella policy from members of the Liberty Mutual Group. The policies include identical provisions, excluding coverage for bodily injury or property damage when the insured may be held liable by reason of causing or contributing to intoxication. Plaintiffs sued Phusion in separate state court actions, alleging injuries caused by consumption of Four Loko. Two cases involved traffic accidents, one involved a shooting, another involved paranoid behavior resulting in accidental death, and a fifth claim involved a death from heart trouble. Phusion notified Liberty, which sought a declaratory judgment regarding the scope of coverage. The district court examined the underlying cases in the context of comparable automobile exclusions and ruled that four of the five cases fell within the Liquor Liability Exclusion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Liquor Liability Exclusions in the policies are unambiguous and apply to Phusion. The allegations of simple negligence raised by the plaintiffs in the underlying complaints are not sufficiently independent from the allegations that Phusion caused or contributed to the intoxication of any person. View "Netherlands Ins.. Co. v. Phusion Projects, Inc." on Justia Law

The sellers own an island off St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, and a launch providing access to the island from St. Thomas. In 2004, the buyers signed land contracts and an escrow agreement to purchase the properties for $21 million and $2.5 million, respectively. Premier Title served as the escrow agent and was party to the escrow agreement. Unbeknownst to the buyers, D’Amour, the sellers’ attorney-in-fact, owned Premier. The contract required an initial deposit of $1 million. The buyers paid an additional $500,000 nonrefundable deposit to extend the closing date. The sellers were to deliver “Clear and Marketable” title and assignments of all permits, submerged land leases and other licenses necessary for occupancy of the dock and other improvements. At the scheduled closing, it was determined that dock permits had expired and that there were several exceptions to title. The sellers refused to refund the deposits. The buyers appealed district court orders, rejecting certain claims; the sellers cross-appealed other orders. D’Amour appealed some holdings. The Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that conclude that the buyers are entitled to recover the $1.5 million deposit in restitution, and that the tort claims are barred by the gist of the action doctrine. View "Addie v. Kjaer" on Justia Law

Steve Sangwin, a State employee, was a qualified subscriber and beneficiary of the State of Montana Employee Benefits Plan (Plan), which was administered by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana (BCBS). Steve's daughter, McKinley, was also a beneficiary under the Plan. This case arose after BCBS denied a preauthorization request for a medical procedure for McKinley on the grounds that the procedure was "experimental for research." Steve and his wife (collectively, the Sangwins) initiated this action by filing an amended complaint setting forth five counts, including a request for certification of a class action. The Sangwins defined class members as other beneficiaries of the Plan who had their employee benefits denied by the State based on the experimental exclusion for research in the past eight years. The district court granted the Sangwins' motion for class certification. The State appealed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's order defining the class; but (2) reversed and remanded with respect to the question certified for class treatment, holding that the district court abused its discretion in specifying for class treatment the question of whether the State breached its contract of insurance with the plaintiffs. View "Sangwin v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in this case to the extent that it concluded Parker Towing was not entitled to indemnity for $25,000 it paid landowners in settlement of landowners' claims against it. The landowners sued Parker Towing and Triangle Aggregates, Inc. stemming from their claims of breach of contract pertaining to properties they originally leased to Parker, which were subsequently purchased by Triangle. Parker argued it was not liable for the landowners' claims following its sale of the properties to Triangle. However, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment with respect to its conclusion that Triangle was not required to indemnify Parker Towing for its attorney fees and other litigation expenses incurred to defend against the claims asserted against Parker Towing for breaches of the agreements with the landowners. The fees and expenses incurred by Parker Towing as a result of those breaches were covered by the indemnification agreement between Parker Towing and Triangle. View "Parker Towing Company, Inc. v. Triangle Aggregates, Inc. " on Justia Law

Gambro Renal Products, Inc. hired The Facility Group, Inc. ("TFG"), as the general contractor for the construction of a facility designed to produce kidney dialysis filters in Opelika. TFG contracted with the Hardy Corporation for specialized piping work on the project. Absolute Welding Services, Inc. ("AWS"), is a subsidiary of Rayco Industrial, Inc., a subsubcontractor hired by Hardy. Although the negotiations on the subcontract at issue in these appeals were between AWS and Hardy, the subcontract was executed by Rayco and Hardy. A dispute arose over whether the exclusion of "passivation" and the installation of piping in Rayco's offer was incorporated into its subcontract. Rayco filed a complaint against Hardy, Gambro and 15 fictitiously named parties, seeking an accounting, a declaratory judgment, a reformation of the contract, and perfection of a lien. Rayco asserted claims for damages for breach of contract, unjust enrichment/quantum meruit, and "work and labor done." Both parties unhappy with the eventual trial court order resolving the dispute, appealed the order. After careful consideration of the contracts and the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed in part, and affirmed in part. The case was remanded with instructions for further proceedings. View "Hardy Corporation v. Rayco Industrial, Inc. " on Justia Law

Safeway Insurance Company of Alabama, Inc. petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to grant its Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss a bad-faith claim against it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Richard Kimbrough submitted a claim to Safeway for uninsured-motorist coverage when he was injured in an accident. A deer ran across the road, causing a truck in the southbound lane to swerve into the northbound lane, where Kimbrough was driving. According to Kimbrough, the truck struck his vehicle and ran him off the road and into a creek bed. The driver of the truck allegedly fled and was unknown. Kimbrough contended the driver of a "phantom vehicle" was an uninsured motorist. He sought the full policy limit of $50,000 because his expenses exceeded his coverage. The parties disputed whether Safeway denied the claim. After review of the matter, the Supreme Court disagreed with Safeway's argument that the Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. As such, Safeway did not demonstrate a clear legal right to the writ of mandamus. The Court therefore denied the petition. View "Kimbrough v. Safeway Insurance Company of Alabama, Inc." on Justia Law