Horsfall worked as a real estate agent for First Weber, 2001-2002, and was the listing agent on First Weber’s contract with Call, who was trying to sell property. The contract gave First Weber exclusive rights collect commissions for sale of the property during the listing period and an exclusive right to collect commissions from sales to defined “protected buyers” for one year after the listing expired. The Acostas made an offer on the property and became “protected buyers.” Call’s contract with First Weber ended in August and at the same time, Horsfall left First Weber to establish his own brokerage, Picket Fence. In October, the Acostas contacted Horsfall. Without involving First Weber, Horsfall resuscitated the transaction with Call. The Acostas and Call executed a sales contract for the Call property. Picket Fence received a $6,000 commission, inconsistent with Horsfall’s status as First Weber’s agent under the earlier contract and in violation of Wisconsin real estate practice rules. Six years later, First Weber sued Horsfall in state court, asserting r breach of contract, tortious interference, and unjust enrichment. The state court entered a judgment against Horsfall for $10,978.91. Horsfall filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, listing First Weber as a creditor. First Weber responded that its judgment was non‐dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6), as involving “willful and malicious injury.” The bankruptcy court, district court, and Seventh Circuit found the debt dischargeable. View "First Weber Grp., Inc. v. Horsfall" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Anil Vazirani was an independent insurance agent who owned and managed Vazirani & Associates Financial, LLC and Secured Financial Solutions, LLC. Vazirani contracted with Aviva Life and Annuity Company. After Defendants Mark Heitz and Jordan Canfield, executives at Aviva, cancelled the contract, Vazirani sued them in federal district court, alleging that they tortuously interfered with the contract. The district court awarded summary judgment to Defendants, holding that an officer of a company could be liable for tortious interference with a company contract only if he was motivated by solely personal interests. The court concluded Vazirani failed to produce evidence that defendants were motivated by solely personal interests in terminating the contract. Finding no error with that decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Vazirani v. Heitz" on Justia Law

American West Enterprises appealed a district court's grant of summary judgement to Case New Holland, Inc. (CNH) in its effort to recover the cost of a remanufactured tractor engine CNH sold to a local seller that American West purchased. The district court dismissed American West's claim of implied warranty because there was no privity between American West and CNH. The district court also rejected American West's claims that it was an intended third party beneficiary of a contract between CNH and Pioneer and that Pioneer was an agent of CNH. American West appeals. The district court denied CNH's request for attorney fees and costs below. CNH cross-appealed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed all but the denial of attorney fees. The case was remanded to the district court for finding costs and fees in favor of CNH. View "American West Ent. v. CNH, LLC." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a contract dispute between the State of Vermont and Corizon Health, Inc., formerly known as Prison Health Services, Inc. (PHS). The State appealed a declaratory judgment ruling that PHS was not contractually obligated to defend the State and its employees against certain claims brought by the estate of an inmate who died while in the custody of the Department of Corrections.  Upon review of the contract in question, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that PHS had a duty to defend. View "Vermont v. Prison Health Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the trial court's refusal to vacate a default judgment against it. This dispute arose from a 2009 contract between plaintiff LaFrance Architect, d/b/a Lake Architectural, and defendant Five Point Development South Burlington, LLC. Under the contract, plaintiff was to provide defendant architectural services for the construction of a Walgreens in South Burlington. Plaintiff invoiced defendant for services rendered, but two days after the invoice was payable and three days after the store opened, defendant sent plaintiff a letter indicating that defendant was terminating plaintiff's services due to an unspecified failure to fulfill the contract and unspecified "significant design errors that caused additional costs."  Plaintiff responded by filing notice of a mechanics lien. Defendant then secured a bond to discharge the mechanics lien, but failed to send a copy of the bond to plaintiff. Plaintiff later filed suit to perfect its mechanics lien by filing a verified complaint with a request for attachment and a claim for damages. Because the parties' contract contained mandatory mediation and arbitration provisions, plaintiff also filed a motion for stay, requesting that the court consider its motion for attachment but then stay proceedings pending mediation and arbitration as required by the contract. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the trial court improperly declined to consider the strength of defendant's proffered defenses to its motion to vacate the default judgment, but that defendant's Rule 60(b) motion did not establish a prima facie case to support a meritorious defense. Therefore the Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "LaFrance Architect v. Five Point Development South Burlington, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the minor beneficiary of a $100,000 life insurance policy. Plaintiff filed a complaint against his financial guardian and the insurance company after the guardian misappropriated the insurance proceeds. The trial court entered judgments in favor of Plaintiff. The insurance company appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that, by entrusting the proceeds to the guardian, the insurance company breached its contractual duties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the insurance company acted in good faith when it relied upon the validity of a juvenile court order establishing a financial guardianship in making payment of the life insurance proceeds, and (2) therefore, the insurance company could not be liable for breach of contract. View "Hood v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

A county-owned police patrol vehicle was damaged in a single-car collision while Respondent, a county police officer, operated the vehicle under the influence of alcohol. The County, a self-insured entity, filed a complaint against Respondent seeking to recover the cost of repairs to the vehicle. The district court ruled that the County could recover damages against Respondent based on an exclusion in the self-insurance guarantee purportedly excluding or disclaiming all insurance coverage on the basis that Respondent operated his vehicle under the influence of alcohol. The circuit court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Maryland's compulsory motor vehicle insurance scheme does not permit a self-insurer such as the County to disclaim or exclude insurance coverage in a self-insurance guarantee where an individual causes a collision while driving under the influence of alcohol; and (2) the exclusion in the guarantee in this case was invalid because it violated the state compulsory motor vehicle insurance scheme, was not expressly authorized by the General Assembly, and was against public policy. View "Montgomery Co. v. Distel" on Justia Law

Shellie and Robert Symonds executed a lease agreement granting AT&T Mobility the right to use a portion of their property to build a wireless communication tower. The town planning board approved AT&T's application seeking approval for the project. William Horton and others appealed, and the town zoning board of appeals (ZBA) upheld the planning board's approval of AT&T's application. Horton appealed, arguing that the lease agreement created a new lot that did not meet the minimum space and setback requirements of the town's zoning ordinances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the lease did not create a new lot and that the setback requirements of the relevant zoning ordinance were satisfied. View "Horton v. Town of Casco" on Justia Law

After entering a construction contract with Appellants, Appellee filed a breach of contract and unjust enrichment action against Appellants. Appellants counterclaimed for breach of contract. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's judgment against Appellants with respect to Appellee's claims under the Prime Contract Change Order (PCCO) Nos. 1 and 2; (2) reversed the district court's order dismissing Appellee's claims relating to PCCO Nos. 3 and 4; and (3) affirmed the district court's dismissal of Appellants' counterclaims. Following remand, the district court (1) granted Appellee's motion to dismiss its remaining claims; and (2) dismissed all counterclaims of Appellants, declaring them to be moot. Appellants appealed, contending that the district court erred in dismissing their counterclaims and denying their request for costs and attorney's fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that they district court did not abuse its discretion by (1) dismissing Appellant's counterclaims, as Appellee's dismissal of its claims rendered any contractual defense to the claims moot; and (2) declining to award costs and attorneys fees to Appellants, as Appellants could not be correctly classified as the prevailing party. View "Sterrett Props., LLC v. Big-D Signature Corp." on Justia Law

Respondent brought this action against Appellant, seeking to recover payment for industrial equipment it fabricated for Appellant. Appellant counterclaimed for breach of contract. The district court entered judgment in favor of Respondent. Appellant filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, arguing that the district court erred in granting Respondent's motion for a protective order to preclude the depositions of two out-of-state witnesses from going forward shortly before trial. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion by granting Respondent's motion for a protective order because it applied the wrong legal standard in this case; (2) Respondent did not demonstrate good cause to preclude Appellant's depositions of the out-of-state witnesses; and (3) because Appellant was prejudiced by the district court's error, a new trial was warranted. View "TC/Am. Monorail, Inc. v. Custom Conveyor Corp." on Justia Law