Plaintiffs-appellees Jackie and Marcia Ellison, along with Richard M. Healy, P.C., Jayne Jarnigan Robertson, P.C., and Michael J. Blascheke, P.C., sued defendants-appellants, Michael D. Campbell and M.D. Campbell & Associates, L.P., for breach of contract. Plaintiffs alleged that Campbell failed to render a defensible expert opinion in underlying litigation in Canadian County, and subsequently abandoned the task for which he was hired. Campbell counterclaimed for "uncompensated professional services." A jury returned a verdict in plaintiffs' favor. Based on the jury's verdict, the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiffs for $408,748.68, plus statutory interest. Campbell filed a motion for new trial or, in the alternative, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. After hearing argument, the trial court overruled the motions and Campbell appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, finding that the breach of contract cause of action failed because plaintiffs did not prove their case by presenting an expert witness. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that in this case the expert witness indicted his own performance in the underlying matter: "Supporting testimony made it clear that Campbell did not produce a document which accurately represented the state of the groundwater underlying the Ellisons' property or the source of its pollution. Any lay person could consider the testimony presented and conclude that the Ellisons did not receive the services for which they contracted. The expert witness's testimony was such that any reasonable juror might question his candidness." Under these unique facts, it was unnecessary for plaintiffs to rely upon expert testimony to prevail in their breach of contract claim. View "Ellison v. Campbell" on Justia Law

When Frances O'Neill arranged for her mother, Elise Hopkins, to become a resident of Manahawkin Convalescent Center, she decided to pay Manahawkin's bills from Hopkins' Social Security benefits, rather than arranging for those benefits to be directly paid to the facility. When her mother was admitted to the nursing home, O'Neill signed a "Rehabilitation and Nursing Home Admission Agreement" which designated O'Neill as the "Responsible Party" for purposes of processing her mother's bills, and set forth remedies in case of a default of that obligation. Following Hopkins' death, Manahawkin demanded in writing that O'Neill pay a balance due on her mother's account. It ultimately filed a collection action against her. In a counterclaim, O'Neill asserted various causes of action, including claims based on the Nursing Home Act (NHA), the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) and the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty, and Notice Act (TCCWNA). After the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the collection action, O'Neill reasserted her NHA, CFA and TCCWNA claims and sought class certification, which the trial court denied. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing O'Neill's claims and construing the Admission Agreement to impose no obligation on O'Neill to devote her personal funds to her mother's care. The trial court therefore deemed the Admission Agreement to conform to the NHA, and dismissed O'Neill's remaining claims. The Appellate Division affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Admission Agreement met the requirements of the NHA, and that Manahawkin accordingly committed no unlawful act within the meaning of the CFA. Because Manahawkin's Admission Agreement imposed no requirements on O'Neill that contravened the NHA, and neither the Admission Agreement nor Manahawkin's collection complaint gave rise to a cause of action under the CFA or the TCCWNA, dismissal of O'Neill's claims was proper. "However, nursing homes and their counsel should ensure that each party's rights and remedies are clearly reflected in contracts and communications between facilities and individuals who arrange payment on a resident's behalf." View "Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill" on Justia Law

Petitioners entered into a written agreement with Bastian Homes and Lion Enterprises, Inc. (collectively, “Bastian Homes”) for the construction of a new home. The agreement contained an arbitration clause. After a water leak allegedly substantially damaged major portions of the partially-constructed home, Petitioners sued Bastian Homes. Bastian Homes filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the arbitration clause in the construction contract required the matter to be submitted to arbitration. Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss, contending that the arbitration clause in this case was not bargained for and was therefore invalid. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) because the construction contract was properly formed and supported by sufficient consideration, there was no requirement that the arbitration clause be independently “bargained for”; and (2) because the circuit court decided the arbitration clause not unconscionable without the issue being fairly argued by the parties and without any factual development, this issue needed to be remanded for further development of the record. View "Kirby v. Lion Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

On July 28, 2012, Michael Becker was injured when a Ford truck driven by his son, Phillip Becker, struck a light pole. Michael and his wife filed suit against Ford Motor Company. On August 26, 2013, Ford filed an answer claiming that the accident was caused by a person other than Ford. On October 1, 2013, the Beckers filed a motion to join Phillip as a party to whom fault could be apportioned and a motion to file an amended complaint. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether, after a defendant asserts a comparative fault claim against a non-party tortfeasor who was known to the plaintiff when the original suit was filed, Tenn. Code Ann. 20-1-119 permits the plaintiff to amend its complaint to assert a claim directly against the tortfeasor named by the defendant. The Court held (1) application of section 20-1-119 is not restricted to tortfeasors who were unknown to the plaintiff when its original complaint was filed; and (2) therefore, the statute permits a plaintiff to file an amended complaint against the tortfeasor named by the defendant within ninety days after the filing of the answer in which the defendant first asserts a comparative fault claim against the tortfeasor. View "Becker v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Russell Reichert sued Sherry Hara in small claims court, claiming that Hara owed him for a $4,000 loan he gave her. The court found the transaction was a loan and entered judgment for Reichert. Hara subsequently filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the district court, alleging that the $4,000 was a gift and not a loan. The district court dismissed Hara’s complaint, concluding that the action was barred by both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) claim preclusion, but not issue preclusion, applies to small claims court judgments; and (2) the elements of claim preclusion were satisfied in this case, and therefore, the district court correctly dismissed Hara’s action. View "Hara v. Reichert" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were Massachusetts-based producers of “reggaeton” music. This case centered on seven songs released on an album distributed by Defendants that allegedly infringed upon copyrights held by Plaintiffs and breached contracts to which Plaintiffs claimed to be parties and/or third-party beneficiaries. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding (1) with respect to the copyright claims, Plaintiffs failed to register their copyrights in the underlying compositions they claimed were infringed, as required under 17 U.S.C. 411(A); and (2) with respect to the breach of contract claims, there was no evidence of a direct agreement between the parties or of third-party beneficiary status. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Defendants on the copyright and contract claims. View "Alicea v. Ayala" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a retention pond constructed in a subdivision for the purpose of catching water runoff. Patrick and Melinda Sterner, who owned property in the subdivision, contracted with WHR Group (WHR) to handle the sale of their home. Petitioners subsequently entered into a contract to purchase the property. Petitioners later filed an action against WHR, the Sterners, and Sahley Realty Company, the subdivision developer (collectively, Respondents), asserting claims for fraud, constructive fraud, negligence, and breach of implied contract, alleging that a “slip” occurred on the retention bond prior to their purchase of the lot, which allowed the pond to cross the common boundary line onto their property. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this action, the circuit court acted properly in granting Respondents’ motions for summary judgment. View "Dickens v. Sahley Realty Co." on Justia Law

Defendants executed a promissory note in favor of FirstMerit Bank secured by a mortgage on several parcels of real estate. After Defendants defaulted on the promissory note, FirstBank initiated foreclosure proceedings. The common pleas court entered a decree in foreclosure, and the properties were sold at auction. Because the sale of the properties resulted in a deficiency, FirstMerit obtained a cognovit judgment against Defendants. Defendants moved for relief from judgment pursuant to Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B), asserting as a defense that they had reached an oral settlement agreement with FirstMerit under which FirstMerit had agreed to cease legal proceedings and release Defendants from their obligations. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the statute of frauds barred their defense. The appellate court reversed, determining that Ohio Rev. Code 1335.05 did not prohibit Defendants from raising as a defense that the parties orally agreed to modify the terms of their agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the oral agreement in this case fell within the statute of frauds, and therefore, Defendants were precluded from raising the agreement as a defense in a motion for relief from judgment. View "FirstMerit Bank, N.A. v. Inks" on Justia Law

Edwina Jones rented a residence that she vacated in 2010. Because Jones did not replace heating oil in the residence’s oil tank at the end of her tenancy under the terms of the lease, Cost Management, Inc., the landlord, told Jones that it would return to Jones the $1,500 deposit minus $448, the cost of filling the oil tank. Jones filed a complaint against Cost Management asserting that she was entitled to $1,500, plus statutory double damages, attorney fees, interest and costs. Cost Management counterclaimed for the $448 it paid to fill the tank. The district court found in Jones’s favor on her complaint, found in favor of Cost Management on its counterclaim, and denied Jones’s claims for costs, double damages, and attorney fees under the wrongful-retention statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly found that Jones was entitled to receive $1,052 from Cost Management; and (2) because Cost Management overcame the presumption that it wrongfully withheld Jones’s security deposit, the district court did not err by not awarding court costs, double damages, and attorney fees. View "Jones v. Cost Mgmt., Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute over Core's interconnection agreement with Verizon. On appeal, Core challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to Verizon with respect to tort claims pursued by Core under Maryland law. Core also contended that the district court erred when it awarded nominal damages to Core on its related claim for breach of contract (Reconsideration Order). The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Verizon to raise the Exculpatory Clause, post-remand, in the summary judgment proceedings; the district court did not err in enforcing the Exculpatory Clause in the consolidated proceedings where the Clause was not void under principles of Maryland contract law; the district court did not err in awarding Verizon summary judgment on Core's state law tort claims for concealment and unfair competition where Core failed to establish that Verizon acted with intent to defraud or deceive; and the district court properly entered judgment on Core's breach of contract claim in the nominal sum of one dollar. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Core Communications, Inc. v. Verizon Maryland, Inc." on Justia Law