Allen Kraft and Jim Kost operated a custom combining partnership. They ceased doing business as a partnership in early 2003, but continued to share equipment and work in 2003 and 2004. In 2008, Kost sued Kraft to formally dissolve the partnership. Kraft counterclaimed for breach of contract, alleging that after the partnership was terminated in 2003, Kost had orally agreed to lease some of Kraft's combining equipment in 2003 and 2004. Kraft alleged Kost owed $150,000 under the oral lease. Kraft also claimed that the parties had entered into an oral agreement for Kraft to do certain work for Kost in 2005, and that Kost owed him $10,000 for the work. Kraft appealed the a district court judgment dissolving the partnership and dismissing his counterclaim seeking damages for breach of an oral agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the equitable theories of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit and did not abuse its discretion in granting a motion in limine precluding evidence or argument of unjust enrichment or quantum meruit. View "Kost v. Kraft" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, authors of romance novels, filed a putative class action against Harlequin Enterprises and its subsidiaries contending that the Harlequin entities breached agreements with them and others by paying them artificially low royalties on the sale of digitized versions of their books. The district court dismissed under Ruled 12(b)(6). Based on the court's review of the Publishing Agreements, the court concluded that plaintiffs' first through third claims were not viable because the Publishing Agreements unambiguously provided that Harlequin subsidiaries HEBV or HBSA was the "Publisher" and Harlequin Enterprises was a "Related Licensee" for purposes of computing royalty payments. The court held that the fourth claim alleged sufficient facts to plead a breach of the Publishing Agreements on the theory that defendants calculated their e-book royalties based on an unreasonable license fee. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Keiler, et al. v. Harlequin Enterprises LTD et al. " on Justia Law

In 2003, Plaintiffs loaned Utility Systems, Inc. (“USI”), which provided wastewater disposal services to the Woods on Herring Creek community, almost $250,000 to meet the costs of managing and improving the wastewater treatment system (“System”). Plaintiffs were not repaid by USI. In 2013, Plaintiffs filed this action seeking to recover the loaned funds under the doctrines of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs named as defendants Woods on Herring Creek Homeowners Association, which took over the System in 2004, and Sussex County, to whom the Association transferred the system in 2008. The Court of Chancery granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that Plaintiffs’ action was barred by laches. View "Carbaugh v. Woods on Herring Creek Homeowners Ass'n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff purchased property with a mortgage from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. In October 2006, Plaintiff took out a loan from Countrywide to cure his breach of a divorce agreement. In December 2006, Plaintiff took out a home equity loan from Countrywide. Because Plaintiff was not able to make payments on his October 2006 loan, Countrywide foreclosed on his property. In May 2009, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging claims of unjust enrichment, rescission/equitable relief, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violations of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and negligence. Countrywide removed the case to federal court. The district court resolved certain claims as a matter of law and, after a bench trial on the remaining claims, entered judgment in favor of Countrywide. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that no grounds exited for reversing any of the district court’s decisions. View "Frappier v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute between property owners in a subdivision developed by Christopher and Jeffrey Houden. In 2007, twenty-three lot owners (“Defendants”) voted to record an amendment (“second amendment”) to the original covenants for the subdivision that prohibited division of the Houdens’ lot. The Houdens filed a complaint against Defendants seeking injunctive relief to declare the second amendment invalid. During the ensuing litigation, the lot owners passed another amendment (“third amendment”) purporting to revoke the second amendment. In 2010, the Houdens and all Defendants except Wayne Todd entered into a settlement agreement which set forth restated covenants expressly prohibiting amendment to prevent subdivision of the Houdens’ lot. The district court subsequently entered partial summary judgment in favor of the Houdens and against Todd, declaring the second and third amendments null and void and ordering that the Houdens were entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to a provision in the original covenants. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment in the Houdens’ favor, as the restated covenants mooted the underlying merits of the case; and (2) affirmed the district court’s determination that the Houdens’ were entitled to attorney’s fees. View "Houden v. Todd" on Justia Law

Technica, a subcontractor on a federal construction project in California, filed suit under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. 3131-3134, against Candelaria, the prime contractor, and its surety CCIC. On appeal, Technica challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Supreme Court and the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have held that rights and remedies under the Miller Act may not be conditioned by state laws. The court applied their reasoning and held that the limitation in California Business and Professions Code 7031(a) on the right of a non-licensed contractor to maintain an action for collection of unpaid services did not apply to an action under the Miller Act. Because the California licensing requirement is not a defense to a claim under the Miller Act, the court need not address whether Technica falls within the labor provider exception to the statute. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded. View "Technica LLC v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Consumers Energy entered into a Purchase Order, under which DynaSteel, operating in Tennessee and Mississippi, would fabricate ductwork for shipment to an Essexville, Michigan power plant for installation by a third party. The PO contained a Michigan choice-of-law provision. Consumers was to pay $10,634,755. PCI, with locations in Kansas and Tennessee, was to supply the insulation requested by Consumers for $1,842,890. The contract between DynaSteel and PCI contained a Tennessee choice-of-law provision. As the project progressed, Consumers paid DynaSteel $2.9 million, but DynaSteel did not pay PCI $1,542,890 it owed. DynaSteel also owed PCI more than $3.2 million for other projects. DynaSteel allegedly comingled Consumer’s payments with funds from other projects. Under a “Payment Plan Proposal,” DynaSteel was to make payments, which would apply to the unpaid orders in chronological order (the Consumers project came last in this order). The PPP did not contain a choice-of-law provision. DynaSteel paid PCI $2.1 million, which satisfied its obligations concerning the other projects, but did not fulfill its obligation as to the Consumers project. PCI sued in Michigan, alleging that DynaSteel violated the Michigan Builders Trust Fund Act. The district court entered summary judgment for Dynasteel, reasoning that the PO between PCI and DynaSteel was controlling, that the Tennessee choice-of-law provision was binding, and that the Trust Fund Act did not apply extraterritorially by its own force. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Performance Contracting Inc. v. Dynasteel Corp." on Justia Law

Following the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, each of the Oil Companies entered into contracts with the government to provide high-octane aviation gas (avgas) to fuel military aircraft. The production of avgas resulted in waste products such as spent alkylation acid and “acid sludge.” The Oil Companies contracted to have McColl, a former Shell engineer, dump the waste at property in Fullerton, California. More than 50 years later, California and the federal government obtained compensation from the Oil Companies under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601, for the cost of cleaning up the McColl site. The Oil Companies sued, arguing the avgas contracts require the government to indemnify them for the CERCLA costs. The Court of Federal Claims granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The Federal Circuit reversed with respect to breach of contract liability and remanded. As a concession to the Oil Companies, the avgas contracts required the government to reimburse the Oil Companies for their “charges.” The court particularly noted the immense regulatory power the government had over natural resources during the war and the low profit margin on the avgas contracts. View "Shell Oil Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Most of the employees at a La Porte unit (“Unit”) of E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company (“DuPont”) were covered by a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). When DuPont announced plans to spin off part of its operations, including the Unit, into a wholly owned subsidiary, DuPont Textiles and Interiors (“DTI”), almost all of the Unit employees moved to DTI, even though the CBA gave the employees the right to transfer to other DuPont jobs. DuPont subsequently sold DTI to Koch Industries, which reduced the former DuPont employees’ compensation and retirement benefits. Several of the former DuPont employees sued DuPont for fraudulently inducing them to terminate their employment and accept employment with DTI by misrepresenting that DTI would not be sold. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions of law to the Texas Supreme Court, which answered by holding (1) at-will employees cannot bring an action against their corporate employer for fraud that is dependent on continued employment; and (2) employees covered under a cancellation-upon-notice CBA that limits the employer’s ability to discharge its employees only for just cause cannot bring Texas fraud claims against their employer based on allegations that the employer fraudulently induced them to terminate their employment. View "Sawyer v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co." on Justia Law

Respondents filed claims against Petitioners relating to certain oil and gas ventures. At issue in this case was Respondents’ assignment claim, which an involved an agreement between Respondents and Petitioners for Respondents to pay a portion of drilling and operating costs in exchange for an assignment of a partial working interest in producing wells. After a bench trial, the trial court largely ruled for Respondents and awarded them $35,000 in attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court modified Respondents’ recovery on appeal and remanded for the trial court to redetermine the attorney’s fee award. On remand, the trial court awarded Respondents $30,000 in attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that no legally sufficient evidence supported the amount of the attorney’s fee award because Respondents offered no evidence of the time expended on particular tasks as required via the lodestar method. Remanded. View "Long v. Griffin" on Justia Law