Defendant Richard Howell appealed a judgment in favor of plaintiff Kneebinding, Inc. on his counterclaims alleging breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, defamation, trademark violation, and misappropriation of trade secrets in this commercial contract and employment dispute. Howell contended on appeal that the trial court erred in concluding that: (1) a contractual release barred the counterclaims arising prior to the date of the release; and (2) the release was supported by sufficient consideration. In 2006, Howell formed Kneebinding, Inc. to develop a ski binding based on a new release mechanism that he had invented. John Springer-Miller provided major financing and received a controlling interest in the corporation. Pursuant to a series of agreements, Springer-Miller became the chairman of the board of directors and Howell was employed as president and chief executive officer. An employment agreement executed by the parties in November 2007 provided that Howell would be an at-will employee with an annual base and, in the event his employment was terminated "other than for Cause," Howell would receive severance payable in equal installments over a period of one year. Less than a year later, the company’s board of directors voted to terminate Howell’s employment without cause. Negotiations between the company and Howell over the terms of his departure resulted in a letter from Springer-Miller on behalf of the company to Howell confirming the terms of the severance arrangement. Pertinent to the appeal was an exhaustive list of claims which Howell agreed to release, "including, but not limited to," employment discrimination under federal and state law and tort and contract claims of every sort, subject to several exceptions, including Howell’s rights under the parties’ Voting Agreement and Investors’ Rights Agreement. In 2009, Kneebinding filed a lawsuit against Howell alleging that he had violated certain non-disparagement and non-compete provisions of their agreements, committed trademark violations and defamation, tortiously interfered with contracts between Kneebinding and its customers and distributors, and misappropriated trade secrets. Howell answered and counterclaimed, alleging counts for breach of contract, defamation, invasion of privacy, misappropriation, unfair competition, tortious interference with business relations, patent violations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Kneebinding moved for summary judgment on Howell’s counterclaims, asserting that they were barred by the release set forth in the letter agreement. The trial court granted the motion with respect to all of the counterclaims that arose prior to the execution of the release on and denied the motion as to those claims that arose after the release. Howell asserted that, in granting summary judgment on the counterclaims, the trial court erred in finding a valid release because he never signed the separate release of claims set forth in Attachment B to the letter agreement. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Kneebinding, Inc. v. Howell" on Justia Law

James Forbes settled a personal-injury action while he was represented by Louis St. Martin. Forbes later sued St. Martin, challenging the validity of his contingency-fee arrangement and the associated attorneys’ fees. The Chancery Court granted summary judgment to St. Martin; the Court of Appeals reversed the chancery court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment, finding that summary judgment in favor of St. Martin was proper. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Louis St. Martin, Deceased: Forbes v. Hixson" on Justia Law

ACL sought a declaratory judgment that certain vessels chartering agreements with DRD were void ab initio. The district court dismissed based on the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action where ACL's position in the declaratory judgment action clearly contradicted its earlier position in a related proceeding that the charters were valid, which had been accepted by the district court. View "American Commercial Lines, L.L.C. v. D.R.D. Towing Co., L.L.C." on Justia Law

Acorn Investment Co. sued the Michigan Basic Property Insurance Association seeking to recover losses suffered in a fire on Acorn’s property. Michigan Basic had denied coverage on the basis that the policy had been canceled before the fire occurred. The case proceeded to case evaluation, which resulted in an award of $11,000 in Acorn’s favor. Acorn accepted the award, but Michigan Basic rejected it. The circuit court granted summary judgment in Acorn’s favor, ruling that the notice of cancellation was insufficient to effectively cancel the policy. The parties then agreed to submit the matter to an appraisal panel as permitted in the insurance policy and by statute. The appraisal panel determined that Acorn’s claim was worth $20,877. Acorn moved for entry of a judgment and also sought interest, case evaluation sanctions, and expenses for the removal of debris. The court entered a judgment in Acorn’s favor for $20,877 plus interest but declined to award case evaluation sanctions or debris-removal expenses. Michigan Basic paid the judgment, and Acorn appealed the denial of the sanctions and expenses. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court held that the circuit court could award actual costs to Acorn. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court with respect to the award of debris-removal expenses: the issue was remanded to the circuit court to determine whether the appraisal panel awarded expenses as part of its award, left them for the circuit court to determine, or whether Acorn waived its right to claim them. View "Acorn Investment Co. v. Michigan Basic Property Insurance Assn." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-corporation brought a breach of contract action against Defendant-corporation. Defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. A jury found that Plaintiff had breached the contract but awarded Defendant no damages. Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in giving a breach of contract instruction or a challenged verdict form to the jury; and (2) the district court correctly exercised its discretion when its excluded Plaintiff’s expert testimony and reports and evidence involving a separate transaction between the parties. View "Black Diamond Energy, Inc. v. Encana Oil and Gas (USA) Inc." on Justia Law

Upon the dissolution of their marriage, Husband and Wife entered into a dissolution settlement agreement that provided that Wife was entitled to half of Husband’s federal retirement benefits entered during the parties’ marriage. Wife later sought an order to show cause alleging that Husband violated the agreement by not naming her as the beneficiary of his Survivorship Benefit Plan. The district court granted Wife’s motion, concluding that the agreement awarded Wife a portion of Husband’s Survivorship Annuity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plain language of the agreement reflected the parties’ intent that Husband was to retain ownership of the Survivorship Annuity after the dissolution. View "In re Marriage of Bushnell" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Georgia Supreme Court centered on a dispute over the legal ownership of mineral rights to land located in Bartow County. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined that appellee James Dellinger, Jr. held a legally enforceable interest in the mineral rights and granted summary judgment in his favor on claims filed by appellant Cartersville Ranch, LLC. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision in the main appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. View "Cartersville Ranch, LLC v. Dellinger" on Justia Law

Pyramid Tech filed suit against its insurer, alleging express breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith. Without holding a Daubert hearing, the district court excluded Pyramid Tech's expert witnesses and granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding insufficient evidence that a flood caused damage to Pyramid Tech's property. The court held that, after an expert establishes admissibility to the judge's satisfaction, challenges that go to the weight of the evidence are within the province of a fact finder, not a trial court judge. A district court should not make credibility determinations that are reserved for the jury. In this instance, the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert evidence of David Spiegel and Ken Pytlewski, but did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert evidence of Del Mortenson. The district court erred in granting summary judgment against Pyramid Tech's claims where genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the insurer breached its contract with Pyramid Tech and breached the implied covenant of good faith. However, to the extent such claims were premised on Pyramid Tech's business interruption theory, no material issues of fact existed and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment against that theory of liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for retrial. View "Pyramid Tech. v. Allied Public Adjusters" on Justia Law

The contracts at issue in this case related to Z3 Technology's design and manufacturing of circuit board modules for use in Digital Ally, Inc.'s products. The first contract, called for Z3 to design, manufacture, and deliver to Digital 1,000 modules incorporating Texas Instruments' DM355 computer chip. The second contract involved a larger quantity of modules that would use Texas Instruments' next-generation DM365 chip. Both contracts were signed by Robert Haler, who was then Digital's Executive Vice President of Engineering and Production. The contracts were described as "Production License Agreement[s]," and they expressly provided that the modules would be licensed, not sold, to Digital. The contracts both stated they would "be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Nebraska, without reference to conflict of laws principles." Upon review of the contracts at issue in this case, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for the district court to award prejudgment interest to Z3 on a damages award and unpaid design fees. All other portions of the district court's judgment were affirmed. View "Digital Ally, et al v. Z3 Technology, et al" on Justia Law

The Gobellans retained Law Firm to defend them and bring suit. Associate was assigned to the case. Associate later left Law Firm and took several clients, including Gobellans, with him. Law Firm sued Associate over client contingency fees, and later settled. Law Firm also sued Gobellans, and moved to compel the dispute to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the contingency fee agreement between Law Firm and Gobellans. The trial court and court of appeals denied Law Firm’s motion to compel arbitration, concluding that because Law Firm had litigated the fee issue with Associate, it waived its right to arbitrate claims stemming from its fee agreement with Gobellans. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Law Firm’s litigation conduct involved suing Associate, with whom it had no arbitration agreement, and filing limited pleadings against Gobellans, the conduct did not substantially invoke the litigation process against Gobellans or prejudice them; and (2) thus, Law Firm did not waive its right to arbitrate its dispute with Gobellans. View "Hodges, LLP v. Gobellan" on Justia Law