Expedia (and several other hotel booking websites, collectively, "Petitioners") has been subject to approximately 80 underlying lawsuits by states, counties, and municipalities (collectively, taxing authorities) for purportedly failing to collect the right amount of local occupancy taxes from its hotel customers. Expedia tendered most of the suits to its insurer, Zurich, although some were tendered late. Zurich refused to defend Expedia on a number of grounds, including late tender and that the underlying suits may be excluded from the policies' coverage. The trial court declined to make a determination of Zurich's duty to defend Expedia, instead ordering discovery that Expedia claimed was prejudicial to the underlying actions. Petitioners sought adjudication of their summary judgment motion concerning their respective insurers' duty to defend them in cases brought by local taxing authorities. They further requested a stay of discovery in the coverage action that could prejudice them in the underlying litigation. Upon review of the matter, the Washington Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by delaying adjudication of Zurich's duty to defend Expedia. Accordingly, the Court vacated the trial court's order. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine Zurich's duty to defend Expedia in each of the 54 underlying cases subject to Expedia's motion. The trial court was furthermore ordered to stay discovery in the coverage action until it could make a factual determination as to which parts of discovery are potentially prejudicial to Expedia in the underlying actions. View "Expedia, Inc. v. Steadfast Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A lessee leased a marina from a governmental entity providing that the premises be used only as a "marina, restaurant, gasoline and sundry sales and as a recreational facility.” When the governmental entity terminated the lease the business sued for breach of contract. The government entity filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity. At issue in this case was whether Chapter 271 of the Texas Local Government Code waived the governmental entity’s immunity from suit. The trial court concluded that it did, and the court of appeals agreed. The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts and dismissed the lessee’s claims for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the parties’ lease agreement did not constitute a written contract stating the essential terms of an agreement for providing goods or services to a local government entity, and therefore, Chapter 271 did not waive the governmental entity’s immunity from suit. View "Lubbock County Water Control & Improvement Dist. v. Church & Akin, LLC" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted this writ application to determine whether a plaintiff had a private right of action for damages against a health care provider under the Health Care and Consumer Billing and Disclosure Protection Act. Plaintiff Yana Anderson alleged that she was injured in an automobile accident caused by a third party. She received medical treatment at an Ochsner facility. Anderson was insured by UnitedHealthcare. Pursuant to her insurance contract, Anderson paid premiums to UnitedHealthcare in exchange for discounted health care rates. These reduced rates were available pursuant to a member provider agreement, wherein UnitedHealthcare contracted with Ochsner to secure discounted charges for its insureds. Anderson presented proof of insurance to Ochsner in order for her claims to be submitted to UnitedHealthcare for payment on the agreed upon reduced rate. However, Ochsner refused to file a claim with her insurer. Instead, Ochsner sent a letter to Anderson’s attorney, asserting a medical lien for the full amount of undiscounted charges on any tort recovery Anderson received for the underlying automobile accident. Anderson filed a putative class action against Ochsner, seeking, among other things, damages arising from Ochsner’s billing practices. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found the legislature intended to allow a private right of action under the statute. Additionally, the Court found an express right of action was available under La. R.S. 22:1874(B) based on the assertion of a medical lien. View "Anderson v. Ochsner Health System" on Justia Law

A mining company contracted with a consultant to help the company obtain new capital investments. The company later brought suit against the consultant, seeking a declaratory judgment that the contract violated Alaska securities law. The company also sought equitable rescission of the contract and cancellation of shares of stock and royalty interests granted under the contract. The superior court granted summary judgment to the consultant on two grounds: (1) the company’s suit was barred as a matter of law by AS 45.55.930(g); and (2) the company’s suit was barred as a matter of law by res judicata in light of a prior suit instituted by the consultant against the company in which the company did not raise its present claims defensively. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment on both grounds, finding questions of fact still existed. View "Girdwood Mining Company v. Comsult LLC" on Justia Law

Shelter Mutual Property Insurance Company retained Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. to provide an engineering evaluation and expert witness services in connection with its defense of litigation resulting from a claim for hurricane damages brought by a corporation insured by Shelter. Rimkus sent Shelter a letter confirming the engagement and indicating Rimkus' services were subject to “Terms and Conditions” attached to the letter. The “Terms and Conditions” included a forum selection clause which required venue for any suits arising out of the contract to be in Harris County, Texas. When a dispute arose, Shelter filed suit against Rimkus in the 15th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Lafayette. Rimkus filed an exception of improper venue, arguing the forum selection clause included in its “Terms and Conditions” required suit to be brought in Texas. Shelter opposed the exception, arguing it never agreed to the unilateral “Terms and Conditions” and thus they were not part of the agreement between the parties.The Louisiana Supreme Court granted this writ application to resolve a split in the circuit courts of appeal regarding whether forum selection clauses were per se violative of public policy in Louisiana. Answering that question in the negative, it reversed the rulings of the lower courts. View "Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. v. Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc." on Justia Law

An insurance company appealed a decision on the issue of coverage under a claims-made-and-reported policy. The appellate court found that, under the Direct Action Statute, an insurer could not use the policy’s claim-reporting requirement to deprive an injured third party of a right that vests at the time of injury. After considering the applicable law, the Supreme Court found that the reporting provision in a claims-made-and-reported policy was a permissible limitation on the insurer’s liability as to third parties and did not violate the Direct Action Statute. Accordingly, the Court reversed that portion of the court of appeal’s decision relating to the claim of the injured third party, and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, finding no coverage. View "Gorman v. City of Opelousas" on Justia Law

Lyon filed a breach of contract action against Illinois Paper in federal district court, alleging that Illinois Paper had breached a contractual representation and warranty that all lease transactions presented to Lyon for review would be "valid and fully enforceable agreements." The Seventh Circuit certified questions to the court under Minn. Stat. 480.065. The court reformulated the questions and held that a claim for breach of a contractual representation of future legal compliance is actionable under Minnesota law without proof of reliance. View "Lyon Financial Services, Inc. v. Illinois Paper and Copier Co." on Justia Law

Defendants appealed the grant of partial summary judgment in favor of seven investors. The court concluded that it had jurisdiction to review all of the orders listed in defendants' notice of appeal; the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking a certified public accountant's affidavit where he lacked personal knowledge of the conclusions he was asserting; and the district court did not err in granting plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment where there had been a failure of consideration as a matter of law. In regards to the district court's holding that all defendants were liable for the return of $3.5 million, the district court did not err in finding SaiNath liable based on a failure of consideration; the district court did not err in holding K.A.P liable under a theory of unjust enrichment; but, because the district court did not have the benefit of Ogea v. Merritt when it analyzed "piercing of the veil," the court remanded for the district court to consider the application of the Louisiana court's analysis as to the facts of this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed partial summary judgment as to SaiNath and K.A.P. The court vacated and remanded as to the Karsans in their individual capacities. View "Meadaa, et al. v. K.A.P. Enterprises, L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant agreed to furnish labor, materials, equipment, and services for a pipe-replacement project at Brown University. Defendant entered into a sub-contract with Plaintiff in which Plaintiff agreed to install the pipe. After Plaintiff completed its portion of the project, Plaintiff filed breach of contract and quantum meruit claims against Defendant, alleging that Defendant failed to pay for some of the work that Plaintiff performed on the project. The superior court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff on its quantum meruit claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not misapply the law, misconceive or overlook material evidence, or make factual findings that were clearly wrong in reaching its decision. View "Process Eng'rs & Constructors, Inc. v. DiGregorio, Inc." on Justia Law

Lawrence LaBonte, the owner of New England Development RI, LLC (N.E. Development), filed a petition seeking the reorganization and/or the dissolution of N.E. Development. American Steel Coatings, LLC (American Steel) filed a motion to approve secured claim attempting to recover the funds it alleged were owed pursuant to a loan agreement between the parties. The LLC’s permanent receiver and LaBonte objected to American’s motion, asserting that the loan agreement was void because the amount of interest to be charged violated the state’s usury laws. The superior court sustained the objections and voided as usurious the loan agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the loan agreement in this case was usurious and, therefore, void. View "LaBonte v. New England Dev. R.I., LLC" on Justia Law