Plaintiff-appellant Nancy Lee hired Attorney William Hanley to represent her in a civil suit. After the litigation settled, Lee sought a refund of unearned attorney fees and unused expert witness fees she had advanced to Hanley. Not having received a refund, Lee hired Attorney Walter Wilson and terminated Hanley. Attorney Hanley thereafter refunded certain expert witness fees, but no attorney fees. More than a year after hiring Wilson, Lee filed a lawsuit against Hanley seeking the return of the unearned fees. Hanley filed a demurrer to Lee’s second amended complaint, based on the one-year statute of limitations contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6. The court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action with prejudice. Lee appealed. Upon review, the Court of Appeal held that to the extent a claim is construed as a wrongful act not arising in the performance of legal services, "such as garden variety theft or conversion, section 340.6 is inapplicable. . . . Here, the facts alleged in Lee’s second amended complaint could be construed as giving rise to a cause of action for the theft or conversion of an identifiable sum of money belonging to her. This being the case, we cannot say that Lee’s second amended complaint demonstrates clearly and affirmatively on its face that her action is necessarily barred by the section 340.6 statute of limitations." Because this action had not reached a point where the court could determine whether the wrongful act in question arose in the performance of legal services, and thus, whether or not section 340.6 applied, the demurrer should not have been sustained. View "Lee v. Hanley" on Justia Law

Lisa Knitter worked as a "handyman" for Lewis General Contracting, Inc. (LGC) from March to October 2010. During this time, LGC's sole client was Picerne Military Housing, LLC (Picerne), now known as Corvias Military Living, LLC. Knitter performed handyman services exclusively on Picerne properties. She sued Picerne under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging: (1) she was paid lower wages than her male counterparts; (2) Picerne effectively fired her in retaliation for her complaints of sexual harassment and wage discrimination; and (3) after she was fired, Picerne denied her application for vendor status in retaliation for her prior complaints of discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to Picerne, dismissing Knitter's Title VII action because Picerne was not her employer. The district court also dismissed her claim for retaliatory denial of vendor status because Knitter did not apply for employment with Picerne when she applied to be a vendor. Knitter appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Finding no reversible error, however, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Knitter v. Picerne Military Housing" on Justia Law

Veridyne’s first contract to provide logistics services to the Maritime Administration (MARAD), was awarded pursuant to the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) 8(a) program for small, disadvantage businesses, 15 U.S.C. 637(a). To obtain extension of the contract without it being submitted to bidding, Veridyne estimated that the new contract would not exceed “$3,000,000 in the aggregate.” Veridyne and MARAD officials knew that the services to be provided under the extension would cost far more than $3,000,000. MARAD proposed that SBA approve the new contract without opening it to competition. MARAD, Veridyne, and the SBA executed the new contract. From 2001 to 2004, MARAD issued additional work orders to Veridyne and paid Veridyne $31,134,931.12. In part due to MARAD’s cost overruns, the Office of Inspector General investigated and concluded that Veridyne had obtained the extension through fraud. After a stop order issued, Veridyne continued to work for MARAD and submitted additional invoices. Veridyne sued to recover $2,267,163. The government entered a defense under the Fraudulent Claims statute, 28 U.S.C. 2514, and counterclaimed for penalties under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729, and the Contracts Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 7103. The Claims Court held that Veridyne’s contract claim was forfeited under the Fraudulent Claims Act, but awarded Veridyne partial recovery under a quantum meruit theory, while awarding penalties to the government under the False Claims Act and the Contract Disputes Act. The Federal Circuit reversed the quantum meruit award, but affirmed the award of penalties.View "Veridyne Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

This case involved efforts to create an Armenian Genocide Museum. Gerard Cafesjian, one of the project's principal founders and benefactors, and CFF first filed suit against the Assembly, alleging that the Assembly failed to reissue a $500,000 promissory note as required by a Grant Agreement, asserting claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court concluded that the district court did not err in its disposition of appellants' claims for breach of fiduciary duty against Cafesjian and John Waters; the district court correctly determined that CFF was entitled to take the Grant Property in full because the Grants were fully funded at the time CFF exercised its reversionary rights; the court found no basis to disturb Cafesjian and Water's indemnification award; the court affirmed the district court's denial of appellants' post-trial motions for relief; and rejected the notion that the Assembly's lease in the Families USA building is invalid. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Armenian Assembly of America, et al. v. Cafesjian, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, doing business as iWorld, filed suit against Westfield, a shopping center, alleging that Westfield violated a lease agreement. The trial court stated that Westfield's service of a notice of termination was protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute and that each count was based in part on Westfield's service of the notice. The trial court concluded that the litigation privilege, Civ. Code, 47, subd. (b), "arguably" was a complete defense to the complaint. The court concluded that plaintiff's complaint did not arise from protected activity and was not subject to a special motion to strike. Therefore, plaintiff need not establish a probability of prevailing on her claims and the court need not decide whether she did so. Accordingly, the court reversed the order granting the special motion to strike and the order awarding attorney fees to Westfield. View "Ulkarim v. Westfield, LLC" on Justia Law

Greg LeMond had an oral contract to purchase a five-acre lot (Lot 11) at the Yellowstone Mountain Club from the lot's owner, Yellowstone Development. Yellowstone Development allegedly breached its contract with LeMond by combining twenty-three acres of additional property with Lot 11 to create what became the Overlook Lots, comprising a total of twenty-eight acres. LeMond sued, claiming that Yellowstone Development breached its contract to convey Lot 11 and was under an equitable duty to convey the entirety of Overlook Lots to LeMond. In its final determination, the district court quieted title to the Overlook Lots in favor of LeMond. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court did not provide adequate insight into the equitable considerations involved in granting LeMond title to the Overlook Lots, as Yellowstone Development was obligated to transfer Lot 11 to LeMond and was unjustly enriched by failing to do so, but LeMond was entitled to enforce a constructive trust worth only the equitable value of the parties’ bargain. View "LeMond v. Yellowstone Dev., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the former president and chief operating officer of PortfolioScope, Inc., brought suit against Portfolio and two individual defendants alleging, among other claims, breach of contract, violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, tortious interference with Plaintiff’s contractual rights, and fraudulent transfers pursuant to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. After a bench trial, the judge rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Defendants argued on appeal that the judge erred in her interpretation of an agreement and an amendment, as well as in her analysis of secured transaction principles, and that the errors affected the entire disposition of the case. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in almost all respects, holding that any error in the judge’s interpretation of the amendment affected only Plaintiff’s claim for conversion. View "Weiler v. PortfolioScope, Inc." on Justia Law

Bill Head, doing business as Bill Head Enterprises (Head), hired Petroleum Solutions, Inc. to manufacture and install an underground fuel system at the truck stop Head owned and operated. After a major diesel-fuel leak occurred, Respondents sued Petroleum Solutions for its damages. The trial rendered judgment in favor of Head and in favor of third-party defendant Titeflex, Inc., the alleged manufacturer of a component part incorporated into the fuel system, on Titeflex’s counterclaim against Petroleum Solutions for statutory indemnity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment as to Head, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the sanctions of charging the jury with a spoliation instruction and striking Petroleum Solutions’ statute-of-limitations defense, and the trial court’s abuse of discretion was harmful; and (2) affirmed the judgment as to Titeflex’s indemnity claim, holding that Titeflex was entitled to statutory indemnity from Petroleum Solutions. Remanded for further proceedings between Respondents and Petroleum Solutions. View "Petroleum Solutions, Inc. v. Head" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her complaint alleging that defendants fraudulently procured a mortgage on her home, and thereafter sought to foreclose on that mortgage, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. 1691 et seq., the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., the New York General Business Law, N. Y. Gen. Bus. Law 349, and common law. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of liability and granted the motions of defendants for summary judgment dismissing the claims against them, ruling that, because plaintiff failed to disclose these claims in a 2006 proceeding under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, her present suit was barred for lack of standing or by collateral estoppel. The court considered all of the parties' arguments and, except to the extent indicated, have found them to be without merit. The court affirmed the judgment in regards to the denial of plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment in her favor and the grant of defendants' motions for summary judgment dismissing her claims under RICO, ECOA, New York Business Law 349, and for negligent misrepresentation. The court vacated so much of the judgment as dismissed plaintiff's claims for violation of TILA and for common-law fraud, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Crawford v. Franklin Credit Management Corp." on Justia Law

Amana seeks reversal of the district court's grant of summary judgment to Excel where the district court concluded that Amana failed to establish that Excel breached a duty of care to Amana in a design-certification letter that it supplied to the firm that Amana hired to construct an anaerobic digester. The court concluded that Amana could not establish that it justifiably relied on any statements from Excel and its engineer concerning the digester outputs because no relevant representations exist on which to rely; Excel never reviewed the final design or substrate proposal and therefore made no representations as to the feasibility of that design; and the district court correctly concluded that Amana could not have justifiably relied on Excel's review of the initial GHD design as a basis for liability due to the failure of a materially different design and utilization. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Amana Society, Inc., et al. v. Excel Engineering, Inc." on Justia Law