Goodwill filed suit against PNC seeking a declaratory judgment that it does not owe a prepayment charge in excess of $300,000 under the terms of its agreement with PNC. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that Goodwill owed PNC a prepayment fee. Because Goodwill gave notice of its intent to make prepayment during the ten-year period of the loan during which interest on the outstanding principal was accruing at the Initial Rate of 4.79 percent per year, Goodwill owed a prepayment charge. View "Land of Lincoln Goodwill Indus. v. PNC Bank, NA" on Justia Law

In 2006, Lincoln T. Griswold purchased an $8.4 million life insurance policy. Griswold established a Trust for the sole and exclusive purpose of owning the policy and named Griswold LLP as the Trust’s sole beneficiary. In 2008, the Trust sold its policy to Coventry First LLC. The written purchase agreement contained an arbitration clause. After learning that the policy was sold for an allegedly inflated price that included undisclosed kickbacks to the broker, Griswold sued. Coventry moved to dismiss the case for lack of standing or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, concluding that both Griswold and the LLP had standing and that the arbitration clause was unenforceable as to the plaintiffs, who were non-signatories. Coventry appealed. The Third Circuit (1) concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of Coventry’s motion to dismiss; and (2) affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration against the plaintiffs, as they never consented to the purchase agreement. View "Griswold v. Coventry First LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against United, alleging that United breached the terms of its frequent-flyer program. Plaintiff argued that United breached the program contract by crediting him for mileage determined by the distance between the airports, instead of the number of miles the airplanes actually flew (including such things as weather diversions and landing delays). The court concluded that plaintiff failed to state a claim for breach of the program because United has discretion to interpret the meaning of "mileage" and the interpretation United gave that term was reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. View "Han v. United Continental Holdings, et al." on Justia Law

Asarco filed suit against UP alleging breach of contract and seeking contribution regarding a dispute about environmental liability for a lead refinery and smelter which polluted Omaha, Nebraska. The district court granted UP's motion to dismiss, ruling that UP did not breach the agreement and consent decree that protected UP from Asarco's claims. Despite receiving notice of UP's settlement, Asarco did not object before the district court issued the consent decree. Asarco waited until after entry of the consent decree and brought this collateral case. The court concluded that the district court correctly recognized that all of Asarco's claims were prohibited contribution claims even though some were disguised as breach of contract claims. In light of the consent decree, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675, protected UP against any contribution claim related to the site. Further, the district court correctly concluded that UP neither waived CERCLA's contribution protection nor breached the tolling agreement by invoking that protection. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "ASARCO v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Cargotec appealed the district court's conclusion that Cargotec's contract with NMC did not contain arbitration and indemnification provisions. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that whether the arbitration clause became part of the parties' agreement remains a question "presumptively committed to judicial determination." On the merits, the court concluded that the district court erred in failing to order a trial to resolve material factual disputes concerning whether the parties agreed to arbitration and indemnification. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to hold a non-jury trial, making findings of fact, and apply the appropriate U.C.C. provisions in light of those facts. View "Nebraska Machinery Co. v. Cargotec Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

As a Solvay employee Moyer participated in Solvay’s ERISA- governed Long Term Disability Plan. In 2005 MetLife initially approved Moyer’s claim for benefits. MetLife reversed its decision in 2007 after determining that Moyer retained the physical capacity to perform work other than his former job. In an administrative appeal, MetLife affirmed the revocation on June 20, 2008. Moyer’s adverse benefit determination letter included notice of the right to judicial review but failed to include notice that a three-year contractual time limit applied. The Summary Plan Description failed to provide notice of either Moyer’s right to judicial review or the applicable time limit. On February 20, 2012, Moyer sued MetLife, seeking recovery of unpaid plan benefits under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B). The district court held that the plan’s limitations period barred Moyer’s claim, noting that the plan documents—which were not sent to participants unless requested—stated that there was a three-year limitations period for filing suit, so that MetLife provided Moyer with constructive notice of the contractual time limit. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Exclusion of the judicial review time limits from the adverse benefit determination letter was inconsistent with ensuring a fair opportunity for review and rendered the letter not in substantial compliance. View "Moyer v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, active and retired Baltimore police officers and firefighters who participate in a public pension plan, challenged the City's decision changing the manner in which annual increases to pension benefits are calculated. Plaintiffs claimed that the substitution of a cost-of-living adjustment for a "variable benefit" violates the members' rights under the Contract Clause and the Takings Clause. The court concluded that the members' rights under the Contract Clause were not impaired because the members retained a state law remedy for breach of contract. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment with respect to the City's elimination of the variable benefit. The court affirmed the district court's decision upholding the remaining portions of the ordinance at issue, and vacated the district court's order dismissing the Takings Clause claim. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Cherry, Jr. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Richard Salzer received medical care at an SSM Healthcare of Oklahoma (SSM) facility for injuries he sustained in an accident. At the time of his treatment, he had a health insurance plan (the "Plan"). Salzer entered into a contract with SSM to receive its services (the "Hospital Services Agreement"), under which he "authorized disclosure of [his] medical information for billing purposes and authorized [his] health insurance company to pay." SSM had an existing contract with Salzer's health insurance company (the "Provider Agreement") which required SSM to submit covered medical charges to Salzer's insurance company and accept discounted payment from the insurer. Although the Provider Agreement prohibited SSM from seeking payment for a covered charge from Salzer, SSM sought the non-discounted amount directly from him. Salzer sued SSM alleging breach of contract and other state law claims based on SSM's attempt to collect payment for medical care from Salzer instead of his health insurance company. SSM removed the case to federal district court. Salzer challenged the district court's denial of his motion to remand based on its determination that his claims were completely preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Salzer v. SSM Health Care of Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, employed by defense contractor Qinetiq to work on a military base in Iraq, were enrolled in Qinetiq’s Basic Long Term Disability, Basic Life, and Accidental Death and Dismemberment insurance policies, governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001, under a single contract with Prudential. Qinetiq paid the premiums. Plaintiffs also purchased, with their own funds, supplemental coverage under the same terms as the basic policies; there was a single summary plan description. An employee would file a single claim for basic and supplemental coverage benefits. The plan booklets provided that loss is not covered if it results from war, or any act of war, declared or undeclared. These exclusions applied to both the basic and supplemental policies. The plaintiffs were not otherwise uninsured for excluded injuries. Qinetiq obtained insurance required by the Defense Base Act, 42 U.S.C. 1651. After Prudential denied claims, the plaintiffs sued, alleging violations of the state consumer fraud acts and the Truth in Consumer Contract, Warranty, and Notice Act; breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and intentional or negligent misrepresentation or omission. They contended that Prudential fraudulently induced them to buy supplemental coverage knowing that any claim they filed would likely be subject to the war exclusions, rendering supplemental coverage effectively worthless. The district court dismissed, treating the basic and supplemental policies as components of a single plan, and holding that all state law claims were preempted by ERISA. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the supplemental coverage cannot be “unbundled” from ERISA coverage. View "Menkes v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Sompo and Nipponkoa, subrogees of the cargo owners/shippers, filed suit against Defendants Norfolk Southern and KCSR to recover for the damages sustained to cargo by a train derailment. At issue in these appeals was the meaning and enforceability of provisions found in the bills of lading that purport to designate the ocean carrier as the sole entity responsible to the cargo owners for damage to the cargo. Further, Docket No. 13-3501 challenged Nipponkoa's ability to maintain its claim for contractual indemnification, a claim assigned to it by the upstream ocean carrier, against defendants. The court affirmed the judgment in Docket No. 13-3416 and concluded that summary judgment for defendants was proper where defendants are entitled to enforce the liability-limiting provision in the upstream carrier's bill of lading against plaintiffs. The court affirmed the judgment in Docket No. 13-3501 because defendants' arguments for reversal of Nipponkoa's judgment against them are all either waived or without merit. View "Sompo Japan Ins., Inc. v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law