In August, 2010, Appellants, Washington County residents Raymond and Donna Mantia, hired Appellee, West Virginia contractor Shafer Electric & Construction, to build a 34 foot by 24 foot, two-car garage addition onto their house. The proposals for the garage did not comply with several requirements of Section 517.7 of the Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act. Specifically, any home improvement contract, in order to be valid and enforceable against the owner of real property, had to be legible, in writing, and contain thirteen other specific requirements. Despite the detail in the specifications for the work to be completed, the contract here only complied with subsections (5), (7), and (8) of Section 517.7(a). Notwithstanding these deficiencies, work on the project began in October, 2010, when Appellants, who owned their own excavation business, began the foundation excavation. When Appellee commenced construction of the addition, it contended that problems surfaced because of Appellants' failure to complete the excavation work properly. During the subsequent months, Appellants eventually reexcavated the foundation area for the addition and, in the process (according to Appellee), changed the design of the addition several times. Negotiations into these design changes and other necessary alterations as a result of the excavation problems occurred, but ultimately failed when Appellants apparently refused to enter into a new contract with Appellee. Upon the breakdown of the negotiations, the parties mutually agreed that Appellee would invoice Appellants for the work completed, and that Appellee would discontinue efforts on the project. Appellants refused to pay the bill. Appellee responded by filing a mechanic's lien in the Washington County Court of Common Pleas. When Appellants still had failed to satisfy the outstanding balance, Appellee filed a civil action in the common pleas court, alleging both breach of contract and quantum meruit causes of action. The Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal in this matter to determine whether the Act barred a contractor from recovery under a theory of quantum meruit in the absence of a valid and enforceable home improvement contract as defined by the Act. The Superior Court held that the Act did not bar a cause of action sounding in quantum meruit and, for slightly different reasons, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shafer Electric & Construction v. Mantia" on Justia Law

In February, 2006, Konstantinos Koumboulis shot and killed his wife and himself inside his house. The murder/suicide was highly publicized in the local media and on the internet. The Jaconos purchased the property from the Koumboulis estate at auction in September, 2006, for $450,000. After investing thousands in renovations, the Jaconos listed the property for sale in June, 2007. They informed Re/Max, their listing agents, of the murder/suicide. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court for review was whether the occurrence of a murder/suicide inside a house constituted a material defect of the property, such that appellees' failure to disclose the same to the buyer of the house constituted fraud, negligent misrepresentation, or a violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law's (UTPCPL). The Court concluded a murder/suicide does not constitute an actionable material defect. View "Milliken v. Jacono" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against John Travolta, Atlo, and others (collectively, "Atlo"), seeking a declaration as to whether a three-page agreement or a four-page agreement was the enforceable termination agreement between the parties, and whether a confidentiality provision, if one exists, is enforceable. Atlo filed an anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP) motion to strike the first amended complaint under Code Civ. Proc., 425.16. The court held that a declaratory relief action filed in response to an attorney's letters threatening litigation over the contract dispute does not come within the provisions of an anti-SLAPP lawsuit where the lawsuit sought a declaration regarding the terms of plaintiff's termination agreement, not whether Atlo may send demand letters or threaten litigation. Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court properly denied the motion to strike the complaint and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.View "Gotterba v. Travolta" on Justia Law

Defendant provides residential real estate brokerage services in Seattle, Washington. Plaintiff lives in California. In 2009 the parties executed a form contract drafted by defendant. Defendant engaged plaintiff as a Contract Field Agent (CFA) as “an independent contractor.” In 2013, plaintiff filed suit on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals, alleging defendant improperly classified CFAs as independent contractors when they were actually employees under California’s Labor Code and Unfair Competition Laws and claimed unpaid overtime, missed meal and rest periods, inaccurate and untimely wage statements, waiting time penalties, and unreimbursed business expenses. Defendant sought arbitration under the Agreement, which provides that it is to be governed by the laws of the state of Washington. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that the arbitration clause was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA); that the arbitration clause did not apply to plaintiff’s statutory claims because those claims were based on statutes, not the contract; and noted “unrebutted evidence of substantial procedural unconscionability.” The court of appeal reversed, Under California law, there is a strong policy favoring the enforcement of choice-of-law provisions and, even under California law, plaintiff’s unconscionability claim lacks merit.View "Galen v. Redfin Corp." on Justia Law

San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (“San Diego”) and several NaturEner wind-energy companies (“NaturEner”) entered into two contracts, a purchase agreement and a contribution agreement, under which San Diego agreed to purchase renewable energy credits and electricity from NaturEner. The credits and electricity are generated at a wind farm in Montana. The purchase agreement contained a forum selection clause stating that the parties consented to conduct all litigation in California. San Diego filed suit in a California court seeking a declaration that NaturEner had not satisfied the “Avian Conditions” of the agreements. NaturEner filed a nearly identical suit in a Montana court seeking a declaration that it had satisfied the conditions. San Diego filed a motion to dismiss or stay, which the district court denied. San Diego then petitioned the Supreme Court to exercise supervisory control, claiming that the district court erred by accepting jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute in light of the purchase agreement’s forum selection clause, as well as forum non conveniens. The Supreme Court granted the application for writ of supervisory control, holding (1) the forum selection clause contained in the purchase agreement was mandatory in nature; and (2) related issues regarding the contribution agreement would be appropriately and justly tried in California as well.View "San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Ninth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

This case involved a parcel of real estate previously owned by Four H Land Company Limited Partnership (Four H). Four H twice applied for a conditional use permit (CUP) to operate a sand and gravel pit on the property. James Tierney and Jeffrey Tierney objected to the applications. To resolve their dispute, the Tierneys, Four H, and Western Engineering Company (Western), the operator of the sand and gravel pit, entered into an agreement in 1998 in which the Tierneys agreed to waive their right to appeal the issuance of the CUP, and Four H and Western accepted various conditions regarding operation of the sand and gravel pit. In 2009, the Tierneys brought an action for specific performance, alleging that Four H and Western had not fulfilled the conditions of the agreement. The district court dismissed the Tierneys’ complaint for specific performance, concluding that Four H and Western had not met the requirements of the 1998 CUP and the agreement but that specific performance was not an appropriate remedy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that specific performance was an appropriate remedy for Four H’s and Western’s breach, and the district court should have ordered it. Remanded.View "Tierney v. Four H Land Co. Ltd. P’ship" on Justia Law

SFG, a Texas firm specializing in distressed‐asset investing, bought a loan portfolio from McFarland State Bank for $1.27 million (28.8% of the face value of the debt). Materials provided by McFarland’s agent indicated that the portfolio was secured by 19 real estate properties in Wisconsin. Both parties were well represented during negotiations. The Sale Agreement provided limited remedies in the event of a breach and disclaimed all other remedies. Soon after purchasing the portfolio, SFG learned that three of the 19 collateral properties that supposedly secured the loans had been released before the sale. SFG contacted McFarland; McFarland disputed liability. Months later, SFG sued, seeking damages beyond the remedies provided in the contract. Applying the contractual remedies limitation, a formula that resulted in zero recovery under the circumstances, the district court granted judgment for McFarland. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Except in the most extraordinary circumstances, courts hold sophisticated parties to the terms of their bargain. View "S. Fin. Grp. LLC v. McFarland State Bank" on Justia Law

VICI, a sports car racing team, sought T-Mobile’s sponsorship for the 2009-2011 Le Mans racing seasons. The companies entered into an agreement that required VICI to field one T-Mobile-sponsored racecar during the 2009 season and two during each of the 2010 and 2011 seasons and required VICI to display T- Mobile’s logo. The agreement provides that “VICI grants to [T-Mobile] the right to be the exclusive wireless carrier supplying wireless connectivity for the Porsche, Audi and VW telematics programs.” The Agreement had a force majeure clause, a severability clause, and a “Limitation of Liabilities.” VICI worked with T-Mobile to secure telematics business from VW, Audi, and Porsche. In July 2009, T-Mobile’s sponsored racecar sustained damage from an accident and was not able to race while undergoing repairs. On January 5, 2010, VICI sent a notice of default, indicating that T-Mobile had failed to pay $7 million due under the agreement. On January 7, T-Mobile sent a letter terminating the Agreement, stating that VICI made a material representation that VICI had authority to bind Audi, VW and that VICI failed, without justification or notice, to race at a key event where T-Mobile hosted business guests. The district court awarded VICI $7 million in damages. The Third Circuit affirmed the award of $7, but vacated with regard to VICI’s damages resulting from T- Mobile’s failure to make the 2011 payment. On remand, the court should consider an award of attorney’s fees to VICI in light of its reassessment of the 2011 damages issue. View "VICI Racing LLC v. T-Mobile USA Inc." on Justia Law

McCarthy worked at Ameritech, a wholly owned subsidiary of AT&T, until her position was terminated in 2008 as part of a reduction in forces. She sought to retire at that time to care for her ailing husband, but Ameritech allegedly told her that she was not eligible to receive post-retirement healthcare benefits, on which her husband depended. She elected to continue working through the company’s Employment Opportunity Pool for another nine months, until she turned 65 and retired with benefits. She then filed suit alleging, among other things, age and sex discrimination. After Ameritech admitted that McCarthy was, in fact, entitled to post-retirement healthcare benefits when it terminated her position in 2008, she amended her suit to add a claim for fraudulent inducement. The district court awarded summary judgment, rejecting the merits of each claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. McCarthy may present her fraudulent-inducement claim to a jury. The district court properly awarded summary judgment to the defendants on each of the other claims View "McCarthy v. Ameritech Publ'g, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the third-party insurers of a shipping service for coins and special metals, invoked their subrogation rights and alleged that several of the service’s shipments, worth a total of $150,000, were lost or stolen by United Parcel Service of America, Inc. (UPS) or its employees. Plaintiffs brought state law claims against UPS in federal district court, alleging true and fraudulent conversion, among other claims, premising subject matter jurisdiction solely upon the complete diversity of the parties. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, holding (1) the Carmack Amendment preempted all of Plaintiffs’ state law claims, and (2) the exception recognized by some courts when the common carrier has committed a “true conversion” of goods does not permit an action based on state law but rather abrogates the limitation of liability for causes of action brought under the Amendment itself. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the Carmack Amendment preempts all state law claims for compensation for the loss of or damage to goods shipped by a ground carrier in interstate commerce; and (2) the “true conversion” exception vitiates the liability limiting features in the Amendment and is not an exception to the Amendment’s preemptive scope. View "Certain Underwriters at Interest at Lloyds of London v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc." on Justia Law