The case at hand involves United States Steel Corporation (U.S. Steel), an Australian producer and exporter of hot-rolled steel, BlueScope Steel (AIS) Pty Ltd., and its affiliated U.S. importer, BlueScope Steel Americas, Inc. U.S. Steel alleged that the Australian company had reimbursed its U.S. affiliate for antidumping duties, a claim which BlueScope denied. The core dispute arose from differing interpretations of a supply agreement between the companies, which determined the pricing of the steel products.Prior to reaching the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the case was reviewed by the United States Court of International Trade. This lower court sustained the Department of Commerce's determination that BlueScope had not reimbursed its U.S. importer for antidumping duties. The court found that the agency's determination was supported by substantial evidence and was otherwise in accordance with the law.Upon reaching the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court reviewed the decisions of the Court of International Trade de novo, applying the same standard of review used by the trial court in reviewing the administrative record before the agency. The appeals court upheld the decision made by the lower court, finding that the agency's determination was supported by substantial evidence and was in accordance with the law. The court also held that the agency did not err in its interpretation of the antidumping duty regulation, and therefore did not depart from an established practice. As a result, the appeals court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "United States Steel Corporation v. United States" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between Sheet Pile, LLC and Plymouth Tube Company. The conflict arose from an exclusivity agreement, in which Plymouth agreed to manufacture certain products only for PilePro, Sheet Pile's predecessor. Approximately a decade later, Sheet Pile accused Plymouth of breaching this agreement by selling those products to other companies, and they sued for fraud and breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Plymouth.Sheet Pile then appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the summary judgment de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. For the breach-of-contract claim, the court concluded that the claim was time-barred under Texas law, which has a four-year statute of limitations for such claims. The court also held that the discovery rule, which could have deferred the accrual of the cause of action, did not apply.Regarding the fraud claim, the court concluded that Sheet Pile failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact that Plymouth's representations were false when made. The court noted that there was no evidence that Plymouth sold the exclusive products to third parties in 2014 or 2015, and that Plymouth had expressly warned PilePro that it might begin selling to third parties if PilePro didn't hold up its end of the agreement. Therefore, the court affirmed summary judgment for Plymouth. View "Sheet Pile v. Plymouth Tube" on Justia Law

A Delaware corporation, Northern Natural Gas Company, sued another Delaware entity, Centennial Resource Production, LLC, in Nebraska for breach of contract. The dispute arose after Centennial, due to a cold weather event in Texas, was unable to use its reserved pipeline capacity and refused to pay the corresponding invoice. The district court concluded it had personal jurisdiction over Centennial based on Centennial's contractual consent and sufficient minimum contacts with Nebraska during the formation and implementation of their business relationship.Centennial appealed, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Centennial consented to personal jurisdiction in Nebraska by joining Northern's Master Escrow Agreement that contained an express consent to jurisdiction in Nebraska and waived the personal jurisdiction defense. The court found that the Service Agreement, Joinder Agreement, and Master Escrow Agreement became one unitary unseverable agreement through the plain language of the Tariff. The court concluded that the forum selection clause found in the Master Escrow Agreement applied equally to the Service Agreement as one unitary agreement. Thus, due process was satisfied when Centennial consented to personal jurisdiction by entering into a contract that contains a valid forum selection clause, and Nebraska was not a forum non conveniens. View "Northern Nat. Gas Co. v. Centennial Resource Prod." on Justia Law

This case involves Stewart Johnston who was the defendant, cross-complainant, and appellant, against BTHHM Berkeley, LLC, PNG Berkeley, LLC, Michail Family 2004 Living Trust, Bianca Blesching, Scot Hawkins (collectively, BTHHM), and Holda Novelo and Landmark Real Estate Management, Inc. (collectively, Landmark). Johnston owned a property which he was to lease to BTHHM for a cannabis dispensary once permits were granted by the City of Berkeley. However, after the city approved the permit, Johnston refused to deliver possession of the property to BTHHM, leading to a lawsuit by BTHHM against Johnston.Following mediation, a two-page term sheet titled “Settlement Term Sheet Agreement” was signed by all parties. Johnston later wished to withdraw from the agreement. BTHHM and Landmark moved to enforce the term sheet pursuant to section 664.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which the court granted. Johnston failed to make the payments required by the enforcement orders. The court granted BTHHM's motion for entry of judgment, awarded prejudgment interest to BTHHM, entered judgment against Johnston, and dismissed his cross-complaint with prejudice.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four reversed the trial court’s award of prejudgment interest but otherwise affirmed the decision. The court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the term sheet’s language evinces the parties’ mutual agreement to settle the case according to its terms. However, the court concluded that the award of prejudgment interest was unauthorized as it differed materially from the terms of the parties’ agreement. View "BTHHM Berkeley, LLC v. Johnston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of California considered whether a health care agent, who had signed two contracts with a skilled nursing facility on behalf of a principal, had the authority to sign an optional, separate arbitration agreement. The first contract ensured the principal’s admission to the facility, while the second made arbitration the exclusive method for resolving disputes with the facility. The court concluded that the execution of the arbitration contract was not a "health care decision" within the authority of the health care agent. Therefore, the facility’s owners and operators could not rely on the agent’s execution of the arbitration agreement to compel arbitration of claims arising from the principal’s alleged maltreatment. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Harrod v. Country Oaks Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined a dispute between the plaintiffs, John and Dawn Harrell, and the defendant, Douglas DeLuca. The Harrells sued DeLuca, a general contractor from whom they purchased a home, for fraudulent inducement, constructive fraud, breach of contract, and violations of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of DeLuca regarding the Harrells’ fraud claims based on one category of misrepresentations. The case otherwise proceeded to a bench trial where the court found DeLuca liable for breaching the contract, but not for the remaining claims. The Harrells appealed, arguing that summary judgment was inappropriate and that the district court should have made explicit findings related to their constructive fraud and breach-of-contract claims.The Court of Appeals upheld parts of the lower court's decision but also vacated parts of it. It agreed with the Harrells that the summary judgment was inappropriate, vacated it, and remanded the case for additional proceedings. It also agreed that the district court should have made explicit findings related to one of each of their constructive fraud and breach-of-contract claims. However, it affirmed the resolutions of the remaining claims which were not challenged by the Harrells on appeal. The court remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Harrell v. Deluca" on Justia Law

This case involves a medical debt collection claim between Medical Recovery Services, LLC (MRS), a debt collection service representing Franklin County Medical Center (FCMC), and Cierra Moser, a former FCMC employee. MRS sought to collect debt for medical services provided to Moser at FCMC during her employment. FCMC offered a 50% discount to employees for unpaid medical bills after insurance payments. When Moser's employment ended, FCMC allegedly retracted the discount and assigned the debt to MRS.The magistrate court granted partial summary judgment favoring MRS regarding a minimum principal amount of debt owed by Moser and decided in favor of MRS on the issue of FCMC's right to retract the employee discount. However, the district court reversed the partial grant of summary judgment and remanded all issues for retrial due to disputed facts requiring retrial.On appeal, MRS argued that the district court erred in reversing the partial grant of summary judgment and in remanding all issues for retrial. The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision, finding that there was a material dispute of fact over the amount of medical debt owed by Moser, which precluded a grant of partial summary judgment. Furthermore, MRS failed to ensure relevant transcripts were included in the record on appeal to the Supreme Court, which was fatal to its position that the district court erred in remanding for a retrial on all issues. View "Medical Recovery Services v. Moser" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit heard an appeal from Bulk Transport Corp. against Teamsters Union No. 142 Pension Fund and its Trustees. The dispute originated from two collective-bargaining agreements between Bulk Transport and Teamsters Local 142, active from 2003 to 2006. The Union insisted that Bulk Transport apply one such agreement, the Steel Mill Addendum, to non-steel mill work (LISCO work), which Bulk Transport initially did, subsequently making pension contributions on behalf of the LISCO workers. However, when Bulk Transport lost the LISCO contract, they ceased these contributions, leading to the Pension Fund assessing a withdrawal liability of about $2 million under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA).After arbitration, Bulk Transport paid but demanded a review of the decision. The district court agreed with the arbitrator's ruling that Bulk Transport had adopted the Addendum by conduct, and thus the Pension Fund was entitled to the withdrawal liability. The district court also denied Bulk Transport's request for a refund.The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed the district court's decision. It held that the written agreement, not the practice or conduct, should dictate the terms of pension contributions to multi-employer plans. The written agreement in this case did not cover the LISCO work, and the court rejected the argument that Bulk Transport's conduct altered the substantive terms of the agreement. The court held that the writings were conclusive and that employers and unions could not opt-out of the requirements orally or through their course of conduct. The court affirmed the district court's denial of attorney's fees for the Pension Fund and remanded the case with instructions to order the Pension Fund to repay the withdrawal liability it collected from Bulk Transport. View "Bulk Transport, Corp. v. Teamsters Union Local 142" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Louisiana considered whether an architect and contract administrator had duty of care towards an employee of a subcontractor under the terms of a construction contract. The employee, Gustavo Bonilla, had been injured during a demolition job and filed a suit alleging negligence against Verges Rome Architects (VRA) and Morphy Makofsky, Inc. (MMI). VRA had been hired as a consultant for design and contract administration services. The trial court ruled in favor of VRA, but the court of appeal reversed this decision.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Louisiana found that the contract terms were clear and unambiguous, and did not impose a duty on VRA to oversee, supervise, or maintain the construction site or Mr. Bonilla’s safety. VRA was required to make weekly site visits to ensure work was progressing according to specifications. However, the contract specifically stated that these visits should not be construed as supervision of actual construction. Responsibility for site safety and construction methods was allocated to the contractor.The Court concluded that VRA could not be held liable for failing to perform duties it was not contractually obligated to undertake. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal's decision and reinstated the trial court's judgment, which granted summary judgment in favor of VRA. View "BONILLA VS. VERGES ROME ARCHITECTS" on Justia Law

The case before the Supreme Court of North Carolina involved a dispute between The Society for the Historical Preservation of the Twentysixth North Carolina Troops, Inc. (plaintiff) and the City of Asheville (defendant). The controversy centered around a monument dedicated to Zebulon Vance, a former North Carolina Governor and Confederate Colonel. The plaintiff, a nonprofit historical preservation organization, raised funds to restore the monument and entered into a donation agreement with the City, whereby the monument was restored and then donated to the City. However, the City later decided to remove the monument, citing it as a public safety threat due to vandalism and threats of toppling.In response, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the City, alleging that the City breached the 2015 donation agreement and seeking a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and a declaratory judgment. The plaintiff argued that both parties had entered into a contract with the intent to preserve the monument in perpetuity. The City filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The trial court granted the City's motion, and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.When the case reached the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the court reversed the Court of Appeals’ determination that the plaintiff's breach of contract claim should be dismissed for lack of standing. However, the court noted that the plaintiff had abandoned the merits of its breach of contract claim in its appeal. As such, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and declaratory judgment for lack of standing. The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to assert any ground for which it has standing to contest the removal of the monument. View "Soc'y for the Hist. Pres. of the Twenty-sixth N.C. Troops, Inc. v. City of Asheville" on Justia Law