In this case, a Delaware statutory trust, NB Taylor Bend, DST (Taylor Bend), borrowed $13 million from Prudential Mortgage Capital Company, LLC (Prudential) to acquire property in Lafayette County, Mississippi. Patrick and Brian Nelson, who were guarantors of the loan, signed an Indemnity and Guaranty Agreement (the Guaranty) in December 2014, personally guaranteeing the loan. After the loan documents were executed, Prudential assigned the loan to Liberty Island Group I, LLC (Liberty), which in turn assigned the loan to North American Savings Bank, FSB (NASB). By May 2020, Taylor Bend struggled to find tenants for the property due to the COVID-19 pandemic and informed NASB of their financial problems. In May 2021, NASB declared Taylor Bend to be in default after the borrower continually failed to make timely loan payments. NASB then filed an action against the Nelsons in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, asserting claims for breach of the Guaranty, for recovery of the loan balance, and for declaratory judgment.The district court entered partial summary judgment for NASB, holding the Nelsons “breached the [G]uaranty and thus owe[d] to [NASB] the amount remaining due on the subject loan.” The court determined that the Guaranty was “freely assignable” and that Prudential adequately assigned all of its rights and interests to Liberty, which in turn assigned all of its rights and interests to NASB, including those conferred by the Guaranty. The court also concluded that the defenses raised by the Nelsons were “unavailable given the borrower’s absence from this litigation.” The court also granted Brian’s motion for summary judgment against Patrick, ruling that the indemnity agreement between the brothers was valid and binding and that Patrick was contractually required to indemnify Brian for “any and all obligations arising out of or relating to this litigation.”The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Guaranty was properly assigned from Prudential to Liberty and from Liberty to NASB. NASB could therefore properly bring its claims for breach of guaranty and declaratory judgment against the Nelsons to recover the loan deficiency. Moreover, under Mississippi law, Patrick may not interpose equitable defenses that were available only to Taylor Bend to defeat his liability under the Guaranty. The court also held that the deficiency judgment awarded to NASB pursuant to the Guaranty need not be reduced by the third-party sale of the Apartments to Kirkland. NASB had no duty to mitigate its damages under either Mississippi law or the terms of the Guaranty. View "North American Savings Bank v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The case involves Robert James McCabe, a former sheriff of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, who was convicted of carrying out fraud and bribery schemes with contractors concerning medical and food services for prisoners in the Norfolk Jail. Over 20 years, McCabe provided favored contractors with inside information about competing bids for the Jail’s contracts, altered and extended contracts for their benefit, and received various things of substantial value in return. McCabe was convicted of 11 federal offenses, including charges of conspiracy, honest services mail fraud, Hobbs Act extortion, and money laundering. He was sentenced to 144 months in prison, plus supervised release.McCabe appealed his convictions and sentences, raising four contentions of error. He argued that his trial was unfairly conducted before a trial of a co-defendant, that the trial court erred by admitting hearsay statements, that the jury instructions were incorrect, and that the court wrongly applied an 18-level sentencing enhancement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected all of McCabe’s contentions and affirmed his convictions and sentences. View "US v. McCabe" on Justia Law

In North Dakota, Donavon Meuchel approached MR Properties LLC, a company with two members, Jessy Meyer and Nick Renner, to purchase the Golden West Shopping Center. Meuchel offered the asking price of $600,000. A real estate broker prepared a purchase agreement, but MR Properties did not sign any version of it. During negotiations, it was discovered that part of the shopping center encroached on a neighboring parcel of land owned by MKB LLP. Meuchel requested MR Properties to acquire additional land from MKB and include it in the purchase. However, negotiations broke down when MR Properties discovered that Meuchel had instructed a surveying company to modify the location of a previously agreed upon boundary line. MR Properties returned Meuchel’s earnest money, stating that an agreement could not be reached.The District Court of Morton County treated MR Properties' motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. The court disregarded statements in Meuchel’s affidavit and struck a late-filed supplemental affidavit. The court concluded that Meuchel failed to meet his burden to show specific performance was necessary and granted summary judgment to MR Properties, dismissing Meuchel’s claim for specific performance.The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in disregarding statements in an affidavit and in striking a late-filed supplemental affidavit. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to MR Properties. The court held that the record did not provide any "clear and unequivocal" evidence showing a meeting of the minds or mutual consent between the parties to establish an oral contract. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment dismissing Meuchel’s claim for specific performance. View "Meuchel v. MR Properties" on Justia Law

The case involves Bristol SL Holdings, Inc., the successor-in-interest to Sure Haven, Inc., a defunct drug rehabilitation and mental health treatment center, and Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company and Cigna Behavioral Health, Inc. Bristol alleged that Sure Haven's calls to Cigna verifying out-of-network coverage and seeking authorization to provide health services created independent contractual obligations. Cigna, however, denied payment based on fee-forgiving, a practice prohibited by the health plans. Bristol brought state law claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel against Cigna.The district court initially dismissed Bristol’s claims, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal, holding that Bristol had derivative standing to sue for unpaid benefits as Sure Haven’s successor-in-interest. On remand, the district court granted Cigna’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempted Bristol’s state law claims.On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Bristol’s state law claims were preempted by ERISA because they had both a “reference to” and an “impermissible connection with” the ERISA plans that Cigna administered. The court reasoned that Bristol’s claims were not independent of an ERISA plan because they concerned the denial of reimbursement to patients who were covered under such plans. The court also held that allowing liability on Bristol’s state law claims would interfere with nationally uniform plan administration, a central matter of plan administration. View "Bristol SL Holdings, Inc. v. Cigna Health and Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Carmen Nicholas and Terry L. Bonnie, an attorney who negligently prepared the will of Carmen's mother. The will, which was not notarized and lacked an attestation clause, was denied probate, resulting in Carmen losing full ownership of a property she was supposed to inherit. Carmen filed a lawsuit against Bonnie, alleging that his negligence caused her loss. Bonnie, in a letter, admitted his mistake and expressed willingness to make financial amends. A consent judgment was signed, establishing Bonnie's liability for all damages caused by his negligence.The trial court denied Bonnie's exception of peremption, arguing that the matter was a legal malpractice suit and was perempted after three years from the act of malpractice under Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5605. Carmen opposed this, arguing that the matter was not a legal malpractice action and that Bonnie had renounced prescription by voluntarily entering a consent judgment that acknowledged liability for all damages caused by his negligence. The trial court denied both the exception of peremption and the motion for summary judgment, leaving quantum as the only issue.The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision, finding Carmen’s petition was filed after the three-year peremptive period for a legal malpractice action. It held that the consent judgment could not revive the extinguished claim and dismissed Carmen’s claims with prejudice.The Supreme Court of Louisiana, however, reversed the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the trial court's decision. It held that the consent judgment formed a bilateral contract between the parties, with Bonnie conceding fault or liability and contractually assuming an obligation to pay damages. The court ruled that the action to enforce the consent judgment was based in contract, not legal malpractice, and was therefore enforceable. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Nicholas v. Bonnie" on Justia Law

VT Halter Marine (VTHM), a shipbuilder, contracted to build a barge and a tug for a client. During construction, over a thousand steel flange plates were incorrectly bent due to the use of an improperly sized die, leading to thinning and cracking of the plates. The faulty plates were installed onto the vessels, and the cracking was discovered later. The cost of replacing and repairing the cracked flange plates amounted to approximately $3,300,000. VTHM submitted a claim to their insurer, Certain Underwriters of Lloyd’s of London (Underwriters), for the cracked flange plates.The Underwriters denied VTHM's claim, asserting that the policy excluded coverage for faulty workmanship and the cost of replacing or repairing improper or defective materials. VTHM contested the denial, leading to a lawsuit for breach of contract. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment in the trial court. The trial court granted Underwriters' motion for summary judgment, ruling that the policy unambiguously excluded coverage for faulty workmanship and the cost of repairing, replacing, or renewing any improper or defective materials.In the Supreme Court of Mississippi, VTHM appealed the trial court's decision, arguing that the flanges were part of the vessel and coverage for faulty workmanship exists if it results in cracking of the vessel. The Supreme Court, however, affirmed the trial court's judgment. The court found that the insurance policy unambiguously excluded the cost of replacing or repairing improper or defective materials. The court concluded that the faulty workmanship directly resulted in improper materials being installed, and the only resulting damage was to the improper materials themselves. Therefore, VTHM's claim for the costs of repairing and/or replacing the improper materials installed was not covered under the policy. View "VT Halter Marine, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters of Lloyd's of London" on Justia Law

The case involves a contract dispute between Brands International Corporation, a Canadian manufacturer of hand sanitizer, and Reach Companies, LLC, a Minnesota retail distributor. In 2020, Reach contracted with Brands for 1,000,000 bottles of hand sanitizer to be delivered directly to Reach’s customer, Five Below. The parties agreed to “cash on delivery” terms. Brands began shipping hand sanitizer to individual Five Below stores. Brands made three deliveries, all of which were accepted by Five Below. Brands informed Reach of the deliveries, and Five Below paid Reach for the hand sanitizer, but Reach did not pay Brands. As a result of Reach’s failure to pay, Brands informed Reach that it would no longer deliver hand sanitizer to Five Below on Reach’s behalf. Brands then invoiced Reach for the contract price for the delivered hand sanitizer. Reach still did not pay and ceased communicating with Brands. Brands then filed suit against Reach for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, account stated, and unpaid goods and services. Reach counterclaimed for breach of contract.The parties cross-moved for summary judgment on their contract claims. They disagreed on the applicable law: Brands asserted that the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) applied, while Reach asserted that Minnesota law applied. The district court determined that the CISG governed and that Reach had breached the contract. The district court granted summary judgment to Brands on the parties’ competing breach-of-contract claims, granted summary judgment to Reach on Brands’s unjust-enrichment and account-stated claims, dismissed all other claims, and awarded Brands the contract price for the delivered hand sanitizer. The district court also found that the CISG authorized the award of attorney’s fees and so awarded Brands attorney’s fees. Reach appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment but reversed the award of attorney’s fees. The court found that the CISG governed the dispute and that Reach had breached the contract by failing to pay Brands upon delivery of the hand sanitizer. The court also found that Brands was entitled to recover damages based on Reach’s breach of the contract. However, the court held that the CISG does not authorize an award of attorney’s fees, and thus, the district court erred in awarding those fees to Brands. View "Brands International Corp. v. Reach Companies, LLC" on Justia Law

The Portland Mint delivered truckloads of coins to a foundry designated by the United States Mint for redemption under a regulation that provided for the redemption of mutilated coins. The coins were melted down and used to make new coins. However, the U.S. Mint refused to pay for the shipment, claiming that a high percentage of the coins were counterfeit. Portland Mint, asserting that the coins were genuine, brought five claims against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims. The Claims Court dismissed all five claims, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction for the first two claims and that all five claims failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the Claims Court erred in dismissing the second claim for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court held that the regulation under which the coins were submitted created an implied-in-fact contract between Portland Mint and the U.S. Mint, and that the Claims Court had jurisdiction over this claim. The court also held that Portland Mint had sufficiently stated a claim for breach of this implied contract. The court affirmed the dismissal of the remaining three merits claims and did not reach the fifth claim concerning attorneys’ fees. The case was affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part for further proceedings. View "The Portland Mint v. United States" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between James Snell, a landscaper, and his insurer, United Specialty Insurance Company. Snell was sued for negligence after a child was injured on a trampoline he had installed at a client's home. United refused to defend Snell in the lawsuit, arguing that the accident did not arise from Snell’s landscaping work as defined in his commercial general liability policy. Snell sued United, alleging breach of contract and bad faith denial of coverage.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama granted summary judgment in favor of United. The court held that the accident did not arise from Snell's landscaping work within the meaning of his insurance policy. The court also found that Snell's bad faith claim failed because United had a lawful basis to deny the claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the allegations in the complaint did not trigger United’s duty to defend. The court also found that Snell's insurance application, which expressly stated that he did not do any recreational or playground equipment construction or erection, made clear that the policy did not cover his work in this case. The court further held that Alabama law does not preclude a decision on the duty to indemnify before judgment in the underlying case. Finally, the court concluded that Snell’s bad faith claim failed because he did not show that United wholly failed to investigate any part of his claim. View "Snell v. United Specialty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The case involves NGL Energy Partners LP and NGL Energy Holdings LLC (collectively, "NGL") and LCT Capital, LLC ("LCT"). NGL, entities in the energy sector, engaged LCT, a financial advisory services provider, for services related to NGL's 2014 acquisition of TransMontaigne Inc. However, the parties failed to agree on payment terms, leading LCT to file a lawsuit in 2015. The Superior Court held a jury trial in July 2018, which resulted in a $36 million verdict in LCT's favor.NGL appealed the Superior Court's decision, challenging the $36 million final judgment and a set of evidentiary rulings. LCT cross-appealed, contesting the Superior Court's methodology for computing post-judgment interest. NGL argued that the Superior Court erred by admitting evidence and arguments about the value/benefit supposedly gained by NGL in the Transaction, asserting that such evidence is prejudicial and irrelevant to a quantum meruit claim. NGL also argued that the Superior Court erred by admitting evidence of benefit-of-the-bargain or expectancy damages when assessing the quantum meruit value of LCT’s services.The Supreme Court of the State of Delaware affirmed the Superior Court’s evidentiary rulings and rejected NGL's contention that the Superior Court incorrectly allowed LCT to recover benefit-of-the bargain/expectancy damages. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Superior Court’s post-judgment interest determination. The Supreme Court held that prejudgment interest is part of the judgment upon which post-judgment interest accrues under Section 2301(a). Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court as to this issue and remanded the case to the Superior Court for entry of judgment consistent with its opinion. View "NGL Energy Partners LP v. LCT Capital, LLC" on Justia Law