An adult passenger in a car was injured in a single-car accident. The passenger and his family brought suit against the vehicle’s unlicensed minor driver, the minor’s mother, the owner of the car, the insurance policy holder, the insurer, and the insurance adjuster who handled the claims arising from the accident. The passenger’s father attempted to raise a contractual interference claim, but the superior court concluded that the complaint did not state such a claim on his behalf. The superior court dismissed the father’s only other claim (intentional infliction of emotional distress), removed the father’s name from the case caption, and ordered the father to cease filing pleadings on behalf of other parties. After the superior court judge dismissed him from the action, the passenger’s father attempted to file a first amended complaint, which expressly stated his contractual interference claim on the theory that he was a third-party beneficiary of the contracts between his son and his son’s doctors. But the superior court denied the father leave to amend the complaint because the father had already been dismissed from the case. Following a settlement among all of the other plaintiffs and defendants (which the father did not join) the superior court granted final judgment to the insurer. The insurer moved for attorney’s fees against the father under Alaska Civil Rule 82, but the father never responded to that motion. The superior court granted the award without soliciting a response from the father, and the father appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order dismissing the father’s claims and denying leave to amend the complaint because the proposed first amended complaint was futile. But because the superior court had barred the father from filing any further pleadings in the case and had removed his name from the caption, the superior court had a responsibility to inform the self-represented father that he was permitted to file an opposition to the motion for attorney’s fees. Therefore, the Court vacated the fee award and remanded the case to the superior court to afford the father an opportunity to respond to the insurer’s motion for reasonable attorney’s fees. View "Bush v. Elkins" on Justia Law

The Fergusons offered to sell their attorney, Yaspan, an interest in a London flat they owned. At Yaspan’s suggestion, the Fergusons hired independent counsel and the parties exchanged five drafts before signing a written agreement in 1995. This agreement enabled the Fergusons to recover nearly all of their original purchase price for the flat and still own half of it. Both the Fergusons and the Yaspans wanted to be partners with each other and not each others’ children, so they agreed that whichever couple outlived the other would have the right to buy out the deceased couple’s interest before that interest could pass to anyone else. The Fergusons were then 70 and 68 years old; the Yaspans were 49 and 47. The trial court concluded that Mrs. Ferguson’s 2011 petition to set aside the agreement as a product of Yaspan’s undue influence was untimely and without merit. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the trial court erred by looking at the fairness of the Agreement as a whole rather than focusing on terms Ferguson identified as unfair, and giving insufficient weight to the statistical likelihood that the buyout provision would favor the Yaspans. View "Ferguson v. Yaspan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff contracted to sell Defendants certain real property. The contract provided that Plaintiff would retain ownership of a sixty-foot wide strip of property to provide access to her remaining property, but the warranty deed failed to include the reservation. When it became difficult for Plaintiff to access her property due to improvements on the purchased real property, Plaintiff sued Defendants, alleging, among other claims that were subsequently dismissed, breach of contract. The trial court ruled for Plaintiff on the breach of contract claim and awarded her $650,000 in damages. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the gravamen of Plaintiff’s prevailing claim was injury to real property, and therefore, the claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to “actions for injuries to personal or real property.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff’s claim was not barred by the three-year statute of limitations because the gravamen of Plaintiff’s prevailing claim was breach of contract, to which the six-year statute of limitations for “actions on contracts not otherwise expressly provided for” applied. View "Benz-Elliott v. Barrett Enters., LP" on Justia Law

A Landlord leased separate properties to two different sets of Tenants using nearly identical written documents. This appeal concerned a dispute between the Landlord and Tenants regarding whether the leases were enforceable for their stated five-year terms or whether a clause providing for “annual review of rental rates” resulted in unenforceable “agreements to agree.” The Landlord sued the Tenants in separate actions, seeking a declaratory judgment to determine its rights under the leases. The district court concluded that the leases were valid and enforceable for their five-year terms. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the terms of the leases were clear and unambiguous and contemplated only an annual review without requiring an annual agreement. View "Gibbons Ranches, LLC v. Bailey" on Justia Law

AstraZeneca, which sells a heartburn drug called Nexium, and three generic drug companies (“generic defendants”) that sought to market generic forms of Nexium, entered into settlement agreements in which the generic defendants agreed not to challenge the validity of the Nexium patents and to delay the launch of their generic products. Certain union health and welfare funds that reimburse plan members for prescription drugs (the named plaintiffs) alleged that the settlement agreements constituted unlawful agreements between Nexium and the generic defendants not to compete. Plaintiffs sought class certification for a class of third-party payors, such as the named plaintiffs, and individual consumers. The district court certified a class. Relevant to this appeal, the class included individual consumers who would have continued to purchase branded Nexium for the same price after generic entry. The First Circuit affirmed the class certification, holding (1) class certification is permissible even if the class includes a de minimis number of uninjured parties; (2) the number of uninjured class members in this case was not significant enough to justify denial of certification; and (3) only injured class members will recover. View "In re Nexium Antitrust Litig." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a breach of contract claim against Zenith after Santana Morales, Jr. was crushed to death by a palm tree while working as a landscaper for Lawns. The Florida Supreme Court answered the following certified questions in the affirmative: (1) Does the estate have standing to bring its breach of contract claim against Zenith under the employer liability policy? (2) If so, does the provision in the employer liability policy which excludes from coverage "any obligation imposed by workers' compensation... law" operate to exclude coverage of the estate's claim against Zenith for the tort judgment? and (3) If the estate's claim is not barred by the workers' compensation exclusion, does the release in the workers' compensation settlement agreement otherwise prohibit the estate's collection of the tort judgment? The court concluded that, given the Florida Supreme Court's resolution of the certified issues, the district court correctly determined that the workers' compensation exclusion in Part II of the policy barred Zenith's coverage of the tort judgment against Lawns. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Zenith. View "Morales v. Zenith Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff offered to sell 3 million pounds of scrap copper to the defendant. The defendant negotiated the core terms of the sale but did not object to a fee-shifting provision: “In the event purchaser shall default in his obligations hereunder, purchaser shall be liable for [the plaintiff]’s costs of collection, including attorney’s fees.” The contract was negotiated between two experienced and sophisticated commercial entities. There was no duress. In a suit between the two, the otherwise victorious plaintiff appealed the district court’s ruling that the unilateral fee-shifting clause for attorney’s fees was unenforceable under Ohio law as a matter of public policy. The district court relied on Sixth Circuit precedent, holding that the Ohio Supreme Court would not enforce similar fee-shifting clauses. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that the Ohio Supreme Court has since clarified that it would enforce such unilateral or one-sided fee-shifting contract provisions. View "Allied Indus. Scrap, Inc. v. OmniSource Corp." on Justia Law

Cross-defendant Michael Tope appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of First American Title Insurance Company in a cross-action to recover money under a title insurance policy after default on a real estate loan to purchase and rehabilitate a home. The property was subject to a notice of abatement action issued by San Joaquin County requiring repair of defects in the rehabilitation of the residence. The subject of the suit was that First American allegedly breached the title insurance policy by failing to provide coverage for the notice of abatement action. Plaintiffs, investors in a real estate loan, sued defendants and cross-complainants Stockton Mortgage Real Estate Loan Servicing Corporation (SMRELS), Stockton Mortgage, Inc., Stockton Management & Development, Inc., and Ross Cardinalli Jr. (collectively cross-complainants) for damages arising from cross-complainants' alleged failure to follow up on the status of the release of a notice of abatement action. Cross-complainants, in turn, initiated this suit against First American, Alliance Title Company, and two of Alliance's employees for damages, indemnity, and declaratory relief arising out of First American's refusal to provide coverage under the title insurance policy, and Alliance's alleged representation, on behalf of First American, that it would obtain a release of the notice of abatement action prior to the close of escrow. First American moved for summary judgment mainly on grounds that the notice of abatement action was not covered under the title insurance policy, cross-complainants were not insured under the title insurance policy, and the preliminary title report relied on by cross-complainants was not a contract. The trial court granted First American's motion and entered summary judgment in its favor. Cross-complainants appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "Stockton Mortgage, Inc. v. Tope" on Justia Law

The parties in this case, two corporations, were parties to a Development Agreement. Defendant claimed Plaintiff owed it approximately $60 million under the Development Agreement. Plaintiff sought a declaration that it did not owe Defendant any money, and Defendant sought reformation of the Development Agreement. After two years of discovery, and as the trial approached, the parties filed a Joint Pretrial Stipulation and Proposed Order (the Proposed Order) identifying fifteen facts as admitted and not requiring proof at trial (the Admitted Facts). Plaintiff moved to have the Court of Chancery declare that certain facts were Admitted Facts and to require Defendant to meet and confer in good faith about additional Admitted Facts. The Court granted the motion, holding (1) facts Defendant admitted in its answer, in its responses to requests for admissions, and drawn from its sworn interrogatory responses constituted Admitted Facts, and Defendant should not have objected to their inclusion in the Proposed Order; and (2) Defendant did not confer in good faith regarding Admitted Facts as required by Ch. Ct. R. 16. View "Itron, Inc. v. Consert, Inc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute between Citigroup and ADIA regarding an Investment Agreement under which ADIA invested billions of dollars in Citigroup. At issue is the arbitration clause contained in the Agreement. The court held that the extraordinary remedies authorized by the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a), cannot be used to enjoin an arbitration based on whatever claim-preclusive effect may result from the district court's prior judgment when that judgment merely confirmed the result of the parties' earlier arbitration without considering the merits of the underlying claims at issue in that arbitration. Because Citigroup has not demonstrated an adequate basis for an extraordinary injunction under the Act, the court affirmed the judgment dismissing Citigroup's complaint and compelling arbitration. View "Citigroup, Inc. v. Abu Dhabi Investment Auth." on Justia Law