Plaintiffs, former employees of Pacific Bell, took early retirement, with the option to take a pension or a lump sum payment. All chose the lump sum, persuaded to do so by Kearney, with whom each plaintiff had significant interaction, having first learned of her from presentations made at the Pacific Bell premises. All became clients of Kearney, in connection with which they signed some documents, by which Kearney came to manage and invest their retirement proceeds, in some cases for years. Dissatisfied, plaintiffs sued Kearney and AIG Financial Advisors, the successor to the company where Kearney originally worked. AIGFA filed a petition to compel arbitration, supported in part by a declaration of Kearney. Without holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the petition. That arbitration occurred, with the arbitrators ultimately issuing an award rejecting plaintiffs’ claims. After judgment was entered on the award, plaintiffs appealed. The court of appeal reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. View "Ashburn v. AIG Fin. Advisors, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Germain and GM Enterprises, filed suit against defendants, HCH and Metropolitan, alleging breach of contract claims related to an option to purchase based on the assignment of a lease agreement. The district court dismissed the complaint because plaintiffs were precluded from bringing the action where a state court already had decided the issue underlying the claims alleged in their federal complaint. As a preliminary matter, the court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar plaintiffs' claims where their complaint alleged injuries caused by breach of contract and related to torts. Turning to section 13 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, the court believed that the Arkansas Supreme Court would hold that the state-court judgment in this case was sufficiently firm to be considered final for purposes of issue preclusion; based on the state court's conclusion and the terms of the subordination agreement, Germain was not entitled to specific performance of the option and dismissal of the federal declaratory-judgment action was appropriate; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees to defendants. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Germain Real Estate v. HCH Toyota" on Justia Law

NanoMech, researcher and developer of nanotechnologies, filed suit against defendant, a former employee, for breach of a noncompete agreement. On appeal, NanoMech challenged the district court's judgment on the pleadings for defendant. The court affirmed the district court's finding that the noncompete agreement was unenforceable under Arkansas law where any error in the district court's decision to convert defendant's motion to dismiss into a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings was harmless; under Arkansas law, a noncompete agreement must be valid as written; and a blanket prohibition on defendant's ability to seek employment of any kind with an employer in the nanotechnology industry anywhere in the world is overbroad, unreasonable, and therefore unenforceable. View "NanoMech, Inc. v. Suresh" on Justia Law

Before it was acquired by DirecTV, 180 Connect entered into an employment arbitration agreement with Marenco, which prohibited filing a class or collective action, or a representative or private attorney general action. After acquiring 180 Connect, DirecTV retained employees, including Marenco. Marenco later filed suit, alleging that DirecTV had issued debit cards in payment of wages to a putative class of employees. Plaintiffs who used their cards to withdraw cash at ATM machines were required to pay an activation fee and a cash withdrawal fee, resulting in DirecTV’s failure to pay plaintiffs’ full wages in violation of the Unfair Competition Law and Labor Code 212. DirecTV moved to compel arbitration of Marenco’s individual claims, and stay the class claims. Marenco argued that DirecTV lacked standing to enforce the agreement and that the agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable under California law. The U.S. Supreme Court then issued its 2011 decision, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts the California rule of unconscionability. The trial court ordered arbitration of Marenco’s individual claims, holding that DirecTV had standing; the class action waiver is not unconscionable; and prohibition of representative actions does not violate the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. 157). The court of appeal affirmed. View "Marenco v. DirecTV, LLC" on Justia Law

Footstar operated the footwear departments in various Kmart stores as though they were islands. Footstar employees could only work in those departments unless they had written permission from Kmart. In 2005, a Footstar employee tried to help a customer get an infant carrier off a shelf outside the footwear department and the customer was injured. She sued. Kmart sought indemnification from Footstar and its insurer, Liberty Mutual. A magistrate judge found that Footstar and Liberty Mutual both had a duty to defend beginning the day Kmart formally requested coverage since the injury was potentially coverable under the agreement between Kmart and Footstar and the insurance policy. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that neither Liberty Mutual nor Footstar had a duty to indemnify Kmart because the injury did not occur “pursuant to” or “under” the agreement between Kmart and Footstar. That agreement specifically precluded Footstar employees from working outside of the footwear department, where the injury occurred, and actions taken in contravention of the agreement were not “pursuant to” or “under” it. Liberty Mutual did not deny coverage in bad faith and that Kmart did not breach the relevant notice provisions such that Liberty Mutual and Footstar could withhold defense costs. View "Kmart Corp. v. Footstar, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2000, Plaintiff purchased a lot in a subdivision being developed by Markirk Construction, Inc., of which Kirk Jones was president. The next year, Plaintiff completed construction of a home on the lot. In 2009, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation in connection with the negotiation and sale of the lot. The jury found in favor of Jones. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it had to find Jones knew that the alleged misrepresentations were false when he made them. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly instructed the jury that Defendant’s alleged representations concerned future events, and therefore, in order for Plaintiff to recover, Jones must have made these representations with knowledge when they were made that the representations were false. View "Stevens v. Markirk Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a law firm, appealed the district court's dismissal of its implied-in-fact contract and quasi-contract claims against Kraft. The dispute stemmed from the Firm's advice to Kraft regarding an antitrust claim. The court concluded that the Firm's implied-in-fact contract claim failed because the complaint does not plausibly allege that Kraft was "reasonably notified" that the Firm expected to be paid for any work completed before that point. The Firm's quasi-contract claim failed because the Firm's services were rendered simply in order to gain a business advantage. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Berry Law v. Kraft Foods Group" on Justia Law

Sister and Brother were co-trustees of a family Trust established by the siblings' parents. Before their mother died, she entered into a contract for deed with Brother for the sale of 480 acres of trust farmland. After the mother died, the siblings stipulated for court supervision of the Trust. Within the Trust action, Sister sued Brother and his wife for undue influence on his contract for deed with their mother. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Brother, concluding that Sister’s claim of undue influence was barred by the statute of limitations and that any oral agreement associated with the contract for deed was barred by the statute of frauds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Sister did not timely bring her claim for undue influence, the circuit court correctly ruled that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) because Sister sought to enforce her asserted interest in the sale of real estate, the circuit court correctly ruled that any oral agreement regarding the real estate was barred by the statute of frauds. View "In re Matheny Family Trust" on Justia Law

The town of Yarmouth entered into a transportation contract with the Bay Colony Railroad Corporation whereby Bay Colony was to transport solid waste from the town’s waste transfer station to a facility in Rochester. The town later notified Bay Colony that it would terminate Bay Colony’s lease of certain rail lines, which meant that Bay Colony would no longer be able to transport the town’s waste by rail. A provision in the contract provided that, in the event the lease of the rail line was terminated, the town would permit Bay Colony to continue to transport the waste by “other modes of transportation.” Bay Colony notified the town that it would continue to transport waste by truck rather than rail. The town, however, began transporting its waste with the railroad operating company that was awarded the rail lease. A jury found that the town had committed a breach of the contract. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the town’s affirmative defense that it was barred by Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 160, 70A from allowing Bay Colony to transport its waste by truck failed as a matter of law; (2) a permit issued to the town by the Department of Environmental Protection did not render Bay Colony legally unable to perform the contract after it lost its rail lease; and (3) the contract remained in effect at the time of the town’s breach. View "Bay Colony R.R. Corp. v. Town of Yarmouth" on Justia Law

In 2009, Central Arkansas Water, which owns and operates Lake Maumelle as a public water supply, authorized the collection of a “watershed fee” imposed on wholesale customers, including Appellants. That same year, Pulaski County and Central Arkansas Water (collectively, Appellees) entered into a watershed protection agreement. Appellants filed suit on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated taxpayers, arguing that the watershed fee constituted an illegal exaction and that the the watershed protection agreement necessitated Central Arkansas Water to expend public funds illegally. The circuit court entered summary judgment for Appellees, concluding that the agreement was a proper contract for administrative services. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly ruled that the watershed protection agreement was a valid agreement under Arkansas law. View "Sullins v. Cent. Ark. Water" on Justia Law