In 2011, the Town of Middletown issued an invitation for bids on a drainage improvement project. Two contractors submitted bids, including HK&S Construction Holding Corp., which provided the lowest bid. Woodard & Curran, Inc. recommended against awarding HK&S the project and in favor of negotiating a contract with the second bidder. The town counsel concluded that HK&S’s bid was non-responsive and awarded the contract to the second bidder. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Town and Woodard & Curran alleging, among other claims, that the Town violated state and local law when it denied the contract award for the project. The superior court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no error in disposing of HK&S’s claims against the Town in summary judgment where HK&S failed to submit a responsive bid; and (2) HK&S’s claim of negligence against Woodard & Curran also failed. View "HK&S Constr. Holding Corp. v. Dible" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a life insurance agent with the New Life Insurance Company for more than forty years. In 2009, Plaintiff was informed that his agent contract would be terminated. In 2012 and 2014, Plaintiff filed two separate suits against New York Life, alleging, in addition to several common-law claims, age discrimination under both Massachusetts law and the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The U.S. District Court of the District of Massachusetts consolidated the two cases. The district court then granted summary judgment for New York Life on all claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s state law age discrimination claims were time barred; (2) no reasonable jury could conclude that New York Life engaged in age discrimination under federal law in terminating his agent contract; and (3) no reasonable jury could conclude that the termination breached Plaintiff’s contract with New York Life or violated any of Plaintiff’s common law rights. View "Santangelo v. New York Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A property developer filed suit against several defendants involved in a construction project asserting claims for negligence and breach of contract. Defendants filed motions to compel arbitration, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the developer must arbitrate its claims against the general contractor but not its claims against the other defendants, as (1) the developer agreed to arbitrate its claims against the general contractor, and the general contractor did not waive its right to demand arbitration; (2) the developer’s argument that a contractual deadline barred the general contractor’s demand for arbitration was itself a claim that must be arbitrated; (3) the developer did not agree in the general contract to arbitrate its claims against the other defendants; (4) the developer was not equitably estopped from denying its assent to its purported agreement that the other defendants could enforce the general contract’s arbitration provisions; and (5) the subcontracts did not require the parties to arbitrate these claims. View "G.T. Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P., L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff bought the property in 2007. The last tenants moved out in 2010. Gas and electric utilities were turned off. In 2011, Plaintiff submitted a claim to Fire Insurance Exchange for a fire at the property. Exchange retained a fire investigator, who reported, “it appears the fire may have been initiated as the result of an uncontrolled warming fire started by an unauthorized inhabitant. Signs of possible habitation were present and the relatively isolated location would permit this. … firewood … and the mattress next to the large hole in the floor also supports this theory.” The property did not have a fireplace. The claims adjuster concluded “Likely transient in house and warming fire got out of hand.” The policy did not “cover direct or indirect loss from: . . . Vandalism or Malicious Mischief, breakage of glass and safety glazing materials if the dwelling has been vacant for more than 30 consecutive days just before the loss.” Vandalism is not defined in the policy. After denial of the claim, Plaintiff filed a complaint for breach of contract and insurance bad faith. The trial court granted Exchange summary adjudication. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the exclusion did not apply. View "Ong v. Fire Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

Law firms Campbell Harrison & Dagley, L.L.P. (CHD), and Calloway, Norris, Burdette & Weber, P.L.L.C. (CNBW) (collectively, the firms), challenged the district court’s partial vacatur of most of an arbitration award, rendered pursuant to a fee agreement (combining a high hourly-rate fee and a low-percentage contingency fee), which governed the firms’ representation of Albert G. Hill, III, and his wife, Erin Hill. After arbitrating a dispute over the requested payment to the firms under the fee agreement, the arbitrators awarded them approximately $28 million. Although the district court, inter alia, enforced the hourly-rate fee award, it vacated the contingency-fee award as unconscionable. In rejecting the arbitrators’ determinations regarding the uncertainty of recovery, the reasonableness of the total fee, and unconscionability, the Fifth Circuit concluded the district court “substitute[d] [its] judgment for that of the arbitrators merely because [it] would have reached a different decision”. As a result, it erred in vacating the contingency-fee-portion of the award and related awards (for the arbitration, the firms’ attorney’s fees, other fees, expenses, and arbitrators’ compensation; and pre-judgment interest on the contingency-fee portion). The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court with respect to the unconscionability issue, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The district court was affirmed in all other respects. View "Campbell Harrison & Dagley, et al v. Hill" on Justia Law

Insurer Cincinnati Specialty Underwriters Insurance Company appealed a trial court's order granting summary judgment to defendants Energy Wise, Inc. and Michael and Shirley Uhler in this declaratory-judgment action. Energy Wise was a Vermont corporation that specialized in insulating buildings and homes. It purchased a commercial general liability (CGL) policy from insurer, effective March 1, 2010 to March 1, 2011. In late 2010, Energy Wise installed spray-foam insulation at the Shrewsbury Mountain School. A school employee, Shirley Uhler, and her husband later filed suit against Energy Wise. Ms. Uhler asserted that she was "exposed to and encountered airborne chemicals and airborne residues" from the spray-foam insulation and suffered bodily injury as a result. The Uhlers raised claims of negligence, res ipsa loquitur, and loss of consortium. Energy Wise requested coverage under its CGL policy, and insurer agreed to defend Energy Wise under a bilateral reservation of rights. In September 2012, insurer filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, asserting that its policy did not cover the claims at issue. Insurer cited the "Total Pollution Exclusion Endorsement" in its policy, which excluded coverage for "[b]odily injury . . . [that] would not have occurred in whole or in part but for the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of ‘pollutants' at any time." Insurer argued that the court should have granted summary judgment in its favor because the "total pollution exclusion" in its policy plainly and unambiguously precludes coverage in this case. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with insurer, and therefore reversed the trial court's decision and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in insurer's favor. View "Cincinnati Specialty Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Energy Wise Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

Kelly Kohn and Kohn Electric, LLC, appealed a damages award given in favor of Eugene Pegg for $11,299 for breach of an oral partnership agreement. Pegg had been an electrician for more than 30 years and had several employers throughout his career. In 1999, Sungold, a sunflower seed processing facility, became Pegg's customer, and Pegg brought the Sungold account with him when he changed employers. Kohn had been an electrician since 1996 and became a partner in each of the companies in which he was employed. In 2009, both Pegg and Kohn worked at Enterprise Electric in Valley City. In March 2009, Kohn left Enterprise Electric and started Kohn Electric. In June 2009, Pegg was dissatisfied with his job at Enterprise Electric because the company refused to pay him a percentage of the substantial revenue generated by the Sungold account. Pegg testified he approached Kohn and proposed that they become partners in Kohn Electric, with Pegg contributing the Sungold account and $10,000 in capital. In return, Pegg would receive 10 percent of the gross revenue generated by the Sungold account, 10 percent of Kohn Electric's net revenue, and an hourly wage. Pegg stated he agreed to the same wage he received from Enterprise Electric and agreed to no paid vacations or overtime pay. Although no written agreement existed about the alleged partnership, Pegg testified he and Kohn "shook hands on it," and Pegg began working at Kohn Electric in July 2009. Pegg paid $9,152.49 for a pickup truck titled in Kohn Electric and paid for tools and equipment for the business. After Kohn denied he and Pegg were partners, Pegg quit Kohn Electric and in 2011 brought this action for breach of the oral partnership agreement, seeking recovery of proceeds due under the agreement. Before trial, Kohn paid Pegg $9,152.49 for his contributions to the business. Following a bench trial, the district court found the parties entered into an oral partnership agreement, Pegg substantially performed his obligations under the agreement by contributing the pickup, equipment and the Sungold account, and Kohn breached the agreement. The court found no agreement existed giving Pegg 10 percent of Kohn Electric's net income from all accounts, but it awarded Pegg $11,164 representing 10 percent of the gross revenue generated from the Sungold account during Pegg's employment. Judgment of $11,299, including costs and disbursements, was entered against Kohn and Kohn Electric. Because the district court's challenged findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pegg v. Kohn" on Justia Law

Coyote Springs Investment, LLC and BrightSource Energy, Inc. entered into a lease. One year later, BrightSource sought to terminate the lease. Coyote Springs sued BrightSource, claiming that the lease’s termination was ineffective without payment of the termination fee. Before trial, the parties deposed Harvey Whittemore, the former co-owner and manager of Coyote Springs. During the deposition, Coyote Springs requested a recess in order to conduct a private conference with Whittemore. The trial commenced, and during cross-examination of Whittemore, BrightSource’s counsel inquired as to what was discussed at the deposition conference. Coyote Springs objected based on attorney-client privilege. The trial court overruled the objection, determining that the communication was not privileged. Coyote Springs petitioned for extraordinary writ relief on the deposition issue. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the communications between Whittemore and counsel for Coyote Springs during the break in Whittemore’s deposition were discoverable because Coyote Springs requested the recess in the deposition and failed to make a sufficient, contemporaneous record of the conference so as to preserve the attorney-client privilege. View "Coyote Springs Inv., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of Daymar College students, filed a lawsuit against Daymar, challenging the college’s admissions process as both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Specifically, Plaintiffs challenged the incorporation of an arbitration provision on the reverse side of the Student Enrollment Agreement, claiming they were unaware of the arbitration provision’s existence, let alone its meaning. The trial court refused to compel arbitration, concluding that the arbitration agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Daymar’s attempted incorporation was unsuccessful, and therefore, Plaintiffs were not bound by the arbitration provision on the reverse side of the Agreement. View "Dixon v. Daymar Colleges Group, LLC" on Justia Law

After Rio School District’s new school was completed, the District and its general contractor (FTR) engaged in a decade-long legal battle, resulting in a judgment for FTR exceeding $9 million. Public Contract Code section 7107 allows a public entity to withhold funds due a contractor when there are liens on the property or a good faith dispute concerning whether the work was properly performed. The trial court assessed penalties against District because it did not timely release the retained funds. The court of appeal affirmed in part. A dispute over the contract price does not entitle a public entity to withhold funds due a contractor; the doctrine of unclean hands does not apply to section 7107; the trial court properly rejected the District's action under the False Claims Act, Government Code section 12650 and properly assessed prejudgment interest, subject to adjustment for any extra work claims found untimely on remand. The trial court erred in its interpretation of a contract provision imposing time limitations to submit the contractor's claims for extra work as requiring a showing of prejudice and erred in awarding fees for work not solely related to FTR's section 7107 cause of action. View "East West Bank v. Rio School Dist." on Justia Law