In 2012, a fire destroyed three buildings and related equipment that were owned by Jackson Hop, LLC, and were used to dry hops, to process and bale hops, and to store hop bales. The buildings were insured by Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho for the actual cash value of the buildings and equipment, not to exceed the policy limit. Farm Bureau’s appraisers determined that the actual cash value of the buildings was $295,000 and the value of the equipment was $85,909. Farm Bureau paid Jackson Hop $380,909. Jackson Hop disagreed with that figure, and it hired its own appraiser, who concluded that the actual cash value of the buildings and equipment totaled $1,410,000. Farm Bureau retained another appraiser to review the report of Jackson Hop’s appraiser, and that appraiser concluded that the value of $1,410,000 was unrealistically high. Jackson Hop filed this action to recover the balance of what it contended was owing under the insurance policy, plus prejudgment interest. The parties agreed to submit the matter to arbitration as provided in the policy. During that process, Jackson Hop presented additional opinions regarding the actual cash values, ranging from $800,000 to $1,167,000 for the buildings and $379,108 to $399,000 for the equipment. Farm Bureau’s experts revised their opinions upward, although only from $295,000 to $333,239 for the buildings and from $85,909 to $133,000 for the equipment. Before completion of the arbitration, Farm Bureau paid an additional sum of $85,330. Arbitrators determined that the actual cash value of the buildings and the equipment was $740,000 and $315,000, respectively, for a total of $1,055,000. Within seven days of the arbitrators’ decision, Farm Bureau paid Jackson Hop $588,761, which was the amount of the arbitrators’ award less the prior payments. Jackson Hop filed a motion asking the district court to confirm the arbitrators’ award and to award Jackson Hop prejudgment interest, court costs, and attorney fees. Farm Bureau filed an objection to the request for court costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest. The court awarded Jackson Hop attorney fees, but denied the request for court costs because the parties’ arbitration agreement stated that both parties would pay their own costs, and the court denied the request for prejudgment interest because the amount of damages was unliquidated and unascertainable by a mathematical process until the arbitrators’ award. Jackson Hop then appealed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jackson Hop v. Farm Bureau Insurance" on Justia Law

Appellant, Stilwyn, Inc., brought suit against the Respondents stating nine claims for relief arising out of a failed transaction to purchase an interest in a loan. The district court dismissed those claims, holding that they were barred by prior federal litigation involving Stilwyn, two of the Respondents, and the same failed transaction. It held the claims were barred by claim preclusion and because the claims were compulsory counterclaims in the federal litigation that were not asserted there. Stilwyn argued on appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court that the district court erred in both respects. Respondents cross-appealed to argue that the district court erred in failing to grant their requests for attorney fees. Respondents also requested attorney fees on appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the district court erred in its conclusion that Stilwyn's claims were barred by claim preclusion; (2) the district court erred in concluding that Stilwyn's claims were compulsory in the federal litigation; and (3) the district court did not err in refusing to grant attorney fees. View "Stilwyn, Inc. v. Rokan Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this putative class action against Defendants - Nisource Corporate Services Company and AGL Resources, Inc. - alleging that Defendants engaged in deceptive business practices by disguising credit sales of hot water heaters as leases to avoid making the disclosures required under federal and Massachusetts’ consumer protection laws. Plaintiff alleged three disclosure violations: (1) a federal claim under the Truth in Lending Act; (2) a state law claim under the Massachusetts Retail Installment Sales and Services Act (RISSA) and (3) a state law claim under the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act (CCCDA). The district court found that Plaintiff did not qualify for protection in light of the state-law standards governing these transactions and dismissed her suit. The First Circuit affirmed on alternate grounds, holding (1) Plaintiff’s federal claim under TILA is barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) as to the pendent state law claims, which were timely, the Court affirmed dismissal for failure to state a claim. View "Philibotte v. Nisource Corp. Services Co." on Justia Law

Arborjet, Inc. (Plaintiff), which manufactures and sells an emamectin benzoate solution used to protect trees from pests called TREE-age, granted Rainbow Treecare Scientific Advancements, Inc. (Defendant) an exclusive right to distribute TREE-age pursuant to a sales agency contract. After termination of this agreement, Defendant began marketing and distributing ArborMectin, another emamectin benzoate combination meant to compete directly with TREE-age. Plaintiff sued Defendant seeking to enjoin Defendant’s sales of ArborMectin and alleging several claims. The district court granted Plaintiff a preliminary injunction to run during the litigation that was meant to enforce the contractual agreement and prohibit a trademark violation. The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the order comprising the preliminary injunction, holding (1) it was not clear error to find a likely showing that Defendant contributed to the creation of ArborMectin; (2) the district court did not err in entering the portion of the preliminary injunction based on Arborjet’s contract claim; but (3) ordering proper attribution of “Arborjet” and “TREE-age” was improper given the district court’s rulings on the Lanham Act claims. View "Arborjet, Inc. v. Rainbow Treecare Scientific Advancements, Inc." on Justia Law

The Cleveland Indians hired National to produce Kids Day events at baseball games, with attractions, including an inflatable bouncy castle and inflatable slide. The contract required National to secure a five-million-dollar comprehensive liability policy. National submitted an Application to Doodson Insurance Brokerage, stating on the application that the Kids Day events would include inflatable attractions. Doodson arranged for National to obtain a policy, but it excluded from coverage injuries caused by inflatable slides. Johnson admiring a display at a 2010 Indians game, was crushed by an inflatable slide that collapsed onto him. He died of his injuries. Johnson’s estate won a $3.5 million state court default judgment against National. The Sixth Circuit held that the insurance policy did not cover Johnson’s injuries. National and the Indians sued Doodson and obtained settlements. Johnson’s estate, which has not collected on the default judgment against National, sued Doodson, alleging negligence and breach of contract. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. Under Michigan law, the broker’s contractual duty to its client to protect the client from negligence suits, without more, does not create a tort duty to an injured party who brings such suits and Johnson was neither a party to nor an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract between the broker and National. View "Johnson v. Doodson Ins. Brokerage" on Justia Law

Employees of Instant, an information-technology staffing firm sign agreements in which they promise not to solicit business from Instant’s clients, not to recruit Instant’s employees to other jobs, and not to disclose the firm’s sensitive information to outsiders. DeFazio was Instant’s Vice President until 2012, when she was fired. She was already cofounding Connect, a new tech-staffing firm, and began working there immediately, along with several coworkers she persuaded to leave Instant. Connect won business from several of Instant’s recent clients. Instant sued DeFazio and others for breaching the restrictive covenants and under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. 1030. DeFazio counterclaimed, alleging that Instant shortchanged her on a bonus. The court concluded that no one is liable to anyone else. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing that defendants did not leak or otherwise misuse Instant’s proprietary data. Defendants admitted breaching the covenants not to solicit and not to recruit, but in Illinois a restrictive covenant in an employment agreement is valid only if it serves a “legitimate business interest.” The district court concluded that neither covenant did. Tech-staffing firms do not build relationships with clients that would justify restricting their employees from setting out on their own. View "Instant Tech. LLC v. DeFazio" on Justia Law

John and Jane Couto entered into a contract with Joseph General Contracting, Inc. for the purchase and construction of a home and carriage house. The trial court found that the contract existed also between the Coutos and Anthony Silvestri, the owner and president of Joseph General. After disputes arose regarding the construction of the dwellings, Joseph General sued the Coutos for, inter alia, breach of contract. The Coutos counterclaimed against Joseph General, Silvestri and Landel Realty, LLC. The trial court held Joseph General, Landel and Silvestri each jointly and severally liable for breach of contract and implied warranty, trespass and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). Silvestri appealed the propriety of these adverse rulings with respect to his personal liability. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment pertaining to Silvestri in an individual capacity. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court as to the claims of breach and contract and implied warranty against Silvestri in his individual capacity and affirmed in all other respects, holding that the Appellate Court (1) erred in determining that Silvestri had incurred contractual obligations to the Coutos in his individual capacity; and (2) properly determined that Silvestri could be held individually liable for alleged violations of CUTPA. View "Joseph Gen. Contracting, Inc. v. Couto" on Justia Law

AVR, an Israeli corporation, and Interton, a Minnesota corporation, produce hearing aid technology, and entered into an Agreement, giving Interton a 20 percent interest in AVR. During negotiations, they discussed integrating AVR's DFC technology into Interton's products, and Interton's purchase of AVR's W.C. components. The Agreement incorporated terms indicating that the Agreement would be governed by the laws of the State of Israel and that “Any dispute between the parties relating to (or arising out of) the provisions of this Agreement … will be referred exclusively to the decision of a single arbitrator … bound by Israeli substantive law.” AVR commenced arbitration in Israel. Interton participated, but believed that disputes concerning DFC and W.C. were separate and not subject to arbitration. The Israeli Supreme Court rejected Interton's objection to the scope of arbitration, citing the "relating to (or arising out of)" language. An Israeli arbitrator awarded AVR $2,675,000 on its DFC and W.C. claims, plus fees and expenses. After the award became final in Israel, in accordance with the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 U.S.C. 201, AVR successfully petitioned the district court for recognition and enforcement in the US. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The Convention does not allow Interton to relitigate the scope of arbitration in an American court. View "AVR Commc'ns, Ltd. v. Am. Hearing Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Roy Caputo, Wade Faerber, and Matthew Neel leased commercial space from DKN Holdings LLC and were each jointly and severally liable on this contract. Caputo later sued DKN for, inter alia, breach of contract. DKN cross-complained for monies due. The court rejected Caputo’s claims and awarded $2.8 million in DKN’s cross-complaint. Before the statement of decision in the Caputo action was filed, DKN sued Faerber and Neel for breach of the lease. Faerber demurred, arguing that suit against him was barred by the rule against splitting a cause of action because DKN’s rights under the lease had been adjudicated in the Caputo action. The trial court sustained the demurrer and entered judgment for Faerber. The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that a second suit is barred after entry of judgment against one of the contracting parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) joint and several liability does not implicate the “primary rights” doctrine wherein a cause of action arises from the invasion of a primary right and gives rise to only one cause of action; (2) the facts of this case do not support preclusion; and (3) Plaintiff has separate breach of contract claims against each defendant alleged to be jointly and severally liable. View "DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber" on Justia Law

VDF has trademark and patent rights in “CoffeeBerry” extract and licensed J&J to make and sell CoffeeBerry-based skin-care products. VDF was entitled to “running royalties,” based on the number of sales by the licensee, or by sublicensees. The license permitted J&J to sublicense its rights and required J&J to pay a minimum quarterly royalty if running royalties fell below a specified level. The license could not be assigned without written permission, but it did not forbid a change of control of J&J. J&J sublicensed Stiefel, a manufacturer of dermatological products. Four years later, J&J’s owners sold their interests to Stiefel for $8.5 million. J&J became a Stiefel subsidiary. After buying J&J’s stock, Stiefel engineered amended the sublicence, reducing the alternative minimum royalties that Stiefel owed J&J and diverting part of the license-revenue stream from VDF and J&J to Stiefel. VDF filed suit, alleging de facto assignment and breach of contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants with respect to claims that they engineered an unauthorized assignment of the license and that the $8.5 million paid for J&J was really a purchase of J&J’s anticipated sales revenue, so that part of that revenue should have gone to VDF as advance royalties. View "VDF Futureceuticals, Inc. v. Stiefel Labs, Inc." on Justia Law