Defendant Dennis Sallaz and Defendants-counterclaimants Glenn Trefren and Tradesman Contractors and Construction, LLC, (collectively “Appellants”) appealed the district court’s holding they could not recover breach of contract damages or obtain equitable relief for the failure of Plaintiff-counterdefendant Real Properties, LLC, to pay the full purchase price under an agreement for the sale and purchase of Real Homes, LLC. Although the district court found that the contract between Sallaz and Trefren, as sellers, and Real Properties, as buyer, was valid, it held that Real Properties’ performance of the contract was excused because of a material breach by the sellers. The district court held that equitable relief was not available because of the existence of the contract. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the counterclaimants' claim for breach of contract. The district court's dismissal of count 3 of the counterclaim was vacated and remanded pending the outcome of reconsideration of count 1. View "Rice v. Sallaz" on Justia Law

Sentinel Insurance Company, Limited appealed a declaratory judgment entered in favor of Alabama Municipal Insurance Corporation ("AMIC") in this dispute between Sentinel and AMIC over which insurance company was responsible for providing primary insurance coverage in an underlying automobile-accident case. After reviewing the AMIC policy and the Sentinel policy, the Supreme Court concluded that the language in each was unambiguous as to which provided primary coverage: the AMIC policy provided primary coverage, and the Sentinel policy provided excess coverage. The Court held that the trial court erred in concluding that the Sentinel policy provided primary coverage. Therefore, the trial court's judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Sentinel Insurance Company, Ltd. v. Alabama Municipal Insurance Corp." on Justia Law

HKS a Texas architecture firm, provided services for a luxury hotel in Mammoth Lakes under an Agreement that contained a Texas forum selection clause, requiring mediation, and a Texas choice of law provision.The Agreement authorized HKS to hire “[c]onsultants.” Vita, a California landscape design firm, submitted to HKS a Contract incorporating the terms of the Agreement. Neither Vita or HKS signed the Contract, but Vita performed work in 2008, during the “design phase” and sent invoices to HKS. Owner began having financial problems before construction commenced, leaving HKS with unpaid bills for its own services and those provided by “consultants.” HKS obtained a judgment against Owner in 2010 in Texas for $1,617,073.70 but was unable to recover anything. In 2013, Vita sued HKS, alleging breach of contract; unjust enrichment; quantum meruit; and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, seeking $370,650.53. After answering the complaint, HKS moved to enforce the forum selection clause and dismiss. The court of appeal reversed dismissal. HKS established the existence of a contract between HKS and Vita containing a forum selection clause, but Code of Civil Procedure 410.42 prohibits enforcement of construction contract provisions requiring disputes between contractors and California subcontractors to be litigated outside California. View "Vita Planning & Landscape Architecture, Inc. v. HKS Architects, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was assured by Bank that he would qualify for and receive a small business, government-backed loan. After Plaintiff was notified that no government-backed loan was available and aware that he had various potential causes of action against Bank, Plaintiff nonetheless sought and obtained a new commercial loan from the Bank and subsequently expressly waived all offsets and defenses. More than six years after Plaintiff first became aware that no government-backed loan was available, he filed a complaint alleging that he obtained the commercial loan in reliance upon the Bank’s representation that the government-backed loan was forthcoming. Bank raised the statutes of limitation as an affirmative defense and filed a compulsory counterclaim to collect on the amount owed on the commercial loan. The trial court granted summary judgment for Bank. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the undisputed facts showed that Plaintiff chose to obtain a new commercial loan after learning no government-backed loan was available and repeatedly reaffirmed his obligations under the commercial loan and expressly waived any offsets and defenses to the loan and against Bank. Remanded. View "Ussery v. Branch Banking & Trust Co." on Justia Law

Appellants guaranteed a promissory note executed in favor of Respondent, which was secured by land in Arizona. The guaranties were executed in Nevada and contained a Nevada choice-of-law provision. After default on the note, Respondent filed a complaint in Nevada and then initiated foreclosure proceedings in Arizona. Respondent sought a deficiency judgment on the guaranty through its initially filed complaint. The district court concluded that because the property was located in Arizona and sold pursuant to Arizona law, neither Arizona’s nor Nevada’s limitations period applied for seeking a deficiency judgment, and therefore, the deficiency judgment could proceed. Judgment was entered in Respondent’s favor for $929,224. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because of the choice-of-law provision in the promissory note, Nevada law - particularly Nevada’s limitations period - applied in this case; and (2) Respondent failed to comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.455(1) because it did not apply for a deficiency judgment within six months of the foreclosure sale, and therefore, the district court erred when it denied Appellants’ motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred. View "Mardian v. Greenberg Family Trust" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Utah-based credit union, loaned an amount of money secured by real property in Mesquite Nevada to Respondents. Respondents later defaulted. Appellant held a trustee’s sale, resulting in a deficiency on the loan balance. Appellant sued Respondents in Clark County to recover the deficiency. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the action under Nev. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), alleging that Appellant could not sue to recover the deficiency in Nevada. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the note and loan agreement contained language clearly expressing the parties’ intent to submit litigation relating to the note and agreement to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah. At issue on appeal was whether forum selection clauses in the loan agreement and note were mandatory or permissive. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the contract clauses stating that the parties shall “submit themselves to the jurisdiction of” Utah were permissive forum selection clauses, and therefore, the district court erred when it found that Utah was the sole forum for any controversy and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Am. First Fed. Credit Union v. Soro" on Justia Law

Stephen Hansen was injured when Brad Aguilar struck Hansen’s vehicle. Hansen sued Aguilar, who was insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. State Farm agreed to defend Aguilar under a reservation of rights. Aguilar agreed to a settlement with Hansen in which he assigned his rights against State Farm to Hansen. Hansen filed this action in federal district court alleging, among other claims, that State Farm breached a contract in its representation of Aguilar. The federal district court concluded that State Farm breached its contractual duty to defend Aguilar because it did not provide Aguilar with independent counsel of his choosing. State Farm moved for reconsideration. The federal district court granted the motion in part and certified two questions to the Supreme Court concerning Nevada’s conflict-of-interest rules in insurance litigation. The Supreme Court answered (1) Nevada law requires an insurer to provide independent counsel for its insured when a conflict of interest exists between the insurer and its insured; and (2) an insurer is only obligated to provide independent counsel when an actual of conflict exists, and a reservation of rights letter does not create a per se conflict of interest. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hansen" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Keith Randall Sparkman and In-Depth Sanitary Service, Inc., filed a complaint against Defendants, CONSOL Energy Inc. and CONSOL of Kentucky, Inc. for breach of contract and tortious interference with contract. The contracts at issue in this dispute were entered into by In-Depth Sanitary Service Group, which was not named in the complaint. The jury found in favor of “Keith Randall Sparkman d/b/a In-Depth Service Group." Defendants appealed, and Plaintiffs cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals disposed of the matter sua sponte based on a perceived lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the wrong parties had filed suit, and the trial court’s judgment awarded damages to a “non-party.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the judgment of the trial court identified the correct party because the parties mutually consented to the amendment of the complaint to reflect Keith Randall Sparkman d/b/a In-Depth Sanitary Service Group; and (2) the naming of the parties in the notice of cross-appeal was sufficient to transfer jurisdiction to the court of appeals. View "Sparkman v. Consol Energy of Kentucky, Inc." on Justia Law

Irish Oil & Gas, Inc. was an oil and gas exploration, production, and brokerage company. Border Resources, LLC provided landman services to clients, including acquiring leases, performing due diligence, and providing title curative work. This case involved Border's claim against Irish Oil for breach of contract for landman services Border provided to Irish Oil and Irish Oil's counterclaim against Border for breach of fiduciary duty in performing those services. Irish Oil appealed the judgment entered after a bench trial, that awarded Border damages and prejudgment interest and dismissed Irish Oil's counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not clearly err in finding Border did not breach its fiduciary duty while providing professional landman services to Irish Oil and in finding leases Border acquired for Irish Oil were sold for $1,100 per net mineral acre. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Irish Oil's motion to amend its counterclaim to add individual landmen as counterclaim defendants. View "Border Resources, LLC v. Irish Oil & Gas, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005, Landmark Investment Group, LLC entered into a contract with Chung Family Realty Partnership, LLC (Chung, LLC) to purchase certain property. Chung, LLC repudiated the contract after receiving a more attractive offer from CALCO Construction & Development Company (Calco) and John Senese, Calco’s president and owner (together, Defendants). Landmark successfully sued for specific performance of the contract but was unable to purchase the property after it was sold at a foreclosure auction where a company controlled by Senese was the highest bidder. Landmark then filed suit against Defendants, alleging tortious interference with its contractual relations and a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Landmark on both counts. The trial court, however, granted Defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and rendered judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court (1) improperly granted Defendants’ motion for JNOV because it failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdict; and (2) incorrectly concluded that Landmark presented insufficient evidence to support its claims. View "Landmark Inv. Group, LLC v. CALCO Constr. & Dev. Co." on Justia Law