Appellant Bryan Trucking, Inc., sued Respondent Terry Gier for fraud, based on statements and representations Gier allegedly made to Bryan Trucking that induced Bryan Trucking to purchase a used commercial truck from a third party. Gier was a member of Gier Jammer’s Diesel Repair, LLC. Gier Jammer’s serviced long-haul trucks for Bryan Trucking starting in 2009. In August 2012, Gier Jammer’s overhauled the motor in a 2005 Kenworth truck owned by Niel Ring Trucking, Inc. (“Ring Trucking”). Niel Ring (“Ring”) notified Gier that Ring Trucking wanted to sell the truck, and Gier arranged the deal. The district court dismissed the claim by stipulation of the parties. Bryan Trucking appealed the district court’s subsequent award of costs and attorney fees to Gier. Finding no reversible error in the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bryan Trucking v. Gier" on Justia Law

Defendants, Markel Corporation, Markel Services, Inc. (Markel Services), and Essex Insurance Company (Essex), appealed a superior court order denying their motions for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to plaintiff Michael Newell, in this insurance coverage action. Newell was allegedly injured in a slip and fall accident at a property owned by Brames, Inc. (Brames) in Laconia. Brames was insured under an Amusement Park General Liability Policy issued by Essex. Essex was a subsidiary of Markel Corporation and Markel Services was Markel Corporation’s claims handling branch. Newell filed two personal injury actions arising from his slip and fall. The first action against Brames' co-owner and treasurer, was settled out-of-court. In the second lawsuit, Newell sued Ivy Banks, the person who allegedly cleaned the floor upon which Newell slipped and injured himself. Defendants received notice of the Banks action, but declined to defend Banks or intervene. Banks, although properly served, filed neither an appearance nor an answer and was defaulted. A default judgment was entered against Banks for $300,000, the full amount of damages sought by Newell. Newell brought suit against defendants to recover the amount of the default judgment, arguing he was a third party beneficiary under the insurance contract between Brames and Markel/Essex. On appeal, defendants argued the trial court erred in determining that the language of the Policy was ambiguous and that Banks was a “volunteer worker” under the Policy. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Newell v. Markel Corporation" on Justia Law

Petitioner John Van Rees, Sr. contracted with respondent Unleaded Software, Inc. to perform web-related services and to design additional websites. After Unleaded missed deadlines and failed to deliver the promised services, Van Rees sued, asserting multiple tort claims, a civil theft claim, three breach of contract claims, and a claim for violations of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA). The trial court granted Unleaded's 12(b)(5) motion, dismissing all but Van Rees' contract claims, on which a jury found in Van Rees' favor. Van Rees appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. After its review, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appellate court had determined that the tort and civil theft claims were barred by the "economic loss rule" because they were related to promises memorialized in the contracts, and the CCPA claim failed to allege a significant public impact. The Supreme Court found the issue pertaining to the economic loss rule was not whether the tort claims related to a contract, but whether they stemmed from a duty independent of the contact. The Court found pre-contractural misrepresentations in this case distinct from the contract itself, and could have formed the basis of an independent tort claim. Accordingly, the Court reversed as to Van Rees' tort claims. With respect to civil theft, the court affirmed the court of appeals on the ground that the claim failed to adequately allege the "knowing deprivation of a thing of value." View "Van Rees v. Unleaded Software, Inc." on Justia Law

Menda Warne appealed the court of appeals' judgment reversing dismissal of Bill Hall's complaint, which asserted a claim of intentional interference with contract. The trial court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted without addressing the applicable case law in its written order. The court of appeals expressly declined to apply more recent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence governing Fed. R. Vic. P. 12(b)(6), finding itself bound by the Colorado Supreme Court's existing precedent, which heavily relied on the federal Supreme Court's earlier opinion in "Conley v. Gibson," (355 U.S. 41 (1957)). The court of appeals reversed the trial court, finding the complaint sufficient to state a claim. The Colorado Supreme Court found that the court of appeals too narrowly understood the Court's existing precedent. After review of the complaint, the Colorado Supreme Court found that the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Warne v. Hall" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against Kamehameha Investment Corporation (KIC), the developer of a hillside area, and Sato and Associates, Inc. and Daniel Miyasato (collectively, Sato), the civil engineer. KIC tendered defense against Plaintiffs’ claims to Sato pursuant to a hold harmless clause in a project consultant agreement between Sato and KIC. KIC filed a cross-claim against Sato, alleging that Sato had agreed to defend and indemnify KIC against Plaintiffs’ claims. The trial court granted KIC’s motion for partial summary judgment against Sato. Relying on Pancakes of Hawaii, Inc. v. Pomare Properties Corp., the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) affirmed, concluding that Sato had a contractual duty to defend KIC in the wrongful death action. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA’s judgment, holding (1) Haw. Rev. Stat. 431:10-222 renders invalid any provision in a construction contract requiring the promisor to defend “the promisee against liability for bodily injury to persons or damage to property caused by or resulting from the sole negligence of willful misconduct of the promisee, the promisee’s agent or employees, or indemnitee”; (2) Pancakes does not apply to defense provisions in construction contracts; and (3) the scope of a promisor’s duty to defend imposed by a construction contract is determined at the end of litigation. Remanded. View "Arthur v. State, Dep’t of Hawaiian Home Lands" on Justia Law

Harrogate, a healthcare provider, participates in Blue Cross networks. Harrogate’s patients sign an “Assignment of Benefits,” allowing Harrogate to bill Blue Cross directly for services. The Provider Agreement allows Blue Cross to perform post-payment audits and recoup overpayments from Harrogate. Blue Cross paid Harrogate's claims for antigen leukocyte cellular antibody (ALCAT) tests, which purport to identify certain food allergies. Blue Cross claims that these tests have “little or no scientific rationale.” Investigational treatments are not “covered, compensable services” under Blue Cross’s Manual, which is incorporated by reference into the Provider Agreement. That Agreement also specifies that Harrogate may not “back-bill” patients for un-reimbursed, investigational treatments unless, before rendering such services, “the Provider has entered into a procedure-specific written agreement with the Member, which has advised the Member of his/her payment responsibilities.” Blue Cross began recouping ALCAT payments. Harrogate filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The district court dismissed, holding that Harrogate did not meet the statutory definition of “beneficiary” and had not received a valid assignment for the purpose of conferring derivative standing to bring suit under ERISA. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While Harrogate had derivative standing through an assignment of benefits, its claim regarding recoupments falls outside the scope of that assignment. View "Brown v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2013, Panther, a marketing and brand management company, signed a contract with IndyCar, to purchase access to coveted space in the “Fan Village” at IndyCar racing events, an area where sponsors set up displays to attract fans. The Army National Guard had been Panther’s team sponsor, 2008-2013. After it signed the 2013 contract, Panther learned that another team, RLL, intended to provide the Guard with Fan Village space. Believing that RLL had conspired with IndyCar and the Docupak agency to persuade the Guard to sponsor RLL instead of Panther, Panther brought suit in state court against RLL, Docupak, IndyCar, and active‐duty Guard member Metzler, who acted as the liaison between the Guard and Panther. The defendants removed the case to federal court, where the United States was substituted as a party for Metzler, 28 U.S.C. 2679(d); Panther filed an amended complaint that did not name either Metzler or the United States. The district court dismissed the complaint against RLL, IndyCar, and Docupak and found the United States’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction moot. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction; the basis for federal jurisdiction disappeared when Panther amended its complaint. View "Panther Brands, LLC v. Indy Racing League, LLC" on Justia Law

NAMC, which buys, services, and sells residential mortgages, and GSF, a residential mortgage lender that also sells mortgages, entered into an Agreement whereby GSF would sell loans to NAMC. To use the Fannie Mae Desktop Originator System (DO), which evaluates potential mortgagors under Fannie Mae’s eligibility standards, GSF needed a sponsoring lender. GSF had several sponsors from 2006 until 2011; one was NAMC. Every time GSF downloaded a report it paid Fannie Mae a $15 fee and the sponsoring lender had to pay Fannie Mae between $20 and $28. GSF was not aware that the sponsoring lender also had to pay a fee. In 2008 NAMC terminated its Agreement with GSF, but failed to notify GSF to stop using it as a sponsoring lender. NAMC was billed by Fannie Mae for almost $278,000 for GSF’s use of the system, 2008-2011. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of GSF in a suit charging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and unjust enrichment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. “NAMC is a sophisticated enterprise... its failure to cancel its sponsorship of GSF when it severed all its other relations to that company was an inexplicable blunder for which it has only itself to blame.” View "Nationwide Advantage Mortgage Co. v. GSF Mortgage Corp." on Justia Law

Brian Bresch entered into a contract with Nationwide Insurance Company that contained a forum-selection clause. The clause designated Franklin County, Ohio as the place to settle disputes arising from the agreement. Bresch later sued several Nationwide affiliates for, among other causes of action, breach of contract. Bresch filed the underlying lawsuit in Travis County, Texas. Nationwide sought to enforce the forum-selection clause by moving to dismiss the Texas litigation. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Nationwide subsequently sought mandamus relief in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court conditionally granted Nationwide’s petition and directed the trial court to enforce the parties’ forum-selection clause, holding that because Bresch failed to establish that the clause was waived or otherwise unenforceable, the trial court abused its discretion by not enforcing it. View "In re Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Petitioners Interstate Freight USA, Inc., Interstate Specialized, Inc., Interstate Freight, Inc. (collectively referred to as "the Interstate companies"), Charles Browning, and Donald Raughton, Sr., filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to direct the Baldwin Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to transfer the underlying action to the St. Clair Circuit Court and to enter an order granting the motion. The plaintiff in the underlying action, Kevin Vogler, was hired as a vice president/general manager for Interstate Specialized and Interstate Freight USA. Vogler sued, alleging that: in December 2013, he was working for another company and had become interested in acquiring the transportation branch of the Interstate companies; that he had entered into negotiations with Browning, the president of Interstate Freight USA and Interstate Specialized, and Raughton, a business consultant for the Interstate companies; that Browning and Raughton were acting on behalf of the Interstate companies; that the parties had agreed that "Vogler could acquire a minority interest in the trucking business over a two year period and, after two years of employment with the Interstate companies, would have the option of buying out the interest of Defendant Browning"; that Browning and Raughton had made representations to him regarding his salary and benefits; and that, based on those representations, Vogler left his previous employment and entered into separate employment contracts with Interstate Specialized and Interstate Freight USA. In early 2014, however, the businesses were shut down for "financial reasons," and Vogler's position was terminated. Petitioners moved to dismiss Vogler's complaint, or in the alternative, for a change of venue. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that Baldwin County was the proper venue, but that the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying the motion for change of venue on the "interest-of-justice" prong of the forum non conveniens statute. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to transfer this case to the St. Clair Circuit Court. View "Ex parte Interstate Freight USA, Inc., et al." on Justia Law