Sumona Islam entered into an agreement with her employer, Atlantis Casino Resort Spa (Atlantis), to refrain from employment or association with any other gaming establishment within 150 miles for one year following the end of her employment. After Islam resigned from Atlantis and began working as a casino host at Grand Sierra Resort (GSR), she entered altered and copied gaming customers’ information from Atlantis’ computer management system into GSR’s computer management system. GSR used this and other information conveyed by Islam to market to those customers without knowing the information was wrongfully obtained. Atlantis filed a complaint against both Islam and GSR, alleging tort and contract claims. All three parties appealed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly found that the noncompete agreement was unreasonable and unenforceable; (2) properly denied Atlantis’ conversion claim based on Islam’s alteration of the electronic information; and (3) properly found that GSR did not misappropriate Atlantis’s trade secrets. View "Golden Road Motor Inn v. Islam" on Justia Law

In 2001, EQT sold or leased to Journey several oil- and natural-gas-producing properties in Kentucky. Both parties continued to conduct oil and natural-gas operations in the state, but Journey later concluded that EQT was operating on some of the lands that had been conveyed to Journey. Journey sought a declaration that it owned or controlled those properties and that EQT was liable for the oil and natural gas that EQT had removed from those properties. The district court concluded on summary judgment that the parties’ 2001 contract had unambiguously conveyed the disputed properties to Journey. A jury found that EQT’s trespasses on Journey’s lands were not in good faith. The court subsequently required EQT to pay $14,288,432 in damages and transfer certain oil and natural-gas wells to Journey. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in construing the parties’ contract, in excluding portions of EQT’s proffered evidence, and in crafting the remedy for EQT’s trespasses. EQT carried out its drilling despite obvious indicators that its ownership of the underlying property was doubtful, establishing an ample basis to conclude that EQT’s trespasses were not in good faith. View "Journey Acquisition-II, L.P. v. EQT Prod.Co." on Justia Law

Kern was injured in a rear-end collision in which the other driver was at fault. Kern filed an underinsured motorist (UIM) claim with Progressive Northern Insurance Company, his insurance provider. Months of settlement negotiations ended in a stalemate. Thereafter, Kern brought an action against Progressive for bad faith, alleging that Progressive’s settlement offers had been intentionally inadequate. Kern also sought unpaid UIM benefits. After a trial, the jury awarded Kern $18,650 in unpaid UIM damages and found that Progressive had not acted in bad faith. Kern appealed, alleging several errors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that none of Kern’s alleged errors required reversal and that the trial court did not clearly err by refusing to award attorney’s fees. View "Kern v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co." on Justia Law

CEEG (Shanghai) Solar Science & Technology Co., Ltd. (“CEEG”), a Chinese company, agreed to sell solar energy products to LUMOS, LLC, a U.S. company. After receiving certain shipments, LUMOS filed a warranty claim alleging workmanship defects, and refused to remit the balance due. After two years of "fitful" negotiations, CEEG filed an arbitration proceeding pursuant to the parties’ agreements. Although the parties had communicated exclusively in English to that point, CEEG served LUMOS with a Chinese-language notice of the proceedings, and LUMOS did not immediately realize what the notice was. After the arbitration panel ruled in its favor, CEEG moved for the district court to confirm the award. LUMOS filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Chinese-language notice caused it to miss the deadline to participate in appointing the arbitration panel. The district court granted the motion, finding that the notice was not reasonably calculated to apprise LUMOS of the arbitration proceedings. The Tenth Circuit agreed and affirmed. View "CEEG (Shanghai) Solar Science v. Lumos" on Justia Law

Appellant City of Allentown (City) contracted with appellee A. Scott Enterprises, Inc. (ASE), to construct a new public road. After arsenic-contaminated soil was discovered at the worksite, the City suspended work on the project. Following testing, it was determined construction could resume if precautions were taken. Accordingly, the City instructed ASE to obtain revised permits and proceed with the project. However, the existing contract did not include terms regarding the potential for contaminated soil, despite the fact the City was aware there might be contamination prior to entering into the contract, and ASE declined to proceed, explaining it would incur substantial additional costs due to the contaminated soil. The parties made several attempts to reach an agreement in which ASE would continue the construction, but to no avail. Consequently, ASE sued the City to recover its losses on the project, alleged breach of contract, and sought compensation under theories of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment, as well as interest and a statutory penalty and fee award for violations of the prompt pay provisions of the Procurement Code. After a trial, a jury found the City breached its contract with ASE and also withheld payments in bad faith. In this discretionary appeal, the issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether an award of a statutory penalty and attorney fees under the prompt payment provisions of the Commonwealth’s Procurement Code was mandatory upon a finding of bad faith, irrespective of the statute’s permissive phrasing. The Court held such an award was not mandatory, and therefore reversed the order of the Commonwealth Court and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "A. Scott Enterprises v. City of Allentown" on Justia Law

Capson filed suit against MMIC seeking a declaration that MMIC was the primary professional liability insurer for Karl J. Hasik, M.D., and that Capson was the excess insurer. MMIC counterclaimed and filed a third-party complaint against Dr. Hasik and others, seeking rescission of its insurance policy or, in the alternative, a declaration that MMIC had no obligation to defend or indemnify Dr. Hasik for two medical negligence cases that had been filed against him. The district court granted MMIC’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that Dr. Hasik’s and the hospital’s nondisclosure of the Wilson lawsuit (a medical malpractice suit filed by a patient against Dr. Hasik) was the equivalent of a false assertion. Therefore, the court held that the elements of equitable rescission were satisfied in this case. Dr. Hasik’s and the hospital’s nondisclosure of the Wilson lawsuit was the equivalent of a material representation that was false. MMIC was entitled to rescind the prior-acts coverage it had agreed to provide. The court further held that Iowa law does not preclude a judgment of rescission in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. View "Capson Physicians Ins. Co. v. MMIC Ins. Inc." on Justia Law

In June 2012, a hailstorm damaged Plaintiff KCOM’s motel. Soon a dispute arose between KCOM and its insurer, defendant Employers Mutual Casualty (EMC), over the extent of the damage. In October 2012, following receipt of an inspection report, KCOM submitted a proof of loss of $631,726.87. EMC admitted coverage but not the amount of loss. Dissatisfied, KCOM invoked the insurance contract’s appraisal provision. KCOM claimed there were issues with the appraisal process, prompting it to ultimately file suit against EMC, alleging breach of contract, unreasonable delay and denial of benefits, and bad faith breach of the insurance contract. The threshold question presented for the Tenth Circuit's review in this state law diversity action was whether the Court had appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s non-final order denying confirmation of a property loss appraisal. The Court concluded it did not, and dismissed the appeal. View "KCOM, Inc. v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co." on Justia Law

After TEC, a subcontractor, submitted a written bid to Flintco, a general contractor, to perform glazing work on a project, Flintco used TEC's bid price in compiling its own bid to the owner of the project. Flintco was awarded the contract and sent TEC a letter of intent to enter into a subcontract and a standard-form subcontract, both of which documents differed materially from TEC’s bid. TEC refused to enter into a subcontract. Flintco secured another subcontractor for that scope of work and sued TEC on a theory of promissory estoppel seeking the difference between TEC’s bid and the amount Flintco was required to pay the replacement subcontractor. The trial court entered judgment for TEC. The court concluded that Flintco failed to demonstrate that there was no substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Flintco did not reasonably rely on TEC’s bid price without considering the material conditions stated in TEC’s bid, the proposed subcontract Flintco sent TEC constituted a counteroffer because it contained material variations from the conditions in TEC’s bid, and the counteroffer gave TEC the right to withdraw its bid. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Flintco Pacific v. TEC Mgmt. Consultants" on Justia Law

Patricia Cornwell, a well-known crime novelist, and her spouse filed suit against their former business managers Anchin Block & Anchin and the company’s principal, Evan Snapper, alleging New York state law claims of negligent performance of professional services, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs on all three claims and awarded Plaintiffs $51 million in damages. Thereafter, the district court vacated the jury’s decision, ruling that it had incorrectly instructed the jury and that Defendants’ statements to the Department of Justice (DOJ) were protected by a qualified privilege and therefore should not have been considered by the jury. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) the district court correctly found that it incorrectly instructed the jury on New York’s statute of limitations for a breach of fiduciary duty claim; and (2) the district court erred in entering judgment as a matter of law for Defendants on the DOJ issue. Remanded for a new trial. View "Cornwell Ent., Inc. v. Anchin, Block & Anchin, LLP" on Justia Law

Multi-employer funds established by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractor National Association and the Sheet Metal Worker’s Union sought confirmation of arbitration awards granted against five employers. None of the employers had participated in the arbitration, which concerned contributions to the funds. The district court declined to confirm the award, concluding that there was an open question as to whether the employers were party to the CBA, and, therefore, bound to its arbitration procedures. After initially ruling that state law applied to the question of whether the employers were bound to arbitrate under the CBA, the court certified a question for appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1292(b): whether state or federal law will apply at trial to the question of whether the employers “are bound/signatory to” the CBA? The Sixth Circuit reversed. While state contract law may provide helpful guideposts to federal courts, it is well-established that in the field of labor relations, the technical rules of contract law do not determine the existence of a CBA. The law to be applied to the question of whether a party has assented to the terms of a CBA, including an arbitration provision, is ultimately federal. View "Sheet Metal Employers Indus. Promotion Fund v. Absolut Balancing Co., Inc." on Justia Law