Coles sued to recover an overdue loan that he had extended to a real estate investment company, Cascade. The loan was guaranteed by Glaser and Taylor. That case was settled when Cascade ostensibly paid off the loan, and Coles, in return, executed a release. Shortly after the settlement, Cascade filed for bankruptcy. Coles was forced to surrender most of the settlement proceeds to the bankruptcy trustee as a preferential payment. In a second suit, against Glaser and Taylor, the trial court found that the defendants had breached the settlement agreement and entered judgment in favor of Coles. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that a debt of a contractual co-obligor is not extinguished by another co- obligor's​ pre-bankruptcy payment to a creditor that is later determined to be a bankruptcy preference. View "Coles v. Glaser" on Justia Law

Rabinak worked full‐time as a business representative for the Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters and, incidental to that position, served on the Council’s Executive Board. He received quarterly payments of $2,500 for his service on the Board, paid by checks separate from those for Rabinak’s weekly salary. When he retired, Rabinak qualified for a pension from the United Brotherhood of Carpenters Pension Fund, governed by ERISA. The compensation amount upon which the Fund calculated his annual retirement benefit did not include the $10,000 he had received each year from the Council. The Fund’s appeals committee denied an appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plan’s definition of compensation includes only “salary,” and the $2,500 quarterly payments for Board service were paid separately from Rabinak’s weekly salary payments and coded differently as well. The conclusion that the payments at issue were not salary payments under his particular plan was not arbitrary and capricious. View "Rabinak v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted in three separate criminal cases for his involvement in various drug-related crimes. The parties eventually negotiated a plea deal that resolved the three criminal cases. The plea agreement memorialized a joint sentencing recommendation and contained a provision in which Appellant waived his right to appeal. After he was sentenced, Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court should have accepted the plea agreement’s guideline calculations. The First Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding Appellant’s appeal was barred by the appeal waiver, that the agreement’s sentence recommendation provision was not ambiguous, and that there was no breach of the plea agreement. View "United States v. Betancourt-Perez" on Justia Law

Pulte Homes Corporation sued Williams Mechanical, Inc. for defective performance of a plumbing subcontract. Even before the action was filed, however, Williams was defunct; first, it was suspended by the Secretary of State, and thereafter, it dissolved voluntarily. Pulte served Williams though an attorney whom Williams had designated as its agent for service of process. The attorney, however, did not notify Williams of the action; he also did not identify or notify Williams’s liability insurer. Williams failed to respond to the complaint, and Pulte obtained a default judgment. Pulte then notified Williams’s liability insurer of the default judgment. About four and a half months later, the insurer retained counsel to represent Williams, and Williams’ counsel filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The trial court granted the motion. Pulte appealed, arguing (1) Williams lacked the capacity to defend this action because it had been suspended; and (2) Williams failed to establish that it was entitled to relief from the default and default judgment. After review, the Court of Appeal held the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that Williams was entitled to relief. Accordingly, the Court did not address whether Williams had the capacity to defend. View "Pulte Homes Corp. v. Williams Mechanical" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Principia, alleging claims arising from events that occurred during plaintiff's time as a student at Principia. The district court granted Principia's motion to dismiss. The court held that plaintiff failed to state a claim for breach of contract because none of the policies and provisions that she identifies in her Third Amended Complaint create obligations that Principia owed to plaintiff; the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim where the allegations set forth in plaintiff's complaint detail, at most, insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities to which liability for IIED clearly does not extend; and the district court properly dismissed the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim (NIED) where, under Missouri law, plaintiff failed to allege that her emotional distress or mental injury is medically diagnosable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gillis v. The Principia Corp." on Justia Law

RGW entered into a contract with Watson for the delivery of 146 sealed expansion joints for use on the Caltrans project for the construction of Highway 99. Watson filed a breach of contract action, contending it was entitled to an adjustment of the price on RGW’s original purchase order because the items ordered were changed. The trial court concluded that RGW’s purchase order was ambiguous and allowed the jury to decide what the contract meant and what price was appropriate. The jury decided in favor of Watson, finding the amount of the subject agreement was $605,990. The jury awarded Watson damages of $383,032. The court concluded that the trial court correctly (1) determined that RGW’s purchase order was ambiguous and (2) allowed the jury to evaluate the conflicting parol evidence before deciding the meaning of the contract. The court also concluded that the price adjustment owed to Watson for the change in the order was sufficiently certain to meet the statutory requirements for an award of prejudgment interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, except for its failure to award prejudgment interest to Watson. View "Watson Bowman Acme Corp. v. RGW Construction" on Justia Law

The City of Montebello filed a complaint against three of its former council members and a former city administrator for conflict of interest, seeking a declaration that Defendants violated Cal. Gov't Code 1090 by voting on a waste hauling contract in which Defendants held a financial interest. After the contract was voided in a separate action, Defendants moved to strike the City’s complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied the motion to strike. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statutory anti-SLAPP exemption for public enforcement actions did not apply in this case; but (2) the votes cast in favor of the contract were protected activity under section 425.16, and because the court of appeal did not reach the issue of whether the City could establish a likelihood of the lawsuit succeeding, the case must be remanded. View "City of Montebello v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was injured when he slipped on the stairs in the common area of a commercial building, he filed suit against the building and its managers (the landlords), for negligence and premises liability. The landlords each filed virtually identical cross-complaints against Edward Murachanian (the tenant), a dentist who rents an office suite in the building. The tenant had hired plaintiff’s employer to clean the carpets in his second-floor suite. The trial court granted the tenant’s motion for summary judgment, finding the lease obligated the tenant to indemnify the landlords only against claims for injuries occurring within the tenant’s office suite, not in the common areas. The court held that, under the indemnity clause in this case, the injury to a third party that occurred outside the dental suite, in a common area over which the landlords have exclusive control, did not arise out of the tenant’s use of the dental suite. It does not matter that the accident would not have happened but for the tenant hiring the third party to clean the carpets in the dental suite, and that the third party may have been at fault. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgments and the order awarding attorney fees. View "Morlin Asset Mgmt. LP v. Murachanian" on Justia Law

This dispute arose from the construction of Cypress Point, a luxury condominium complex in Hoboken. Co-defendants Adria Towers, LLC, Metro Homes, LLC, and Commerce Construction Management, LLC (collectively, the developer) served as the project's developer and general contractor, and subcontractors carried out most of the work. During construction, the developer obtained four CGL policies from Evanston Insurance Company, covering a four-year period, and three from Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Company, covering a subsequent three-year period (collectively, the policies). In this appeal, issue before the Supreme Court was whether rain water damage caused by a subcontractor's faulty workmanship constituted property damage and an occurrence under the developer's commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy. In a published decision, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that, under the plain language of the CGL policies, the unintended and unexpected consequential damages caused by the subcontractors faulty workmanship constituted property damage and an occurrence. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed, finding that the consequential damages caused by the subcontractors faulty workmanship constituted property damage, and the event resulting in that damage water from rain flowing into the interior of the property due to the subcontractors faulty workmanship was an occurrence under the plain language of the CGL policies at issue here. View "CypressPoint Condominium Association, Inc. v. Adria Towers, L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

At the center of this dispute was defective rebar that was incorporated into the construction of concrete pile caps that would form support for the Pinnacle Bank Arena. Some of the pile caps had to be modified in order to provide the necessary structural support for the Arena. The general contractor paid the costs of the correction and sought reimbursement from Drake-Williams Steel, Inc. (DWS), which fabricated the rebar. DWS reimbursed the general contractor and sought coverage from its insurers. The insurers denied the claim and commenced this action to determine their obligations under the policies of insurance. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no coverage under the policies. View "Drake-Williams Steel, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co." on Justia Law