Richard Tryon was injured by an underinsured motorist while driving his motorcycle. At the time of the accident, Tryon owed two automobiles insured with Encompass Indemnity Co. and Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. (together, the Companies). Both policies included Underinsured Motorist Insurance (UIM) coverage provisions. The Companies denied UIM coverage for Tryon on the basis of their respective insurance policies, which had owned-but-not-scheduled-for-coverage exclusions. Tryon filed suit against the Companies. The trial court granted summary judgment for Encompass and Philadelphia, ruling that the language in the policies issued by the Companies clearly excluded coverage of Tryon’s motorcycle. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the unpublished Court of Appeals opinion in Motorists Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hartley and the Supreme Court’s holding in Chaffin v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Insurance Cos. mandated coverage. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) owned-but-not-scheduled provisions for UIM coverage are enforceable so long as they expressly and plainly apprise insureds of the exclusion; and (2) the Philadelphia policy failed to plainly exclude coverage under the circumstances, but the terms of the Encompass policy plainly excluded coverage. View "Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Tryon" on Justia Law

In 2014, Lend Lease, the construction manager of the Chicago River Point Tower Project, hired Cives as a subcontractor. Cives hired Midwest Steel. Midwest had, years before, hired AES to supply Midwest with additional workers, who were co‐employed by Midwest and AES. Lend Lease entered into a “contractor-controlled insurance program” with Starr Liability with a $500,000 deductible. All subcontractors were to join in the policy. AES had, several years earlier, obtained workers’ compensation for its workers from TIC, so that injured AES‐Midwest workers could obtain workers’ compensation from either Starr (or Lend Lease under the deductible) or TIC. Four ironworkers, jointly employed by Midwest and AES and performing work for Midwest were injured on the job and sought workers’ compensation. The claims exceeded $500,000, so Lend Lease had to pay its full deductible. Starr paid the remaining claims. Lend Lease filed suit against TIC, AES’s insurer, and AES, seeking reimbursement of the $500,000. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Lend Lease made a deal with Starr and is bound by it. The court rejected an argument that AES has been unjustly enriched; AES was not obligated to purchase an insurance policy that would cover Lend Lease's deductible. View "Lend Lease (US) Construction, Inc. v. Administrative Employer Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Customers of an indoor trampoline park, of Sky Zone Lafayette, must complete a “Participant Agreement, Release and Assumption of Risk” document (“Agreement”) prior to entering the facility. The Agreement contains a clause waiving the participant’s right to trial and compelling arbitration. Plaintiff, James Duhon, was such a customer, and was injured in the course of participating in the park’s activities. After plaintiff filed suit seeking damages, Sky Zone moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the Agreement. The district court overruled Sky Zone’s exception, but the court of appeal reversed, finding the arbitration provision should be enforced. After review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitration clause in the Sky Zone agreement was adhesionary and therefore unenforceable. View "Duhon v. Activelaf, LLC" on Justia Law

Customers of an indoor trampoline park, of Sky Zone Lafayette, must complete a “Participant Agreement, Release and Assumption of Risk” document (“Agreement”) prior to entering the facility. The Agreement contains a clause waiving the participant’s right to trial and compelling arbitration. Plaintiff Theresa Alicea executed the Agreement prior to her husband, Roger Alicea, taking their minor sons to Sky Zone. The Aliceas’ son, Logan, was injured while jumping on a trampoline. The Aliceas filed suit against Sky Zone, individually and on behalf of Logan. Sky Zone moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the Agreement. The district court overruled Sky Zone’s exception and the court of appeal denied Sky Zone’s writ application. After review, the Supreme Court held the arbitration clause in the Sky Zone agreement was adhesionary and therefore unenforceable. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the rulings of the lower courts. View "Alicea v. Activelaf, LLC" on Justia Law

Before accepting a transfer to a Bridgestone facility in North Carolina, Deschamps expressed concern about losing pension credit for his 10 years of employment with Bridgestone in Canada. After receiving assurances from Bridgestone’s management team that he would keep his pension credit, Deschamps accepted the position. For several years, Deschamps received written materials confirming that his date of service for pension purposes would be August 1983. He turned down employment with a competitor at a higher salary because of the purportedly higher pension benefits he would receive at Bridgestone. In 2010, Deschamps discovered that Bridgestone had changed his service date to August 1993, the date he began working at the American plant. After failed attempts to appeal this change through Bridgestone’s internal procedures, Deschamps filed suit, alleging equitable estoppel, breach of fiduciary duty, and an anti-cutback violation of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1054(g). The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Deschamps on all three claims. The text of the plan “is at worst ambiguous, but at best, favors Deschamps’s argument that he was a covered employee in 1983” and, as a result of the change in the interpretation of this provision that excluded foreign employees from being classified as covered employees, Deschamps’s benefits were decreased. View "Deschamps v. Bridgestone Americas, Inc." on Justia Law

NDC Communications, LLC and Kenneth Carle III engaged in a complex set of agreements in the context of the development of a piece of land. When the parties’ working relationship broke down, NDC filed a complaint asserting that it was owed funds from Carle, and Carle counterclaimed seeking contract remedies and other relief. The trial court ultimately entered judgment enforcing a mechanic’s lien against Carle in the amount of $336,681.24. Carle appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court failed to provide him a credit due of approximately $25,000, rendering the judgment against him inaccurate. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) Carle’s due process rights were not violated by the post-trial procedures employed by the court; and (2) there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the court’s judgment, including its determination of damages. View "NDC Communications, LLC v. Carle" on Justia Law

When Ultramar sold the Golden Eagle Refinery to Tesoro Refining, the purchase and sale agreement specified that Ultramar was to assign the Tosco indemnities, and to either secure an endorsement to the Chartis policy adding the new company as an additional insured or assign the Chartis policy directly. This litigation concerns the transfer of the Chartis policy from Ultamar. In this appeal, Tesoro Refining challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment for Chartis. The court agreed with the district court that Tesoro Refining cannot assert third-party judgment on the breach of contract claim premised upon a third-party beneficiary argument where the instant policy's language does not evince any intent to benefit a third party. The court also concluded that the Tesoro Parties were unable to point to any basis for concluding that the injury in this case—the alleged mistake over which entity was covered—is “inherently undiscoverable.” The court explained that Texas cases since 1996 have determined the discovery rule does not apply to delay the accrual of the cause of action in such situations. Therefore, the Tesoro Parties’ reformation claim is time-barred. The court affirmed the judgment. View "AIG Specialty Ins. Co. v. Tesoro Corp." on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over a change in hauling fees paid by a dairy cooperative to an independent contractor who transported milk from farms to the cooperative’s facilities. When the co-op notified the hauler that it would be phasing out a trip fee it had been paying the hauler, the hauler objected but continued to transport milk. Thereafter, the co-op paid the agreed hauling rate without the trip fees. Several months later, the hauler sued the co-op for unpaid trip fees. The co-op, in turn, declared the contract terminated. The district court granted summary judgment for the co-op, concluding that the change in payment terms was a new offer that the hauler accepted by performance. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that summary judgment was inappropriate where questions of fact existed as to acceptance. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the district court’s summary judgment, holding that, under the parties’ oral contract, the co-op could alter payment terms prospectively upon reasonable notice, and the hauler accepted the new terms by performance, notwithstanding its protests. View "Johnson v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the purchasers of a health claims administration company, brought a breach of contract action against Defendant, the seller. After learning that they had not acquired all of the assets that contracted to purchase, Plaintiffs continued to operate the business for the next eighteen months. Only then did they stop making payments on the promissory note and then file this action. Defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract. Plaintiffs raised the affirmative defense that Defendant was first to breach the contract and that Plaintiffs were therefore excused from performing their contractual duties. The district court entered judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs’ conduct after learning of Defendant’s alleged breach precluded it from asserting a prior breach as a defense to Plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claim. View "Maverick Benefit Advisors, LLC v. Bostrom" on Justia Law

Process America filed suit against Cynergy for breach of contract and Cynergy counterclaimed, alleging, inter alia, that Process America improperly solicited its customers. The district court held that although both parties had breached the contract, Cynergy’s liability was capped by the contract. The district court awarded Cynergy a net total of $8,521,182 in damages. The court concluded that the solicitation of merchants, and transfer of a portion of the Portfolio to a third party, violate the Independent Sales Organization (ISO) Agreement which permits transfer only pursuant to Section 2.6.B of the ISO Agreement, such that Cynergy is entitled to damages based on the increased rate of attrition of merchant accounts in the Portfolio; the court rejected Process America's argument that, even if the solicitation of merchants would ordinarily be a breach of the non‐solicitation clause, it is excused from performing its obligations under that provision as a result of Cynergy’s failure to pay Process America residuals; the court agreed with the district court's finding that the plain language of Section 4.6 limits damages for Cynergy’s breach of contract to $300,818; the court affirmed the district court’s damages calculation to the extent that it attributes 100% of the increased attrition to Process America; but the court agreed with Process America's contention that the damages calculation was erroneous because it improperly included residuals that would have been paid to Process America. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s interim decisions regarding Process America’s liability. The court vacated the district court's calculation of damages and remanded for further proceedings. View "Process America v. Cynergy Holdings" on Justia Law