The City of Chattanooga added a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) to its Fire and Police Pension Fund in 1980. In 2000, the city amended the COLA for a third time to create a fixed three-percent annual increase in retirement benefits. The city amended the COLA again in 2014 to a lower, variable annual increase. Fund participants challenged the 2014 amendment under the Contract Clause, claiming a right to the fixed three-percent COLA. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. There is no unmistakable evidence of the city’s intent to be bound to the fixed COLA, because the COLA is neither vested nor accrued within the meaning of the City Code. Absent some clear indication that the legislature intends to bind itself contractually, a statute does not create a contractual relationship. The City Code contains one vesting provision: After 10 years of service, a participant has the right either to a full refund of her contributions or to retirement benefits upon turning 55. The section does not mention the COLA. The fact that the Fund described the fixed three-percent COLA as “guaranteed” when enacting the 2000 amendment does not prove that the city intended to be bound to the fixed COLA. View "Frazier v. City of Chattanooga" on Justia Law

Jon and Winifred Prime brought suit against Dawn Harlor stemming from a dispute over the Primes’ right to use a dock according to an easement Harlor had granted the the Primes. At all relevant times, Harlor was insured by Amica Mutual Insurance Company under a homeowner’s insurance policy providing that Amica would defend Harlor against claims that may result in covered damages. Amica denied Harlor’s request that Amica provide a defense in the underlying suit based on its conclusion that the suit could not result in covered damages. After Harlor settled the suit with the Primes, Harlor brought suit against Amica alleging that Amica breached the policy by failing to defend her in the underlying lawsuit. The superior court granted summary judgment for Amica, concluding that any damages that might have resulted from the underlying suit would not be covered by Harlor’s policies and, therefore, did not give rise to a duty to defend. The Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment and remanded for the entry of summary judgment in favor of Harlor, holding that Amica breached its duty to defend. Remanded for further proceedings regarding Amica’s duty to indemnify Harlor for any or all of the amount that she paid to settle the underlying action. View "Harlor v. Amica Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In 1996, Matthew Cote accepted an employment opportunity with Richmond Ready-Mix (RRM) when John Aiello explained that Plaintiff could purchase RRM in the future. Over the years, Aiello repeatedly assured Cote that he would purchase RRM. In 2005, Aiello sold RRM to Peter Calcagni. Cote subsequently filed an action against the John and Anna-Maria Aiello (together, the Aiellos) alleging breach of an implied contract, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. The trial justice found for the Aiellos on all claims, concluding that Cote failed to prove the existence of an implied contract to purchase RRM and that Aiello’s promises to Plaintiff did not support a claim for promissory estoppel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not overlook or misconceive material evidence and was not otherwise clearly wrong in dismissing the complaint. View "Cote v. Aiello" on Justia Law

The district court granted summary judgment dismissing the negligence, contract, and fraud claims brought by Path to Health, LLP (“Path”) against Daren Long and ALL-IN INC. d/b/a RE/MAX ALL-IN REALTORS (collectively “Realtors”). Path’s claims were based on the allegation that Long misrepresented that property Path purchased was zoned for commercial use when it was actually zoned for residential use. After review, the Supreme Court found that the district court erred in dismissing Path's breach of contract claim because Idaho Code section 54-2087 was incorporated into the Buyer Representation Agreement at issue in this case. Further, the Court found the district court erred in dismissing Path's fraud claim because it found issues of fact as to whether Path justifiably relied upon Long's representations. The Court reversed on those two issues, but affirmed as to all others. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Path to Health, LLP v. Long" on Justia Law

Appellant Greenville Country Club, through its workers’ compensation carrier, Guard Insurance (“Guard”), appealed a Superior Court Order affirming a decision of the Industrial Accident Board (the “Board”). While working for Greenville Country Club, Jordan Rash suffered injuries to his lumbar spine in two separately compensable work accidents. The first accident occurred in 2009 while the country club was insured by Guard Insurance Group. The second accident occurred in 2012 while the country club was insured by Technology Insurance (“Technology”). In 2014, Rash filed two Petitions to Determine Additional Compensation, one against Guard and one against Technology. After a hearing, the Board determined that the condition at issue was a recurrence of the 2009 work injury and not an aggravation of the 2012 work injury, and concluded that Guard was therefore wholly liable for the additional compensation to Rash. Guard appealed, arguing: (1) the Board failed to properly apply the rule for determining successive carrier liability; and (2) there was no substantial evidence to support the Board’s finding that Rash fully recovered from the 2012 accident or that his ongoing condition was solely caused by the 2009 work accident. After review, the Delaware Supreme Court found no error in the Board’s decision, and that the decision was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Board's decision. View "Greenville Country Club (Guard Insurance) v. Greenville Country Club (Technology Insurance)" on Justia Law

The issue in this appeal centered on whether a force majeure clause in a written contract between the county and a developer did not apply to the developer’s failure to obtain zoning approval in order to construct the cement plant required in the agreement. After review of the contract and the clause at issue here, the Supreme Court held that the clause was broad enough to apply. Accordingly, the Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Burns Concrete, Inc v. Teton County" on Justia Law

This appeal centered on the legality of a Joint Powers Agreement (“JPA”) entered into in 2003 between the Independent Highway District (“IHD”) and the City of Sandpoint (“City”) to settle litigation between the two. The JPA provided for the City to assume control of all streets in the City and for IHD to pay over to the City all highway ad valorem taxes collected on property in the city limits. After the parties had operated under the JPA for ten years, IHD notified the City that, upon reflection, it had determined the JPA was legally void and that it would no longer pay its share of the property taxes to the City. The City filed suit against IHD for breach of contract and sought both a declaratory ruling that the JPA was valid and an order enjoining IHD from interfering with the City’s control of the streets within city limits. The district court ruled in favor of the City on summary judgment and granted attorney fees. IHD appealed. Finding that the JPA was void and unenforceable (violating Idaho Code section 67-2328), the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded this case for for the trial court to unwind the relationship between the parties. View "City of Sandpoint v. Independent Hwy Dist" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Century Surety Company (“Century”) issued a commercial lines policy to Defendant-Appellant Shayona Investment, LLC covering commercial property and business income coverage. Shayona submitted claims, Century paid them, and then Century sought a declaratory judgment in the district court as to whether the claims were fraudulent. At trial, the jury found in favor of Century, awarding it both the amount the company paid Shayona under the policy and the sum it spent investigating the claims. Shayona appealed, arguing that the standard of proof the court instructed the jury to use was wrong. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of judgment on the verdict. View "Century Surety Co. v. Shayona Investment" on Justia Law

Respondents, landowner-lessors, filed a putative class action in federal court claiming that Petitioner, the lessee, underpaid gas royalties under the terms of their leases. Under each lease, the lessee must bear all the production costs. The federal court certified to the Ohio Supreme Court a question regarding whether the lessee was permitted to deduct postproduction costs from the lessors’ royalties and, if so, how those costs were to be calculated. Specifically, the federal court asked the Supreme Court whether Ohio follows the “at the well” rule, which permits the deduction of post-production costs, or whether it follows some version of the “marketable product” rule, which limits the deduction of post-production costs under certain circumstances. The Supreme Court declined to answer the certified question and dismissed the cause, holding (1) under Ohio law, an oil and gas lease is a contract that is subject to the traditional rules of contract construction; and (2) therefore, the rights and remedies of the parties in this case are controlled by the specific language of their lease agreement. View "Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Insureds, who owned a policy from Insurer, alleged that Insurer failed to pay them for damage to their home from sinkhole loss, thus breaching the terms of the insurance policy. When Insurer became insolvent, Florida Insurance Guaranty Association (FIGA) was activated to handle the “covered claims.” The circuit court ordered appraisal, and the appraisers determined the amount of loss to be $130,600. FIGA objected to the confirmation of the appraisal award, arguing that the statutory definition of “covered claim” in effect when Insurer was adjudicated insolvent should govern any payments made on the claim, thus prohibiting any direct payment to Insureds for their sinkhole loss. The circuit court confirmed the appraisal award and entered judgment in favor of Insureds in the amount of $130,600, concluding that Insureds’ rights to recover against FIGA for sinkhole loss were established when Insurer issued the insurance policy. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the definition of “covered claim” in effect on the date that Insurer was adjudicated to be insolvent governed the scope of FIGA’s liability to Insureds for the sinkhole loss at their property; and (2) Insureds were precluded from obtaining an appraisal award for their sinkhole loss directly from FIGA under the terms of the policy. View "de la Fuente v. Florida Insurance Guaranty Ass’n" on Justia Law