Plaintiff Shashi Airi filed suit against defendant Gurdeep “Sunny” Nagra in 2011. The trial court held a bench trial in 2016. Initially, defendant hired plaintiff to manage two hotels in Brattleboro. In this capacity, plaintiff was employed by a variety of business entities that owned the hotels. Defendant was either a member, partner, or shareholder in these entities until October 2007, when federal agents raided defendant’s various business entities and the physical hotels. As a result of the raids and defendant’s subsequent prosecution, the business entities that employed plaintiff went into receivership. At this point, in 2007, defendant contracted in an individual capacity with plaintiff to assist with the receivership proceedings and to perform the duties defendant could not accomplish because of the pending criminal charges. The parties agreed to a rate of pay. Plaintiff performed the required tasks until December 14, 2007, when the properties were out of receivership. From November 5, 2007 to December 14, 2007, was the first period under dispute; the trial court awarded plaintiff $7215 for services rendered during this period. Defendant appealed that award. The Vermont Supreme Court concluded that because defendant did not submit the transcripts of that record, he waived his right to contest the issue on appeal under Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b)(1). Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Airi v. Nagra" on Justia Law

A plaintiff who was not a party to a written contract was not permitted to enforce the agreement as a third-party beneficiary.DTSG, Ltd. filed suit against First Bank. Richard Brumitt intervened as an additional plaintiff, alleging that he was a third-party-creditor beneficiary of an agreement entered into by DTSG and First Bank. The jury found First Bank liable to both DTSG and Brumitt for breach of contract and for negligent and grossly negligent misrepresentation. The trial court entered judgment based on the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment, holding (1) the agreement between DTSG and First Bank was unambiguous and did not make Brumitt a third-party beneficiary; and (2) the trial court erred by submitting that issue to the jury and by instructing the jury that it could consider extrinsic evidence to add a third-party-beneficiary term to the unambiguous written agreement. The court remanded the case for further consideration of Brumitt’s claims alleging negligent and grossly negligent misrepresentations. View "First Bank v. Brumitt" on Justia Law

Whether a contract provision is an illegal penalty or enforceable liquidated damage clause is a question for the trial court; on review, appellate deference to that court’s factual findings is required.In 2005, Brother and Sister entered a contract under which Brother, a licensed real estate agent, would develop Sister’s Pebble Beach property through funding from investors and then sell the developed property, with Brother and Sister to split the profits after paying $1.5 million to Sister, reflecting her equity, and $30,000 to Brother as a fee. Brother obtained investors. Sister obtained loans totaling $1,008,000.00, secured by first and second deeds of trust. Brother did not use the money for its intended purposes. The property was sold at foreclosure. The investors and Sister sued Brother. Brother filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court granted relief from the automatic stay for Sister’s state claims for “Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Conversion, Fraud, and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.” In 2014, after mediation, Brother and Sister signed a settlement, under which Sister was awarded a stipulated judgment of $850,000. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Brother’s “fact-based” argument that the amount included an unenforceable liquidated damages penalty of $250,000.00 (Civil Code 1671), which he had not raised in the trial court. View "Krechuniak v. Noorzoy" on Justia Law

Waiver of a nonwaiver provision cannot be anchored in the same conduct the parties specifically agreed would not give rise to a waiver of contract rights.The long-term tenant in this forcible-detainer action frequently defaulted on the lease’s rental payment terms. The commercial landlord, however, regularly accepted, without protest, the tenant’s rental payments when tendered. A contractual nonwaiver provision provided that the landlord acceptance of rent past due “shall not be a waiver and shall not estop Landlord from enforcing that provision or any other provision of [the] lease in the future[.]” In this forcible-detainer action, the landlord sought to oust the tenant, claiming a superior right of immediate possession under a lease-extension option. The tenant, in turn, asserted that the landlord’s conduct in accepting late rental payments waived the contractual nonwaiver clause. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment rejecting the landlord’s forcible detainer action and rendered judgment in the landlord’s favor because the landlord did not act inconsistently with the contract’s express terms and because the tenant failed to identify any evidence supporting an equitable-estoppel bar to eviction. View "Shields Limited Partnership v. Bradeberry" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice’s determination that Plaintiff’s reappointment to his fourth consecutive two-year term as assistant zoning inspector in the Town of North Smithfield did not constitute a contract of employment. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging breach of employment contract and a violation of his constitutional rights after his employment was terminated for budgetary reasons. The trial court entered final judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice’s decision, holding that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to support his contention that a valid contract existed. View "Andoscia v. Town of North Smithfield" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action against the Pegasus Pipeline's current owners and operators, Exxon, alleging that the company's operation of the pipeline was unreasonable and unsafe. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court's decision to decertify the class based on a lack of commonality of issues. In this case, the contract claims would require examination of how Exxon's operation of the pipeline affects plaintiffs, which varies depending on where individual class members' property was located, as well as many other factors. The Eighth Circuit also concluded that the evidence here was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was unreasonable interference. The court explained that the question of unreasonable use of an easement was generally one of fact, dependent on the nature of the easement, the terms of the grant, and other relevant circumstances. Finally, the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend the judgment where the additional evidence at issue would not have produced a different result. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment. View "Webb v. Exxon Mobil" on Justia Law

The Idaho Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in determining that the insurer did not breach its insurance contract with its insureds, and in dismissing the insureds’ bad faith claim that resulted from that determination. Plaintiffs Joel and Kathleen Harmon filed a claim with their insurance company, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., after their motorhome was broken into and damaged. The Harmons subsequently brought suit against State Farm in district court, claiming that State Farm breached the insurance agreement by failing to pay the amount required to actually repair the vehicle or pay the cash value. The Harmons also brought a claim for bad faith. State Farm moved for summary judgment on both claims, which the district court granted. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Harmon v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins Co." on Justia Law

Arbitration is a contractual agreement between parties. And only agreed-upon arbitrable disputes are subject to arbitration. On de novo review, the Mississippi Supreme Court found in this case a valid arbitration agreement, but the subject of the lessee’s premises-liability claim (a dispute that stemmed from a physical and sexual assault on the apartment complex premises) was not within the arbitration agreement’s scope, as it did not arise under or relate to her “occupancy and leasing of the [apartment].” Because the dispute was outside the agreement’s scope, the trial court erred by staying proceedings and ordering arbitration. View "Jane Doe v. Hallmark Partners, LP" on Justia Law

The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Plaintiff and its ruling that Plaintiff was the “prevailing party” in the proceedings below. Before trial, Defendant made a settlement offer of $1,000,001. Plaintiff rejected the offer and, later, obtained a jury verdict in the amount of $10,733. Because a fee award provision in a contract between the parties did not itself define “prevailing party” but did incorporate Arizona law to determine the parties’ rights and remedies, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-341.01(A) applied for the purpose of determining the successful party. Because the final judgment was more favorable to Defendant than its pretrial offer, Plaintiff was not entitled to recover any fees incurred after the offer under section 12-341.01(A). The court remanded to the trial court to apportion fees and costs between the parties. View "American Power Products, Inc. v. CSK Auto, Inc." on Justia Law

The University of South Carolina and the university's booster club, known as the Gamecock Club (Petitioners), and several Gamecock Club members (Respondents) fought over parking spaces. As part of the bargain Respondents struck with Petitioners, Respondents were entitled to "assigned reserved parking" at home football games. Respondents claimed Petitioners violated this contract provision when USC discontinued parking on the "apron" around the football stadium and failed to give Respondents first priority in the selection of new parking spaces. Petitioners claimed the parking provision had no priority requirement and it was satisfied when Respondents were assigned reserved parking spaces in an adjacent lot. The issue for the South Carolina Supreme Court’s resolution was whether this was an appropriate case for the use of equitable estoppel: the trial court held it was not, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and reversed the court of appeals. View "Rosarte v. USC" on Justia Law