JEM Contracting, Inc. (JEM) and Ohio Farmers Insurance Company (OFIC) executed two indemnity agreements so that JEM could obtain bonding from OFIC for construction projects. Thereafter, OFIC executed and delivered two surety bonds on behalf of JEM for two construction projects. JEM hired a subcontractor, Hollow Contracting (Hollow), to furnish labor and equipment for both projects. After a dispute arose between JEM and Hollow regarding payment for the work performed, Hollow filed a complaint against JEM and OFIC. The lawsuit was resolved, and the district court dismissed the litigation. Thereafter, OFIC filed a complaint seeking indemnification from JEM for attorney fees and costs incurred in the underlying litigation. In its answer, JEM alleged that the fees and costs OFIC incurred in the litigation were not covered under the indemnity agreements. The district court granted partial summary judgment on the pleadings in favor of OFIC, concluding that JEM was required to indemnify OFIC for “appropriate expenses.” The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting partial summary judgment on the pleadings to OFIC on the limited issue of whether OFIC may seek indemnification from JEF pursuant to the indemnification agreements. View "Ohio Farmers Insurance Co. v. JEM Contracting, Inc." on Justia Law

The parties in this case disagreed over the ownership and operation of an irrigation system on a ranch. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, arguing that Defendants had converted his property by exercising unauthorized dominion or control over the irrigation system, that Defendants had been unjustly enriched through their possession of the irrigation system, and that Defendants had caused him damages. Defendants filed counterclaims against Welu, alleging trespass and breach of contract. The district court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) determining that the entire pivot irrigation system constituted a fixture; (2) concluding that Defendants did not breach the parties’ agreement concerning the pivot irrigation system; and (3) did not err in determining that Defendants were not unjustly enriched. View "Welu v. Twin Hearts Smiling Horses, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was two oral contracts entered into between Ryffel Family Partnership, Ltd. (Ryffel Partnership) and Alpine Construction (Alpine). The first agreement was entered into in January 2007, and the second agreement was entered into in September 2007. Ryffel Partnership filed suit against Alpine. The jury found that Ryffel Partnership had breached both oral contracts but that Alpine should be awarded no damages for either breach. The jury further found that Ryffel Partnerhsip had been unjustly enriched by Alpine’s labor and awarded Alpine $50,348 in damages. The jury also found that Ryffel Partnership had breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and awarded $25,000 to Alpine. The district court amended the judgment to assign the jury’s damages award for unjust enrichment to its finding that Ryffel Partnership breached its contract. The court also struck the jury’s award for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury’s verdict was supported by substantial evidence; (2) the district court did not err in denying Ryffel Partnership’s motion for a new trial based on an inconsistent or illegal jury verdict; and (3) the district court did not err in denying Alpine’s motion for prejudgment interest. View "Ryffel Family Partnership Ltd. v. Alpine Country Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether, under Connecticut law, after a judgment debtor’s wages have been garnished, the remaining wages are exempt from execution, and whether the transfer of those wages to a third party constitutes a fraudulent transfer. Pursuant to two state court judgments, The Cadle Company was Terry Fletcher’s judgment creditor, Fletcher owing the company more than $3 million. Since at least 2005, Terry has transferred more than $300,000 of his residual wages to the bank account of his wife, Marguerite Fletcher. The Cadle Company sued the Fletchers in federal district court, alleging, inter alia, that the transfer violated the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (CUFTA). The district court granted the Fletchers’ motion for partial summary judgment, granted The Cadle Company’s motion for partial summary judgment, and ultimately rendered judgment for The Cadle Company in the amount of $401,426 on its CUFTA claim. The Fletchers appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Second Circuit subsequently certified a question to the Supreme Court, which the Court accepted. The Supreme Court answered that Terry’s residual wages would not have been exempt from execution if he had retained possession of them, and therefore, they were subject to execution after Terry transferred them to his wife’s account. View "Cadle Co. v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

WBCMT challenges the district court's adverse judgment in a breach of contract suit to recover on a guaranty of financing for a commercial project. The district court held that the term “Borrower” in the guaranty refers collectively to all of the numerous borrowing entities, not to each of them individually. The court concluded that the only reasonable, textually supportable interpretation of “Borrower” is that it refers to the collective entities or to each individual borrowing entity, as the context may require. “Borrower” is unambiguous as a matter of law in the Guaranty. Therefore, NNN Realty’s interpretation of “Borrower” as limited to all borrowing entities collectively creates various absurdities throughout the Guaranty—so much so that the interpretation cannot be considered a reasonable alternative interpretation of “Borrower.” Accordingly, the court reversed and rendered judgment for WBCMT. View "WBCMT 2007 C33 Office 9720 v. NNN Realty Advisors" on Justia Law

Champion Pro filed suit against Impact Sports and others, principally alleging that Impact Sports engaged in deceptive and unfair practices in violation of the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act (UDTPA), N.C. Gen. Stat. 75–1.1, by their recruitment of a football player, Robert Quinn. The court affirmed the district court's denial in part of Champion Pro's motion for sanctions based on the alleged spoliation of evidence and grant of Impact Sports motion for summary judgment on all claims. The court agreed with the district court that Champion Pro's allegations, even when assumed to be true, are insufficient to establish a violation of the UDTPA. Likewise, Champion Pro's civil conspiracy claim fails as a matter of law. Finally, Champion Pro's claim that the district court erred in failing to award sanctions in the form of an adverse jury instruction is moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Champion Pro Consulting Group v. Impact Sports Football" on Justia Law

VitaVet hired IDS to develop a software program that would increase the speed and efficiency of its online services. IDS delivered an unfinished version of the software and withheld the source code and technical specifications needed to finish it. The parties filed suit against each other and the trial court issued a preliminary injunction that ordered the software consultant to deliver the source code and technical specifications to the company. The court concluded that a preliminary injunction that alters the status quo does not constitute an impermissible final adjudication of the merits of the lawsuit. The court explained that such injunctions are reserved for “extreme cases” where the right to relief is “clearly established.” The court affirmed the issuance of the injunction because the trial court did not abuse it discretion in concluding that this is one of those “extreme cases” where VitaVet had a “clearly established” right to preliminary injunctive relief. In this case, VitaVet established that the contract gave all ownership of IDS's work product to VitaVet, going so far as to empower VitaVet to obtain copies of that product whenever it wanted. IDS's refusal to hand over the source code breached these contractual provisions and damaged VitaVet's business operations. View "Integrated Dynamic Solutions v. Vitavet Labs" on Justia Law

Wilson was an admissions representative, recruiting students to CEC’s culinary arts college. Wilson earned a bonus for each student that he recruited above a threshold who either completed a full course or a year of study. If a representative was terminated, he was entitled only to bonuses already earned, not including students “in the pipeline.” CEC reserved the right to “terminate or amend” the contract at any time, for any reason, in its sole discretion. The Education Department released regulations, to become effective in July 2011, prohibiting institutions participating in Title IV student financial aid programs from providing bonuses based on securing enrollment. CEC decided to pay bonuses that were earned as of February 28, 2011, depriving Wilson of bonuses that were in the pipeline. CEC raised the base salary by at least the total of 3% plus 75% of each representative’s previous two years’ bonuses. Wilson sued. The Seventh Circuit remanded, holding that Wilson must prove that CEC exercised its discretion in a manner contrary to the parties' reasonable expectations. On remand, the district court rejected an argument that cost savings, not compliance with the regulations, drove CEC’s decision. There were no cost savings to CEC. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Even accepting Wilson’s characterization, the evidence is insufficient to allow a jury to reasonably conclude that CEC breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. View "Wilson v. Career Education Corp." on Justia Law

This was an appeal of a judgment denying a claim for contribution on equitable principles in an action by one co-guarantor against another co-guarantor. One of two independent grounds for the district court’s decision was not challenged on appeal, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the district court without addressing either ground. In his opening brief, plaintiff-appellant R. Gordon Schmidt did not state the basis for the trial court’s rulings, did not state the standard of review and, therefore, did not present any argument and authority showing how the court abused its discretion. Therefore, he waived those issues on appeal. More significantly, the district court based its ruling on two alternative grounds. Although Schmidt argued the Supreme Court should reweigh the equities as to the first ground addressed by the district court, he did not mention the second ground. "Where a lower court makes a ruling based on two alternative grounds and only one of those grounds is challenged on appeal, the appellate court must affirm on the uncontested basis." Therefore, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of either ground on appeal. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Schmidt v. Huston" on Justia Law

623 Partners, LLC obtained a judgment against R. Larry Hunter and Larry Hunter Development Co. (collectively Larry). In its effort to satisfy the judgment, 623 Partners alleged that properly originally owned by Hunter Development was fraudulently transferred to Larry Todd Hunter, Larry’s son. The district court concluded that the properly was fraudulently transferred in order to avoid subjecting the property to 623 Partners’ writ of attachment and that Todd was liable to 623 Partners for the proceeds he received from the sale of a parcel of the property. The Supreme Court affirmed. On remand, Todd argued that he was entitled to an offset from the judgment amount based on the value of the improvements that he made to the property and that the property was exempt from execution or forced sale because he had claimed it as his homestead. The district court rejected Todd’s assertions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that Todd was not entitled to an offset and correctly concluded that Todd did not qualify for a homestead exemption. View "623 Partners, LLC v. Hunter" on Justia Law