Dominion and Bransen entered into a contract wherein Bransen was paid $27 million for coal product which would satisfy rigid specifications and environmental regulations. When Bransen failed to deliver product meeting the requirements, Dominion filed suit in district court. Dominion was awarded partial summary judgment on claims related to Bransen's delivery of coke breeze, and the district court held in favor of Dominion after a bench trial on its claims related to the delivery of waste coal. The district court awarded Dominion $22 million in damages. The court affirmed the district court's ruling in favor of Dominion as to liability where Bransen was liable for delivery product that did not satisfy the contracts between the parties. The court rejected Bransen's argument that the district court awarded damages, including indirect damages, in violation of Section 8.8 of the parties' contract, and rejected Bransen's challenges to the calculation of the damages award. Because the court found no error, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Virginia Electric and Power v. Bransen Energy" on Justia Law

In 2013, Felicia Farris filed an amended complaint alleging that, in 2005, she entered into a contract with Cynthia Conger, d/b/a Conger Wealth Management (Conger), entitled “Wealth Management Agreement.” In 2008, Farris sought to have Conger transfer sufficient funds from Farris’s Fidelity Investment Account to Farris’s personal checking account so that Farris could purchase certain property prior to a foreclosure sale. Conger failed to transfer the funds, and the property was sold to a third party. Farris ultimately obtained the parcel at additional costs. Farris brought this action against Conger in 2013. Conger moved for dismissal and for summary judgment, asserting that the cause of action sounded in the tort of negligence and, therefore, was barred by the three-year statute of limitations for tort actions. Farris argued that her cause of action was for breach of contract, and thus the five-year statute of limitations applied. The circuit court granted summary judgment, finding that Farris’s complaint sounded in negligence and, consequently, was time-barred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in failing to apply the five-year statute of limitations for contract claims, making Farris’s cause of action timely. View "Farris v. Conger" on Justia Law

The law firm’s contract with XO Communications provided that the contract would be automatically renewed “for a similar term and at the same rates.” A customer who did not want to renew was required to notify XO at least 30 days before the expiration date in the contract. The contract provided that if the customer terminated the contract after the deadline it would have to pay a termination fee. XO’s monthly invoices contain a prominent reminder of the automatic renewal. After its third renewal, the firm wanted out of the contract because it was moving to a location not serviced by XO. The firm, not wanting to pay the $9,000 termination fee, filed a purported class action, alleging that XO’s monthly reminders should have included the date of the automatic renewal, or that XO should have otherwise notified the plaintiff of the renewal date. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal, noting that: "It’s not as if the plaintiff were some hapless consumer bamboozled by a huge company…. Had this substantial enterprise kept track of the date of its contract with XO (more precisely the date of its latest renewal of the contract), it would not have incurred the modest termination fee." View "Cafferty, Clobes, Meriwether & Sprengel, LLP v. XO Communications Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Eagle Rigid Spans, Inc., ("ERS") appealed an order denying its motion for new trial and an amended judgment entered after a jury found in favor of Brandon and Constance Jalbert and awarding them $650,000 plus interest, and costs and disbursements. ERS also appealed from the district court's order overruling its objections to costs and disbursements. ERS contracted to build a multi-purpose building for the Jalberts. During and after the construction of the building the Jalberts discovered problems with the structure. The Jalberts brought suit alleging breach of contract and breach of warranty. ERS argued irregularities in the proceeding of the jury trial prevented them from having a fair trial, the jury awarded excessive damages because of the influence of passion or prejudice, sufficient evidence did not exist to justify the verdict and the trial court erred in failing to reduce the Jalbert's expert witness fees. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jalbert v. Eagle Rigid Spans, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the meaning and application of the stockholders’ agreement between Babcock Power Inc. and its former executive, Eric Balles. Babcock terminated Balles’ employment after discovering that he was engaged in an extramarital affair with a female subordinate. Concluding that Balles had been terminated “for cause” under the terms of his stockholders’ agreement with the company, the company’s board of directors “repurchased” Balles’ stock at a minimal price, withheld subsequent dividends, and refused to pay Balles any severance. Balles sought declaratory relief seeking that the stock be returned to him along with the withheld dividends. Balles prevailed at a jury-waived trial on his claim for declaratory relief but was unsuccessful in his request to receive severance pay. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge properly reviewed the board’s decision on a de novo basis; (2) the judge did not err in determining that Balles’ conduct did not constitute “cause” as defined in the stockholders’ agreement; and (3) Balles was not precluded from seeking relief pursuant to the terms of the stockholders’ agreement. View "Balles v. Babcock Power Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of a dispute over a construction contract between Golden Nugget and Yates. On appeal, Yates challenged the dismissal of its claim for a statutory lien under the Louisiana Private Works Act (LPWA), La. Stat. Ann. 9:4822, which grants general contractors a privilege to secure payment for their work. However, the LPWA requires that the contractor must preserve their lien by filing a statement of claim or privilege in a timely manner. In this case, although Yates did not file a lien statement within the time required by statute, the court found that because Golden Nugget never filed a notice of substantial completion, Yates's lien statement was timely filed. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Golden Nugget Lake Charles v. W. G. Yates & Son" on Justia Law

Timothy Bevel appeals from an order granting a motion to compel arbitration. In March 2015, Bevel financed the purchase of a used Bennington brand boat and a Yamaha brand boat motor from Guntersville Boat Mart, Inc., and he rented a boat slip on Lake Guntersville to dock the boat. The sale and boat-slip rental were documented by a one-page bill of sale, which contained an arbitration provision. According to Bevel, the boat was seized several months after the transaction for allegedly defaulting on payments on the boat and boat-slip rental. Bevel disputed that he owed those payments. The matter was submitted to arbitration. The Supreme Court found, however, that the arbitration provision at issue here did not become part of the contract between the parties, and, thus, it could not be enforced against Bevel. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's order compelling arbitration, and the case remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bevel v. Marine Group, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case the trial court entered judgment terminating a bottom lease based on jury findings that the lease failed to produce in paying quantities over a specified period of time. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding (1) the rule against perpetuities did not invalidate the top lease, and (2) the trial court erred in charging the jury on the production-in-paying-quantities question. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly remanded for a new trial where (1) the top lease did not violate the rule against perpetuities; and (2) the trial court erred in charging the jury on cessation of production in paying quantities. View "BP America Production Co. v. Laddex, Ltd." on Justia Law

Landlord leased commercial real estate to Tenant, a third party. The lease agreement provided on option to purchase with a condition precedent. At the time Tenant assigned this purchase option to Assignees, Tenant had fully performed all obligations under the lease. When Assignees attempted to exercise the purchase option, Landlord denied the attempt, arguing that because of certain rental underpayments, which were later paid in full, Tenant had failed to satisfy the condition precedent. Assignees filed a complaint seeking specific performance of the purchase option. Landlord later moved for specific performance of the terms and provisions of the purchase option. The district court sustained Landlord’s motion, and Assignees purchased the property. The district court then entered judgment in Assignees’ favor and awarded equitable monetary relief for lost rentals. Landlord appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) Landlord was judicially estopped from asserting the condition precedent in avoidance of equitable monetary relief; and (2) Landlord was entitled to offset the monetary award with the interest on the unpaid purchase price. View "O'Connor v. Kearny Junction, LLC" on Justia Law

In this insurance coverage dispute, Liberty Mutual, OES's insurer, denied OES's claim for reimbursement of funds OES spent defending against, and ultimately settling, the underlying tort suit. On appeal, Liberty Mutual claimed that the district court erred by permitting OES and Anadarko to equitably reform their master services contract (MSC), and that the district court interpreted the OES-Liberty Mutual policy erroneously by concluding that the policy obligated Liberty Mutual to reimburse OES for all of the attorney's fees OES incurred in connection with the tort suit, rather than a pro-rata portion of those fees. The court affirmed as to the MSC issue. In this case, OES and Anadarko met the higher clear-and-convincing evidence burden of establishing mutual error in the contract's creation. However, the court concluded that the insurance policy only obligated Liberty Mutual to pay a pro-rata share of the attorney's fees, and modified the attorney's fees award, determining that the policy entitled OES to attorney's fees totaling $168,695.96. View "Richard v. Anadarko Petroleum" on Justia Law