The Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the United States in Northwest Title Agency’s (NWTA) suit based on contracts, under which NWTA provided closing services for homes owned by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The courts concluded that the contracts unambiguously preclude NWTA from charging additional closing fees and declined to consider the affidavit of industry practice submitted by NWTA. The fee prohibition does not conflict with the buyers’ rights, as stated in the contracts, to retain a title company of their own choosing. View "Northwest Title Agency, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Leslie Meadows filed a complaint against William Erps claiming that Erps owed he money from several real estate projects that she shared with him. For purposes of appeal, Meadows’s claims involved two of those transactions with Erps: (1) claims related to the purchase of, improvements to, and sale of the Sutphin property; and (2) claims related to the financing for the Twiford apartments. The circuit court awarded judgment to Meadows in the amount of $18,675 with respect to the Sutphin property and $67,000 for the Twiford apartments, for a total sum of $85,675. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court’s award of judgment of $18,675 to Meadows as an abuse of discretion; and (2) the circuit court’s award of $67,000 was an abuse of discretion, and the circuit court’s award of judgment on the Twiford apartments is hereby reduced to $30,000. Remanded with directions to vacate the judgment for Meadows on the Sutphin property and to enter judgment for Meadows on the Twiford apartments in the amount of $30,000. View "Erps v. Meadows" on Justia Law

Gerardo Salvati died from injuries he sustained while doing maintenance work. Gerardo’s wife, Lucia (hereinafter referred to as Salvati) filed a lawsuit seeking damages for wrongful death and loss of consortium. The underlying defendants had a primary policy through Western World Insurance Company in the amount of $1 million and an excess policy through the American Insurance Company (AIC) in the amount of $9 million. AIC refused to provide coverage to the underlying defendants. Salvati and the underlying defendants eventually reached a $6 million settlement agreement. In exchange for tendering the full $1 million of the Western World primary insurance policy, the agreement released Western World and the underlying defendants from any further liability and assigned all rights held by the underlying defendants against AIC to Salvati. Thereafter, Salvati filed a complaint against AIC, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and seeking a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to collect $5 million from AIC under the excess policy. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Salvati failed to show that the settlement agreement triggered AIC’s duty to indemnify; and (2) Salvati may not bring a claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D, and therefore, none of her causes of action survived. View "Salvati v. American Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce loaned Dobson Bay Club II DD, LLC and related entities (Dobson Bay) $28.6 million for Dobson Bay’s purchase of commercial properties. The loan was secured by a deed of trust encumbering the properties. Under the terms of a promissory note, as a consequence for any delay in payment, Dobson Bay was required to pay, in addition to regular interest, default interest and collection costs and a five percent late fee assessed on the payment amount. When Dobson Bay failed to make the required payments, La Sonrisa de Siena, LLC, which bought the note and deed of trust, noticed a trustee’s sale of the secured properties, arguing that Dobson Bay owed more than $30 million, including a nearly $1.4 million late fee. At issue during the ensuing trial was whether the note was an enforceable liquidated damages provision. The superior court concluded that the late fee was enforceable as liquidated damages. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion and reversed the trial court’s partial summary judgment in favor of La Sonrisa on the liquidated damages claim, holding that an approximately $1.4 million late fee is unreasonable and an unenforceable penalty. View "Dobson Bay Club II DD, LLC v. La Sonrisa De Siena, LLC" on Justia Law

Jacked Up and Sara Lee signed a licensing agreement whereby Sara Lee would produce and sell energy drinks developed by Jacked Up. Sara Lee sold its beverage division to the J.M. Smucker Company and Smucker decided not to assume Sara Lee's licensing agreement. After Sara Lee formally terminated the agreement, Jacked Up filed suit against Sara Lee, alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and fraudulent inducement. Jacked Up joined claims against Smucker for, among other things, tortious interference with a contract and trade secret misappropriation. The district court granted summary judgment against Jacked Up on all claims. In regard to claims against Sara Lee, the court reversed the district court's conclusion that Section 14(b) of the agreement unambiguously permitted Sara Lee to terminate the licensing agreement at will; there are genuine disputes about whether Sara Lee breached the contract and whether Jacked Up performed under the contract, and thus the court reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Sara Lee on Jacked Up's breach of contract claim; the court affirmed as to the breach of fiduciary claim because Jacked Up failed to point to sufficient evidence that would support finding a fiduciary relationship between the parties; the court reversed as to the fraud and fraudulent inducement claim because, at the very least, there is a genuine dispute of fact as to whether Jacked Up's reliance on Sara Lee's representations was justifiable. In regard to claims against Smucker, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Smucker on the tortious interference claim; affirmed as to the trade secret misappropriation claim; affirmed the denial of Jacked Up's Rule 56(d) motion for a continuance; and the court left it to the district court to determine whether Jacked Up has put forth sufficient evidence of damages. View "Jacked Up, LLC v. Sara Lee Corp." on Justia Law

BBII filed suit against the City for breach of contract, alleging that the City unlawfully assessed liquidated damages against the company for failure to complete a construction project on time. This case involved two public works contracts entered into by the parties, in which BBII agreed to build certain parts of a wastewater treatment system aimed at reducing pollution in the Chesapeake Bay. The court agreed with the district court that BBII is not excused from the normal requirement of administrative exhaustion under Maryland law. The court rejected BBII's remaining claims and affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Balfour Beatty Infrastructure v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law

A subsidiary company brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment against its parent companies, challenging three management agreements by which the parent companies controlled, managed, and participated in the affairs of the subsidiary. The subsidiary argued that two clauses in the agreements were unconscionable because one stated that the parent companies could never be liable to the subsidiary company and the other required the subsidiary to indemnify the parent companies for all legal and liability costs. The circuit court declared that the two clauses at issue were unconscionable and unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in ruling that the two challenged clauses were unconscionable because the clauses were oppressive and unfair. View "Blackrock Capital Investment Corp. v. Fish" on Justia Law

In Marina Pacifica Homeowners Assn. v. Southern California Financial Corp., this court determined that a monthly "assignment fee," payable by individual condominium unit owners to the developers of the condominium project, was properly collectible under those statutory provisions. On appeal, the Association challenged the trial court's judgment determining the amended amounts owing from unit owners to the developers' successor in interest, Southern California, for the assignment fee. The court need not decide whether it could properly reconsider its decision in Marina Pacifica I, because the amended statute and its legislative history demonstrate that the Legislature intended in any event to permit the Marina Pacifica I assignment fees to remain in place. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Marina Pacifica Homeowners Assoc. v. Southern California Financial Corp." on Justia Law

GRC, a manufacturer and supplier of refractory products designed to retain strength when exposed to extreme heat, previously included asbestos in its products. GRC was the defendant in 31,440 lawsuits alleging injuries from “exposure to asbestos-containing products manufactured, sold, and distributed by GRC” dating back to 1978. GRC’s insurers initially fielded these claims. During the 1970s and ‘80s, GRC had entered into primary liability insurance policies with several different insurers. GRC also secured additional excess insurance policies. In 1994 GRC’s liabilities from thousands of settled claims far exceeded the limits of its primary insurance coverage. In 2002, after years of continued settlements, GRC tendered the underlying claims to its excess insurance carriers. All denied coverage on the basis of a policy exclusion: It is agreed that this policy does not apply to EXCESS NET LOSS arising out of asbestos, including but not limited to bodily injury arising out of asbestosis or related diseases or to property damage. The district court ruled in favor of GRC. The Third Circuit reversed. The phrase “arising out of,” when used in a Pennsylvania insurance exclusion, unambiguously requires “but for” causation. The losses relating to the underlying asbestos suits would not have occurred but for asbestos, raw or within finished products. View "General Refractories Co. v. First State Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Fleur and her son, Sidney, filed breach of contract claims against Wilmington. A jury determined that defendants breached an agreement to lend money for the acquisition, maintenance, and certain investments relating to life insurance policies obtained for Charlie and his wife, Fleur. The jury awarded $23 million in damages. The district court then determined post-trial that Wilmington breached an agreement to return certain funds to the Estate upon Charlie's death, and ordered Wilmington to return those funds in accordance with the parties' agreement. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting an expert's testimony, because plaintiffs' noncompliance with Rule 26 was harmless in the context of the events that transpired. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Wilmington's Daubert challenge. The court rejected Wilmington's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at trial, and affirmed the district court's order requiring Wilmington to return to the Estate the $5 million in collateral payments that Charlie had made. The court affirmed the portion of the damages award representing the net-in-trust shortfall, because that award was not reached against the clear weight of the evidence, and would not result in a miscarriage of justice. Finally, the court held that the jury properly awarded plaintiffs $3.9 million in consequential damages, and that this award was neither contrary to the clear weight of evidence nor one that would cause a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bresler v. Wilmington Trust Co." on Justia Law