When a landlord sues a tenant for breach of contract based on a residential lease and the trial court enters judgment in the landlord’s favor and the judgment includes damages for unpaid rent and other expenses, a post-judgment interest rate of six percent applies pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. (“CJ”) 11-107(b) rather than the post-judgment interest rate of ten percent under CJ 11-107(a).Landlords initiated actions for breach of contract against Tenants. The district court entered judgments in Landlords' favor, but the judgments did not delineate the portions thereof that were comprised of unpaid rent, as opposed to other expenses. Thereafter, Debt Collector engaged in collections activity on Landlords’ behalf. Debt Collector sought to apply the post-judgment interest rate of ten percent under CJ 11-107(a). Tenants filed complaints against Debt Collector, arguing that CJ 11-107(b) applied. The federal district court certified the question of which legal rate of post-judgment interest on the judgment awarded applied. The Supreme Court answered as set forth above. View "Ben-Davies & Moore v. Blibaum & Associates, P.A." on Justia Law

Justin Vigos appealed a district court’s decision to reverse a magistrate court’s order granting his motion for summary judgment against MFG Financial, Inc. (MFG). MFG initiated this action to recover damages from a breach of contract. In 2007, Vigos purchased a vehicle from Karl Malone Toyota. The contract was assigned to Courtesy Auto Credit (Courtesy). After some time, Vigos defaulted on the contract and the vehicle was repossessed and sold at auction. Courtesy then allegedly assigned the contract to MFG who initiated this action in 2015. After discovery, the parties each filed a motion for summary judgment. The magistrate court granted Vigos’s motion for summary judgment, finding that MFG had not presented sufficient admissible evidence to show that it was a real party in interest. MFG appealed and the district court reversed the decision of the magistrate court. Vigos appealed, arguing that the district court applied the wrong standard when it failed to first determine if evidence was admissible before considering it for purposes of summary judgment. MFG cross appealed, arguing that the district court erred when it failed to award it attorney fees on appeal. Finding no reversible error in the district court’s judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "MFG Financial Inc. v. Vigos" on Justia Law

Securiforce entered into a requirements contract with the government to deliver fuel to eight sites in Iraq. The government terminated the contract for convenience with respect to two sites because Securiforce intended to supply fuel from Kuwait, reasoning that delivery to those sites would violate the Trade Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. 2501, and that obtaining a waiver would take too long. Weeks later, the government ordered small deliveries to two sites, to occur by October 24. Securiforce indicated that it could not deliver until November. The government notified Securiforce that it should offer justifiable excuses or risk termination. Securiforce responded that the late deliveries were excused by improper termination for convenience, failure to provide required security escorts, small orders, and other alleged irregularities. The government terminated the contract for default. Securiforce filed suit (Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491; Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. 7101-09). The Claims Court found that it had jurisdiction to review both terminations; that the Contracting Officer abused her discretion in partially terminating the contract for convenience; and that the termination for default was proper. The Federal Circuit affirmed in part. The court lacked jurisdiction over the termination for convenience; a contractor’s request for a declaratory judgment that the government materially breached a contract violates the rule that courts will not grant equitable relief when money damages are adequate. The government did not breach the contract by terminating for convenience or with respect to providing security. View "Securiforce International America, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

Cita Trust appealed the district court's dismissal of its complaint against Fifth Third Bank in a commercial contract dispute action. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by dismissing the complaint as untimely and enforcing the contractual one-year limitation period. In this case, the agreement's limitation provision was reasonable, clear, and unambiguous. Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Cita leave to amend its complaint, because Cita did not properly move for leave to amend. View "Cita Trust Company AG v. Fifth Third Bank" on Justia Law

An arbitration provision in a maritime insurance policy is enforceable despite law in the forum state assertedly precluding its application. This case concerned the scope of insurance coverage Galilea bought for its yacht. The Ninth Circuit held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1-16, applied to the insurance policy but not the insurance application. In this case, the insurance application was not a contract, but the insurance policy was a contract subject to the FAA because the FAA constituted established federal maritime law for maritime transactions; federal maritime law was not precluded by Montana law under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1012; and federal maritime law was not precluded by Montana law under M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). The panel also held that the parties have delegated arbitrability issues to an arbitrator. Therefore, the panel affirmed the district court's order finding the policy's arbitration clause enforceable and affirmed the district court's order granting the Underwriters' motion to compel arbitration as to certain causes of action. The panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Galilea, LLC v. AGCS Marine Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment in favor of Western in an action alleging breach of three personal guarantees. In this case, defendant signed the guarantee agreements in conjunction with a real estate development project and Western financed the project. Western filed suit against defendant after the borrowers defaulted on the underlying loans and Western foreclosed on the property. The court held that the district court correctly identified the governing law; the two-year limitations period in TEX. PROP. CODE 51.003(a) is procedural and applied insofar as it barred Western's claim for recovery of unpaid debt under the Construction Loan; the district court shall evaluate on remand whether the Mezzanine Loan's promissory note waived notice of acceleration, and in turn, shall examine the ultimate timeliness of the Mezzanine Guarantee claim and its constituent parts under the four-year limitations period; the Completion Guarantee claim was timely; and the court upheld that district court's denial of Western's attorney’s fees and post-foreclosure construction costs. View "Western-Southern Life Assurance Co. v. Kaleh" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant for causes of action arising out of defendant's breach of contract, and for fraud. Plaintiff and defendant had entered into a contract under which plaintiff paid the purchase price for a Malibu residence to be held by defendant as the "nominal owner." The trial court rejected plaintiff's fraud claim, but found that defendant had breached the contract. The trial court denied plaintiff's request for rescission, but ordered that the property be sold and the proceeds apportioned between the parties in accordance with the contract. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not err by granting plaintiff relief based on defendant's breach of contract; defendant's challenge to particular provisions of the judgment were rejected; and plaintiff's appeal from an order denying his motion for leave to amend was moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Guan v. Hu" on Justia Law

As Oilgear’s CEO, Hitt held restricted stock. When Hitt left his position in 2014, Oilgear exercised its option to repurchase the shares. Oilgear and Hitt agreed that he would receive $753,000: $108,000 immediately and $215,000 (plus interest) each June for the next three years. Oilgear also owes money to JPMorgan Chase Bank. Hitt, Oilgear, and the Bank signed an agreement acknowledging that Oilgear’s debt to Hitt is subordinate to Oilgear’s debt to the Bank and that Hitt will not be paid while Oilgear is in default of its obligations to the Bank. After paying the 2015 installment, Oilgear defaulted on an obligation to the Bank. The Bank agreed to waive most consequences of the default if Oilgear promised the Bank that it would not resume paying Hitt without the Bank’s consent. The Bank did not consent to the payment of Hitt’s 2016 installment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a declaratory judgment that Oilgear is entitled to defer payment of the 2016-2017 installments. Oilgear paying Hitt without the Bank’s consent would vitiate the Bank’s waiver and a default “would exist.” View "Oilgear Co. v. Hitt" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed as modified the district court’s order dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff, an attorney, filed a complaint for breach of contract against Defendant. The trial court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint including claims for tortious conversion and a violation of Nebraska’s Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, holding (1) neither general nor specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant existed; but (2) the district court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice. The court modified the district court’s order to a dismissal without prejudice. View "Nimmer v. Giga Entertainment Media, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1995, Peoria signed a lease that allowed RTC to construct and operate a gas conversion project at the city’s landfill, providing that when the lease terminated, the city had an absolute right to retain, at no cost, the “structures” and “below‐grade installations and/or improvements” that RTC installed. Years later, RTC entered bankruptcy proceedings. Banco provided RTC with postpetition financing secured with liens and security interests in effectively all of RTC’s assets. RTC defaulted. Litigation ensued. The city notified RTC that it was terminating the lease and would retain the structures and installations. After RTC stopped operating the gas conversion project, Peoria modified the system to comply with environmental regulations for methane and other landfill gasses and continued to use the property. Banco sued, alleging unjust enrichment and arguing that it had a better claim to the property because its loan was secured by a lien on all of RTC’s assets and the bankruptcy court had given its loan “super-priority” status. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the city. No matter the priority of its claim to RTC’s assets, Banco has no claim to Peoria’s assets. By the terms of the lease between RTC and the city, the disputed structures and installations are city property. The lease gave RTC no post‐termination property interest in that property. View "Banco Panamericano, Incorporat v. City of Peoria, Illinois" on Justia Law