In 1999, Ronnie and Jeanette Dennis purchased property on Callawassie Island. At that time, the Dennises joined a private club known as the Callawassie Island Club, and paid $31,000 to become "equity members." The Club's bylaws stated "Any equity member may resign from the Club by giving written notice to the Secretary. Dues, fees, and charges shall accrue against a resigned equity membership until the resigned equity membership is reissued by the Club." In 2010, the Dennises decided they no longer wanted to be in the Members Club, so they submitted a "letter of resignation" and stopped making all payments. The Club filed a breach of contract action against the Dennises, alleging the unambiguous terms of the membership documents required the Dennises to continue to pay their membership dues, fees, and other charges until their membership was reissued. The Dennises denied any liability, alleging they were told by a Members Club manager that their maximum liability would be only four months of dues, because after four months of not paying, they would be expelled. The Dennises also alleged the membership arrangement violated the South Carolina Nonprofit Corporation Act. Finding no ambiguity in the Club bylaws, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated summary judgment for all unpaid dues, fees and other charges. View "Callawassie Island Club v. Dennis" on Justia Law

Palmetto Mortuary Transport, Inc. sued Knight Systems, Inc. and Robert Knight (collectively, Knight) for breach of an asset purchase agreement executed in connection with the sale of Knight's mortuary transport business to Palmetto. A special referee found Knight breached the agreement by violating both a non-compete covenant and an exclusive sales provision contained in the agreement. Knight appealed, and the court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding the 150-mile territorial restriction in the non- compete covenant was unreasonable and unenforceable. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that under the facts of this case, the territorial restriction in the non-compete covenant was reasonable and enforceable. The Court also found Knight's additional sustaining grounds to be without merit and therefore reinstated the special referee's order. View "Palmetto Mortuary v. Knight Systems" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the government in an action to enforce a settlement agreement. The court held that OSC's press release stating that its investigation found that Nebraska Beef had engaged in illegal employment practices did not constitute a material breach of the settlement agreement. Therefore, because the government did not fail to fulfill any promise, Nebraska Beef's breach of contract counterclaim failed and the government's claim for enforcement prevailed. View "United States v. Nebraska Beef, Ltd." on Justia Law

Ankor Energy, LLC, and Ankor E&P Holdings Corporation (collectively, "Ankor") appealed a circuit court's grant of a motion for a new trial in favor of Jerry Kelly, Kandace Kelly McDaniel, Kelly Properties, LLP, and K&L Resources, LLP (collectively, "the Kellys"). In 2010, Renaissance Petroleum Company, LLC, drilled two oil wells in Escambia County, Alabama. The Kellys owned property in Escambia County and entered into two leases with Renaissance. The leases included property near the two wells. In December 2010, Ankor acquired an interest in Renaissance's project and leases in Escambia County. In January 2011, Renaissance and Ankor petitioned the Oil and Gas Board ("the Board") to establish production units for the two wells. In February 2011, the Board held a hearing to determine what property to include in the production units. The Kellys were represented by counsel at the hearing and argued that their property should be included in the production units. The Board established the production units for the two wells but did not include the Kellys' property. Renaissance continued to operate the project until May 2011, when Ankor took over operations. In December 2011, Ankor offered to request that the Board include the Kellys' property in the production units. Ankor took the position that it had not drained any oil from the Kellys' property, and Ankor offered to pay royalties to the Kellys but only after the date the Board included the Kellys' property in the production units. The Kellys did not accept the offer, and later sued, listing multiple causes of action and alleging Ankor failed to include their property in the production units presented to the Board, knowing that their property should have been included. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order granting the Kellys' motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct; the matter was remanded for the trial court to reinstate the original judgment entered on the jury's verdict in favor of Ankor. View "Kelly v. Ankor Energy, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue was a real estate contract containing a “first right of refusal” applicable to a separate land tract.Appellant sought specific performance and title to a smaller parcel that was sold after he failed to respond to an earlier offer to sell the entire tract subject to the real estate contract. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. A Court of Appeals panel reversed. Defendants petitioned for review solely on the panel’s contractual compliance analysis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the panel both misread the contract and improperly inserted terms inconsistent with the plain language under consideration; but (2) the first right of refusal was fulfilled after Appellant failed to respond to the offer to sell him the full tract subject to the contract. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings where there remained an unresolved claim as to whether the parties discharged their implied duty of good faith and fair dealing when the offer was presented, and the answer to this question will determine whether the first right of refusal provision lapsed when Appellant failed to respond. View "Trear v. Chamberlain" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Alfredo Fuentes entered into a written agreement with defendant TMCSF, Inc., doing business as Riverside Harley-Davidson (Riverside), to buy a motorcycle. At the same time, he entered into a written agreement with Eaglemark Savings Bank (Eaglemark) to finance the purchase. The loan agreement included an arbitration clause; the purchase agreement did not. Fuentes then filed suit against Riverside, alleging that Riverside made various misrepresentations and violated various statutes in connection with the sale of the motorcycle. Riverside petitioned to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the petition. The Court of Appeal held Riverside was not entitled to compel arbitration because it was not a party to the arbitration clause, it was not acting in the capacity of an agent of a party to the arbitration clause, and it was not a third party beneficiary of the arbitration clause. Moreover, Fuentes was not equitably estopped to deny Riverside’s claimed right to compel arbitration. View "Fuentes v. TMCSF, Inc." on Justia Law

The chancery court examined the principles underlying quantum meruit and found that Vincent Castigliola and David Kiyhet, attorneys for the estate of Dane Eubanks, should have been awarded attorneys’ fees from two minors out of a settlement they, and only they, obtained. After remand from the Mississippi Supreme Court, the chancery court again heard arguments as to whether Castigliola and Kiyhet should be awarded attorneys’ fees from the two minors based on quantum meruit out of the settlement they obtained. The remand required that the chancery court make specific findings of fact. This time, without making any findings of fact and without any contradictory evidence being introduced, the chancery court reversed course and found that the factors for quantum meruit were not met. Because the chancery court failed to follow remand instructions by failing to make findings of fact, and, because no contradictory evidence was adduced suggesting the factors for quantum meruit were suddenly not met, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a further determination of attorneys’ fees. View "In the Matter of the Estate of Dane Richard Eubanks, Deceased" on Justia Law

At issue was whether the circuit court abused its discretion when it dismissed a complaint with prejudice upon sustaining a plea in bar for failure to comply with a contractual condition precedent before filing suit.Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant alleging breach of contract. Plaintiff had filed a similar breach of contract action against Defendant, which he nonsuited. In the current action, Plaintiff alleged that he entered into an employment agreement with Defendant that Defendant later breached. Defendant filed a plea in bar to the complaint alleging that a written request to mediate was a condition precedent to initiating legal action. The circuit court found that the mediation provision was a condition precedent to filing suit, that Plaintiff did not satisfy this condition, and that the appropriate remedy was dismissal of the complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint due to Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a mandatory condition precedent to filing suit. View "Primov v. Serco, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case asserting breach of contract and fraud, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the circuit court granting the motion filed by Portable Lift Equipment Inc. (PLE) for a new trial on the issue of damages, holding that the circuit court erred in concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support the compensatory awards.International Services Group Corp. (ISG) contracted with PLE to build two observation platforms for use by law enforcement at a festival held in Puerto Rico. PLE failed to deliver the agreed-upon platforms and instead delivered a contractually noncompliant platform. ISG sued PLE and its president. The jury found in favor of ISG and awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. PLE later filed a motion for a new trial. The circuit court granted a new trial on the issue of damages, expressing concern that it could not replicate the jury’s calculations, and denied the motion on the issue of liability. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the compensatory damages awards provided by the jury could be explained by the evidence, and the compensatory damages did not impermissibly taint the punitive-damages awards. View "ISG, Corp. v. PLE, Inc." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's action based on a forum-selection clause in share purchase agreements that required disputes related to the parties' agreement be adjudicated in California state court, rather than Washington state court. The panel held that plaintiffs failed to carry their heavy burden of showing the sort of exceptional circumstances that would justify disregarding a forum-selection clause. Applying federal contract law to interpret the scope of the forum-selection clause, the panel held that the forum-selection clause here applied to any disputes arising out of or related to the Share Purchase Agreements and plaintiffs' claims that defendant violated the Washington State Securities Act constituted such a dispute. The panel rejected plaintiffs' claims to the contrary and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint. View "Sun v. Advanced China Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law