Perdue Farms operates a poultry-processing plant in Indiana. In August 2018, an L&B Transport driver mistakenly delivered aluminum chloride instead of bleach, causing a chemical reaction that damaged the plant. Perdue sued L&B Transport, its driver, U.S. Security Associates, and three security guards employed by U.S. Security, seeking over $1.2 million in damages. The security-service contract between Perdue and U.S. Security included a forum-selection clause designating Maryland federal court as the venue for disputes.The Daviess Circuit Court dismissed Perdue’s claims against U.S. Security and its employees, citing the forum-selection clause. Perdue appealed, arguing the clause was unenforceable and did not apply to the employees. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding the clause unenforceable due to the potential for multiple lawsuits in different jurisdictions. A dissenting judge argued that Perdue, as a sophisticated entity, should adhere to its contractual agreement.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the forum-selection clause is enforceable against U.S. Security, requiring Perdue to litigate those claims in Maryland federal court. However, the court found that the clause does not apply to the individual employees, as they were not parties to the contract and not in privity with U.S. Security. The court rejected the argument that the employees' duties under the contract made them subject to the forum-selection clause.The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of claims against U.S. Security for improper venue but reversed the dismissal of claims against the individual employees. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Perdue Farms Inc. v. L & B Transport, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, Randall C. Belyea was the sole shareholder and president of Belyea Enterprises, Inc. (BEI), which had a contract with FedEx. Due to a misdemeanor charge, FedEx refused to renew the contract with Belyea, leading him to transfer his interest in BEI to his fiancée, Heather A. Campbell, under the understanding that she would be the owner in name only while he continued to run the business. However, in 2018, Campbell terminated Belyea's employment and restricted his access to BEI's bank accounts.The Superior Court (Aroostook County) initially granted Campbell’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on Belyea’s conversion claim and later entered judgment as a matter of law in favor of Campbell on Belyea’s breach of contract claim, despite a jury verdict in Belyea’s favor. The court found that there was insufficient evidence of an enforceable contract between Belyea and Campbell, as the terms were too vague and indefinite.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that the terms of the alleged contract between Belyea and Campbell were not sufficiently definite to form an enforceable contract. The terms did not clearly define the roles and obligations of each party, the duration of the contract, or the details regarding a possible reconveyance of BEI to Belyea. Consequently, the court also upheld the judgment in favor of Campbell on the conversion claim, as Belyea did not have a legal interest in BEI in 2018. View "Belyea v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Bruce Molzan, a well-known chef, filed a lawsuit against Bellagreen Holdings, LLC, and other associated entities and individuals, alleging trademark infringement and other claims under the Lanham Act and Texas law. Molzan claimed that he had been using the "RUGGLES" trademarks for over forty years and that the defendants misused these trademarks after a forced sale of his restaurants. He alleged that the defendants continued to use the "RUGGLES GREEN" trademark and domain name without authorization, causing consumer confusion.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed all of Molzan's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court found that Molzan's allegations were conclusory and did not establish a connection between the defendants and the third-party websites causing the confusion. The court also determined that the Settlement Agreement between the parties addressed the alleged infringements and provided a remedy for such transgressions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that Molzan's complaint contained well-pleaded factual allegations that made his claims facially plausible. The court noted that the allegations established a likelihood of confusion due to the defendants' continued use of the "RUGGLES" trademarks. The court also found that the district court erred in assuming the veracity of the defendants' assertions over Molzan's well-pleaded allegations. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Molzan's federal and state trademark infringement, false advertising, unfair competition, and state trademark dilution claims. The court also reversed the dismissal of Molzan's breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. Additionally, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of the Web Defendants and the denial of Molzan's motion for leave to amend his complaint. View "Molzan v. Bellagreen Holdings" on Justia Law

Cynthia Roberge, a State of Rhode Island employee, was involved in a car accident with an underinsured motorist while driving her personal vehicle during the course of her employment. She sought uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage under the State's insurance policy issued by Travelers Property Casualty Company of America. Travelers denied her claim, stating that she was not entitled to UM/UIM coverage because she was not driving a "covered auto" as defined by the policy.Roberge filed a lawsuit in Providence County Superior Court, asserting claims for breach of contract, declaratory judgment, and bad faith. Travelers removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Travelers, concluding that Roberge was not entitled to UM/UIM coverage under the policy's terms and that neither the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision in Martinelli v. Travelers Insurance Companies nor the Rhode Island Uninsured Motorist Statute required such coverage.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the policy's language clearly excluded Roberge from UM/UIM coverage because she was not driving a "covered auto." However, the court found that the case raised unresolved questions of Rhode Island insurance law, particularly regarding the applicability of the Martinelli exception and the requirements of the Rhode Island Uninsured Motorist Statute. The First Circuit decided to certify two questions to the Rhode Island Supreme Court: whether an employee must be considered a named insured under an employer's auto insurance policy when operating a personal vehicle in the scope of employment, and whether it violates Rhode Island law and public policy for an employer's policy to provide liability but not UM/UIM coverage to employees in such circumstances. The case was stayed pending the Rhode Island Supreme Court's response. View "Roberge v. Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America" on Justia Law

Next Millennium Telecom Co. (Nextel), a Saudi Arabian corporation, was contracted by the Saudi Arabian government to install an emergency siren system. Nextel paid American Signal Corporation, a Wisconsin corporation, approximately $11 million for the sirens and related components. After installation, the sirens failed to operate correctly, and American Signal refused to repair or replace the defective parts or refund the payment. Consequently, Nextel sued American Signal in federal court for breach of contract, among other claims.The case was heard in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The litigation was marked by Nextel's uncooperative behavior, which hindered the discovery process. At the final pretrial conference, the district court noted the lack of progress on key factual issues and ordered Nextel to take specific steps, including obtaining local counsel, conferring with American Signal, and filing a plan for testing the sirens and securing visas for witnesses. Nextel's failure to comply with these orders led the district court to dismiss the case for failure to prosecute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case. The appellate court found that Nextel's conduct, including its failure to facilitate inspections, schedule depositions, adhere to local rules, and comply with the court's pretrial order, justified the dismissal. The court emphasized that the responsibility to move the case forward rested with Nextel, and its pattern of delay and non-compliance supported the district court's decision. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal and did not address Nextel's argument regarding remote testimony for its witnesses. View "Next Millennium Telecom Co. v. American Signal Corporation" on Justia Law

Benchmark Property Remodeling, LLC, a construction company, performed remodeling work on a building owned by Grandmothers, Inc., which was leased to the Kansas Department of Revenue (KDOR). The work was based on quotes finalized between KDOR and Benchmark, and a "Third Amendment to Lease" between KDOR and Grandmothers. Benchmark completed the work and invoiced Grandmothers and KDOR. KDOR paid Grandmothers, but Grandmothers only partially paid Benchmark, withholding some amounts for various reasons. Benchmark sued Grandmothers, KDOR, and others for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and other claims.The Shawnee District Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Grandmothers on several claims, concluding there was insufficient evidence of a contract between Benchmark and Grandmothers. The court also granted KDOR's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Benchmark then dismissed its remaining claims without prejudice and appealed the partial summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings.The Kansas Court of Appeals reviewed the case and concluded that appellate jurisdiction was proper because Benchmark did not refile its dismissed claims, making the district court's judgment final. The panel reversed the district court's entry of judgment on the pleadings for KDOR, noting significant factual issues regarding the parties' intent. The panel also reversed the district court's summary judgment for Grandmothers, finding that the evidence could support a finding of a contract between Benchmark and Grandmothers.The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the district court's partial summary judgment became final with the dismissal of the remaining claims, thus granting appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court agreed that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding the existence of a contract, making summary judgment inappropriate. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Benchmark Property Remodeling v. Grandmothers, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a contract dispute between Kenneth E. Salamone and RUFSTR Racing, LLC (Plaintiffs) and Douglas Marine Corporation (Defendant). Plaintiffs contracted with Douglas Marine to purchase a custom-made race boat and trailer for $542,117, making payments totaling $501,500. Douglas Marine failed to deliver the boat on time, leading Plaintiffs to cancel the contract. Douglas Marine sold the boat and engines for $375,000 but only remitted $50,000 to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, seeking damages.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York held a jury trial, which found in favor of Plaintiffs, awarding them $131,171 in damages. Plaintiffs moved to alter the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), arguing the jury's calculation was fundamentally erroneous and should be increased to $451,500. The district court agreed, ruling that the jury's verdict constituted a fundamental error and increased the damages to $451,500. Douglas Marine appealed, arguing the district court erred in increasing the damages and in not instructing the jury on a mitigation-of-damages defense. They also challenged the court's personal jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. It found merit in Douglas Marine's argument that the district court improperly increased the damages award, ruling that the jury's verdict did not constitute fundamental error. The appellate court reversed the amended judgment to the extent it increased the damages and remanded the case for entry of a second amended judgment consistent with the jury's original award of $131,171. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Douglas Marine's post-judgment motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Salamone v. Douglas Marine Corp." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Commodities & Minerals Enterprise, Ltd. (CME) and CVG Ferrominera Orinoco, C.A. (FMO). CME sought to confirm a New York Convention arbitration award of $187.9 million against FMO. FMO opposed the confirmation, alleging that CME procured the underlying contract through fraud, bribery, and corruption, arguing that enforcing the award would violate U.S. public policy. The district court confirmed the award, ruling that FMO was barred from challenging the confirmation on public policy grounds because it failed to seek vacatur within the three-month time limit prescribed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially reviewed the case. CME moved to confirm the arbitration award in December 2019. FMO opposed the confirmation nearly two years later, citing public policy concerns. The district court granted CME’s motion, explaining that FMO was barred from opposing confirmation on public policy grounds due to its failure to seek vacatur within the FAA’s three-month time limit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, based on its recent en banc decision in Corporación AIC, SA v. Hidroélectrica Santa Rita S.A., FMO should have been allowed to assert its public policy defense in opposition to confirmation. The court clarified that the grounds for vacating a New York Convention arbitration award are those set forth in U.S. domestic law, specifically Chapter 1 of the FAA, which does not recognize public policy as a ground for vacatur. However, the court affirmed the district court’s confirmation of the award, concluding that FMO’s public policy defense failed on the merits because it attacked the underlying contract, not the award itself. View "Commodities & Minerals Enterprise, Ltd. v. CVG Ferrominera Orinoco C.A." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the allocation of attorneys' fees from a $1.51 billion settlement between Syngenta AG and numerous plaintiffs. The settlement arose after Syngenta failed to obtain regulatory approval for its genetically modified corn seeds to be imported into China, leading to significant financial losses for American corn farmers and producers. As part of the settlement, $503 million was allocated for attorneys' fees, which was divided into four pools: three common benefit pools and one for individually retained private attorneys (IRPAs). The IRPA pool was allocated $60 million.The United States District Court for the District of Kansas initially approved the allocation scheme and the modification of contingent-fee contracts, capping IRPA fees at approximately 10% of their clients' recovery. The Objecting Firms, including Hossley-Embry and Byrd/Shields, challenged this allocation and the modification of their fee contracts. They filed motions for reconsideration, arguing that the settlement claims process was more complex than anticipated, requiring additional work. The district court denied these motions, and the Objecting Firms appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit previously affirmed the district court's allocation scheme and the modification of the contingent-fee contracts in In re Syngenta I. The current appeal focuses on the district court's June 2021 IRPA Pool Allocation Order, which adopted the special master's recommendations on the allocation of the $60 million within the IRPA pool. The Objecting Firms argued that the district court's allocation was insufficient and that their due process rights were violated.The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's June 2021 IRPA Pool Allocation Order, concluding that the Objecting Firms failed to raise any arguments within the scope of the appeal, which was limited to the allocation of the IRPA pool itself. The court also dismissed the contingent cross-appeal by MDL Co-Lead Counsel as moot, given the affirmation of the district court's order. View "In re: SYNGENTA AG MIR162 CORN LITIGATION" on Justia Law

3M Company operates a manufacturing facility in Cordova, Illinois, producing chemical products containing PFAS. The State of Illinois sued 3M, alleging that PFAS from the Cordova Facility contaminated the Mississippi River, violating state environmental laws. The State's complaint specifically excluded PFAS contamination from any other source, including AFFF used by the U.S. military at the nearby Rock Island Arsenal.The case was initially filed in Illinois state court. 3M removed it to the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, citing the federal officer removal statute, arguing that some contamination might have come from AFFF provided to the military, thus invoking a federal government contractor defense. The State moved to remand the case back to state court. The district court granted the motion, finding that the State's complaint excluded AFFF-related contamination, focusing solely on PFAS from the Cordova Facility.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that 3M could not satisfy the fourth element required for removal under the federal officer removal statute, which necessitates a colorable federal defense. The court noted that the State had unequivocally conceded that it would not seek relief for mixed PFAS contamination and that any recovery would be barred if contamination was not solely from the Cordova Facility. Consequently, 3M's government contractor defense was deemed irrelevant under the State's theory of recovery. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case to state court. View "Raoul v. 3M Company" on Justia Law