Jeanne Oaks and Parkerson Construction, LLC ("Parkerson"), were engaged in a dispute concerning Parkerson's reconstruction of Oaks's fire-damaged residence in Huntsville, Alabama. Parkerson initiated the action, claiming that Oaks owed it more than $50,000 for its work. Oaks filed counterclaims alleging, among other things, that Parkerson misrepresented itself and performed deficient work. Parkerson moved the trial court to order that Oaks's counterclaims be arbitrated based on a provision in an unauthenticated work-authorization agreement that was attached to the motion. The trial court granted Parkerson's motion and ordered that Oaks's counterclaims be arbitrated. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's arbitration order, however, because Parkerson did not meet its burden of establishing the existence of a contract calling for arbitration. View "Oaks v. Parkerson Construction, LLC" on Justia Law

LED Corporations, Inc. ("LED"), and Anthony Florence petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Etowah Circuit Court ("the trial court") to vacate its order denying their motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction an action filed against them by SDM Electric, LLC ("SDM"), and to enter an order dismissing the case against them. SDM is an Alabama corporation that served as an electrical subcontractor for a construction project at a high school in Calhoun County, Alabama. LED is a Florida corporation owned by Florence, its sole shareholder. In 2017, SDM contacted LED to solicit a bid for lighting fixtures for use in the construction project. SDM executed and delivered to LED a purchase order for lighting fixtures; SDM paid LED the balance of the purchase order. The fixtures were never shipped, and, in late 2018, SDM sued LED and Florence (among others), for breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation and conversion. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, concluding SDM satisfied its burden in opposition to LED's and Florence's motions to dismiss by showing that LED and Florence has sufficient contacts with Alabama to support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction and that the exercise of jurisdiction over them "complies with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." View "Ex parte LED Corporations, Inc." on Justia Law

Mark Rosenthal ("Mark"), as personal representative of the estate of Richard Rosenthal, deceased ("Richard"), appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of JRHBW Realty, Inc., d/b/a RealtySouth ("RealtySouth"), and Charles Valekis on Richard's claims alleging breach of contract and negligence/wantonness. In early June 2013, Richard retained RealtySouth through its agent Valekis to assist him in locating a new house to purchase. Valekis told Richard about an unlisted property that Valekis believed would meet Richard's needs. Richard testified that he told Valekis that he would not buy the home without having a structural engineer examine it. Richard testified that, based on Valekis's representation that he had had a structural engineer inspect the home and on Valekis's representation that Garland Caudle, a home inspector (but not a structural engineer) had not found any structural issues, he placed an offer on the home. Richard closed on the home on July 19, 2013, and he moved into the home soon thereafter. After he had lived in the home for several months, Richard concluded that the home was too small and that he needed a larger home. He again engaged the services of Valekis and RealtySouth to sell the home. After the home was placed on the real-estate market, Richard began to notice problems with it. Valekis subsequently informed Richard that numerous potential buyers were concerned with the condition of the home. Ultimately, Richard had the home inspected by a foundation-repair contractor, and that contractor recommended that Richard hire a structural engineer. The structural engineer determined the home was experiencing significant structural distress and estimated that fixing the issues would cost over $100,000. In 2015, Richard sued RealtySouth, Valekis, Caudle, Foundations Unlimited of Alabama, and the Coopers (the previous owners of the house). The Alabama Supreme Court concluded Mark's allegation of a breach of contract by Valekis apart from the agency agreement was without merit. As the circuit court concluded, the agency agreement "contains language that RealtySouth and Valekis did not assume any responsibility to inspect the property or retain building experts to inspect the property," so the Court concluded the agency agreement did not provide a basis for Richard's breach-of-contract claim. Accordingly, the circuit court correctly entered a summary judgment in favor of RealtySouth and Valekis with respect to any alleged breach of contract. View "Estate of Richard Rosenthal v. JRHBW Realty, Inc., d/b/a RealtySouth" on Justia Law

In this dispute over whether an email exchange reflected the meeting of minds required for a contract the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Sellers after concluding that the parties did not intend to be bound to any agreement, holding that, as a matter of law, the parties did not execute and deliver a definitive agreement.The Sellers agreed to develop and sell certain assets worth hundreds of millions of dollars. The Sellers and Le Norman Operating LLC (LNO) exchanged a number of emails regarding the purchase of the assets, but the Sellers elected to sell the assets to another entity. LNO brought this breach of contract alleging that the Sellers breached an alleged contract entered into through the email exchange. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Sellers, concluding that there was no meeting of the minds. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that whether LNO and the Sellers intended to b abound by the terms set forth in the exchanged emails were fact issues precluding summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the emails did not constitute a definitive agreement. View "Chalker Energy Partners III, LLC v. Le Norman Operating LLC" on Justia Law

In this wrongful death action brought against a nursing home notwithstanding the existence of an arbitration agreement between the decedent and the nursing home the Supreme Judicial Court answered two certified questions by holding that the Legislature intended wrongful death actions to be derivative of the decedent's own cause of action and that, under the circumstances of this case, the arbitration agreement between the decedent and the nursing home controlled the decedent's statutory beneficiaries.After the decedent died in a nursing home, Plaintiff, her daughter, brought this wrongful death action. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit certified two questions to the Supreme Judicial Court. The Supreme Court answered (1) the wrongful death statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 229, 2, provides rights to statutory beneficiaries derivative of, rather than independent from, what would have been the decedent's action for the injuries causing her death; and (2) the arbitration clause in this case was enforceable. View "GGNSC Administrative Services, LLC v. Schrader" on Justia Law

In this wrongful death action, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant based on the release from liability and covenant not to sue that the decedent signed before his death, holding that the beneficiaries of a wrongful death action have rights that are derivative of, rather than independent from, any claim the decedent could have brought for the injuries causing his death.The decedent, a certified open-water scuba diver, drowned while participating in a promotional diving equipment sponsored by Diving Unlimited International, Inc. (DUI). The decedent signed a release from liability prior to participating in the event. Plaintiff, in her capacity as the decedent's personal representative, sued DUI and Defendant, a DUI agent, for the benefit of the decent's statutory beneficiaries. Plaintiff settled with all defendants other than Defendant. The superior court then granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that the waivers the decedent signed were valid and thus precluded any recovery on behalf of the decedent's beneficiaries, who had no rights independent of the decedent's cause of action, which was waived. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the valid waivers signed by the decedent precluded Plaintiff from bringing a lawsuit for the benefit of the statutory beneficiaries. View "Doherty v. Diving Unlimited International, Inc." on Justia Law

Flameproof, a distributor of fire retardant and treated lumber (FRT lumber), maintained liability insurance through Lexington, covering liability for "property damage” that is “caused by an occurrence that takes place in the coverage territory.” “Occurrence” is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” “Property damage” is “physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of that property,” or loss of use of property that is not physically injured. Three lawsuits arose from Flameproof’s sale of lumber to Minnesota-based contractors. The contracts called for FRT lumber meeting the requirements of the International Building Code (IBC). The complaints alleged that Flameproof “unilaterally” decided to deliver its in-house FlameTech brand lumber, which purportedly was not IBC-compliant. After the material was installed, the owners discovered that the lumber was not IBC-certified. Flameproof “admitted” that it had shipped FlameTech lumber rather than the FRT lumber advertised on its website and ordered. The FlameTech lumber was removed and replaced, damaging the surrounding materials. The lawsuits alleged negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, deceptive business practices, false advertising, consumer fraud, breach of warranties, and breach of contract. Lexington sought a ruling that it owed no duty to defend Flameproof. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Lexington. The underlying complaints do not allege an “occurrence”—or accident—as required to trigger Lexington’s duty to defend under the policy. View "Lexington Insurance Co. v. Chicago Flameproof & Wood Specialties Corp." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court against Kodak Alaris, Inc. based on the jury finding that Kodak was in breach of its contractual obligation to ITyX Solutions AG except as to the calculation of prejudgment interest, holding that the district court correctly rejected Kodak's motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial but that, as to the prejudgment interest award, the interest must be recalculated from a different date.Judgment in this case was entered against Kodak in the sum of $9,211,699.20, including prejudgment interest. The district court rejected Kodak's argument that the jury must have necessarily found that it was ITyX which actually breached the contract and that ITyX had breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court further rejected Kodak's various standing and damages arguments. The First Circuit affirmed the rulings of the district court in all respects except its award of prejudgment interest on damages, and, as to that prejudgment interest award, altered the date used and remanded. View "ITyX Solutions AG v. Kodak Alaris, Inc." on Justia Law

Guerline Felix’s vehicle collided with Brian Richards’ vehicle in New Jersey. Richards was insured under a New Jersey automobile insurance policy issued by AAA Mid-Atlantic Insurance Company (AAA). The policy provided bodily injury (BI) liability coverage, as well as uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage. Felix was insured by the Government Employee Insurance Company (GEICO) under a policy written in Florida. That policy provided up to $10,000 in property liability and personal injury protection (PIP) benefits, but it did not provide any BI liability. Felix sued Richards for personal injuries, and, in a separate action, Richards sued Felix and AAA for personal injuries. AAA then filed a third-party complaint against GEICO, claiming that GEICO’s policy was automatically deemed to include $15,000/$30,000 in BI coverage and that payment would eliminate the claim for UM/UIM coverage by AAA. The motion court determined that the New Jersey "deemer" statute applied to GEICO’s policy, rejecting the argument that the statute created a carve-out for BI coverage based upon the basic policy, as well as GEICO’s constitutional challenge. The Appellate Division affirmed, and the New Jersey Supreme Court granted the petition for certification filed by GEICO. The Supreme Court concluded after review that the deemer statute did not incorporate by reference the basic policy’s BI level for insurers, like GEICO, to which the second sentence of N.J.S.A. 17:28-1.4 applied. From the perspective of the insurers’ obligation, the required compulsory insurance liability limits remained $15,000/$30,000. As to the equal protection claim, New Jersey insureds were the ones who had a choice to purchase less than the presumptive minimum BI amount. The obligation of in-state insurers to offer and provide that minimum was the same as the obligation imposed under the deemer statute’s second sentence on authorized insurers writing an out-of-state policy. "The equal protection claim therefore falls flat," and the Appellate Division's judgment was affirmed. View "Felix v. Richards" on Justia Law

Mac Haik appeals the circuit court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration. In 2016, plaintiff Brenda Hester purchased a used 2014 Dodge Ram from Jackson Mac Haik CDJR, Ltd. (Mac Haik). Hester executed a retail-installment sale contract with Mac Haik for the purchase of the vehicle. The contract contained an arbitration provision. In 2017, Hester sued Mac Haik, American Financial Warranty Corporation (American Warranty), Randy Miggins d/b/a M&S Towing, and Randy Miggins, alleging that the vehicle she bought from Mac Haik “was defective in materials and workmanship from and after the date of purchase” and “that said defects have existed since the Plaintiff started using said vehicle.” She alleged further that American Warranty issued her a warranty but failed to repair her truck. Hester never served American Warranty with a summons and copy of her complaint. Hester alleged that Mac Haik took possession of her vehicle to make warranted repairs and later allowed it to be towed. Mac Haik, finding that all of Hester’s claims, which sounded in tort or contract and related to her purchase or condition of the vehicle at issue, argued that the claims were subject to arbitration. Mac Haik appealed the circuit court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration. Because the Mississippi Supreme Court found that the claims fell within the scope of the valid arbitration provision, and that no defenses existed to bar arbitration, it reversed reverse the circuit court’s order denying Mac Haik’s motion to compel arbitration and ordered the claims to arbitration. View "Jackson Mac Haik CDJR, Ltd. v. Hester" on Justia Law