In August 2013 the Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (DOT) entered into a contract with Osborne Construction Company to upgrade the Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting building at the Fairbanks International Airport to withstand damage in the event of an earthquake. The DOT appealed a superior court decision reversing the agency's decision in an administrative appeal. The agency denied a contractor’s claim for additional compensation because the claim was filed outside the filing period allowed by the contract. After applying its independent judgment to interpret the contract, the Alaska Supreme Court agreed with the DOT that the contractor failed to file its claim within the period allowed. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the superior court’s decision and reinstated the agency’s. View "Alaska, Dept. of Transportation & Public Facilities v. Osborne Construction Co." on Justia Law

Stampley, the owner-operator of a tractor-trailer, provided hauling services for Altom. Altom agreed to pay Stampley 70% of the gross revenues that it collected for each load he hauled and to give Stampley a copy of the “rated freight bill” or a “computer-generated document with the same information” to prove that it had properly paid Stampley. The contract granted Stampley the right to examine any underlying documents used to create a computer-generated document and required him to bring any dispute regarding his pay within 30 days. Years after he hauled his last Altom load, Stampley filed a putative class action, alleging that Altom had shortchanged him and similarly situated drivers. The district court certified a class and held that Altom’s withholdings had violated the contract. Stampley had moved for summary judgment on the 30-day provision before the class received notice. The court subsequently denied Stampley’s motion for summary judgment, decertified the class, granted Altom summary judgment, and held that Stampley’s individual claims were barred.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Stampley an inadequate class representative and decertifying the class. The court found that the 30-day period began to run as soon as Stampley received any computer-generated document purporting to have the same information as the rated freight bill, necessarily including those that lacked the same information as the rated freight bill. View "Stampley v. Altom Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

Buffkin, a former teacher in the Department of Defense (DoD) school for the children of military personnel, challenged her termination. The collective bargaining agreement process for contesting adverse employment actions provides that any grievance will be mediated if requested by either party. A written request for arbitration must be served on the opposing party within 20 days following "the conclusion of the last stage in the grievance procedure.” “The date of the last day of mediation will be considered the conclusion of the last stage in the grievance procedure" for purposes of proceeding to arbitration.DoD denied Buffkin’s grievance. The union and DoD met with a mediator in December 2012. No agreement was reached. In July 2014, the union submitted a written request for arbitration. DoD signed the request and the parties received a list of arbitrators in August 2014. In March 2015, DoD listed Buffkin’s grievance as an open grievance and the parties held another mediation session. The union and DoD selected an arbitrator in January 2017. DoD then argued that the arbitration request was untimely. The arbitrator found that the union did not invoke arbitration within 20 days after the 2012 mediation concluded.The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to address whether the union’s premature request for arbitration ripened into a timely request. Buffkin’s grievance was not resolved in the 2012 mediation; there was another mediation session in 2015, the last stage of the grievance procedure. Invoking arbitration in 2014 was premature, rather than too late. DoDs conduct and past practices indicate that it did not consider the arbitration request untimely. View "Buffkin v. Department of Defense" on Justia Law

In this construction contract dispute, the Supreme Court held that the San Antonio River Authority possessed the authority to agree to arbitrate claims under Texas Local Government Code Chapter 271 and exercised that authority in the contract and that the judiciary, rather than an arbitrator, retains the duty to decide whether a local government has waived its governmental immunity.The River Authority hired Austin Bridge and Road L.P. for a construction project. The parties agreed to submit any disputes about the contract to arbitration. Austin Bridge invoked the contract's arbitration provisions when disagreements about the scope of work and payment arose. After the arbitrator denied the River Authority's plea of governmental immunity, the River Authority sued Austin Bridge, arguing that it lacked the authority to agree to the contract's arbitration provisions. The trial court concluded that the arbitration provisions in the contract were enforceable. The court of appeals agreed that the River Authority had the authority to agree to arbitrate but concluded that a court, rather than an arbitrator, must decide whether the River Authority was immune from the claims against it. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that chapter 271 waived the River Authority's immunity from suit for Austin Bridge's breach of contract claim. View "San Antonio River Authority v. Austin Bridge & Road, L.P." on Justia Law

In this commercial landlord-tenant dispute the Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the intermediate court of appeals (ICA) vacating the circuit court's judgment finding that Tenant was not entitled to damages and that Tenant's claims for equitable relief were moot, holding that the ICA erred in two of its holdings.Landlords performed a self-help eviction after Tenant allegedly breached the lease. Tenant filed this complaint alleging violations of Haw. Rev. Stat. 654-1, 480-2, 480-13, and 480-13.5, and intentional infliction of emotional distress and requesting injunctive relief and damages. The circuit court concluded that Tenant was not entitled to damages because two of the breaches were material and that Tenant's equitable relief claims, including a claim for replevin seeking access to his personal property, were moot. The ICA vacated the circuit court's judgment. The Supreme Court vacated the ICA's judgment in part, holding that the ICA (1) correctly found that the breaches were not material; (2) should not have analyzed the merits of the replevin claim because Tenant had already retrieved his personal property at the time of trial; and (3) misapplied the law of equitable relief because all the equitable claims were moot. View "Kahawaiolaa v. Hawaiian Sun Investments, Inc." on Justia Law

Taylor fell behind on his mortgage payments during the 2008 financial crisis and sought help under the Home Affordable Mortgage Program (HAMP), which allowed eligible homeowners to reduce their monthly mortgage payments to avoid foreclosure. The first step toward a permanent loan modification was for qualifying borrowers to enter into a Trial Period Plan (TPP, 12 U.S.C. 5219(a)(1)) with their lenders and make lower payments on a provisional basis. Taylor’s lender, Chase, sent him a proposed TPP agreement to be signed and returned to Chase to start the process. That agreement stated that the trial period would not begin until both parties signed the TPP and Chase returned to Taylor a copy bearing its signature. Taylor signed the proposed agreement, but Chase never did. Taylor’s loan was never modified. Taylor sued Chase.The district court granted Chase judgment on the pleadings. The breach of contract claim failed because Taylor failed to allege that Chase had signed and returned a copy of the TPP. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Chase never pre-committed to sending Taylor a countersigned copy of the TPP; it expressly reserved the right not to The return of the signed copy was a condition precedent to contract formation. Taylor alleged no actions by Chase from which it could be reasonably inferred that Chase intended to proceed with the trial modification absent a countersignature. View "Taylor v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction Appellants' appeal from the circuit court's order granting summary judgment dismissing some but not resolving all of the parties' claims, holding that the circuit court's summary judgment order was indisputably not final.The circuit court's order granting summary judgment did not resolve all of the parties' claims, and it was not certified as a final decision prior to Appellants' appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits of the appeal, holding that because the circuit court resolved only part of the case and the summary judgment order did not cite S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-54(b) (Rule 54(b)), did not designate the order as final, and was not accompanied by a reasoned statement supporting a Rule 54(b) certification, this Court lacked appellate jurisdiction. View "Huls v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court finding that Defendant committed a breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and awarding $10.2 million in damages, holding that the superior court did not abuse its discretion.The jury awarded Plaintiff in excess of $22 million in damages after Defendant withdrew its support for Plaintiff's research laboratory. The judge conditionally ordered a new trial unless Plaintiff agreed to remit all but $10.2 million of the awarded damages, which represented in part $10 million that Plaintiff testified was necessary to reestablish her laboratory. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial evidence supported the finding that Defendant committed a breach of both the express terms of the contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (2) the cost of reestablishing the laboratory was a permissible element of the damages; and (3) the judge did not abuse her discretion in adding a remittitur of all but $10.2 million of the award of damages. The judges were equally divided as to whether the $10 million should go to Plaintiff outright or subject to a restriction, and therefore, the award of damages stood without any restriction. View "Hlatky v. Steward Health Care System, LLC" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's award of $64 million to Utica. In this case, the jury found that the Fireman's Fund breached its obligations under reinsurance contracts issued to Utica. The court agreed with Fireman's Fund that the reinsurance contracts, by their terms, demonstrate as a matter of law that Fireman's Fund did not owe to Utica the obligations allegedly breached. The court explained that the umbrella policies unambiguously define their attachment point by reference to the underlying limits of liability "as stated in the Schedule[s]." Therefore, where the losses in question did not exceed the limits stated for bodily injury in the Schedules, Fireman's Fund had no obligation under the reinsurance contracts to pay for those losses. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fireman's Fund Inc." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction enforcing a non-competition agreement between defendant and her former employer Realogy. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion and its decision satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52. In this case, the district court properly concluded that Realogy had a substantial likelihood of success regarding the enforceability of its non-competition agreement with defendant under Texas law. The court lifted the stay previously imposed and remanded this matter, instructing the district court to conduct a trial on the permanent injunction as soon as possible and, when rendering its judgment, to reweigh the equities with respect to the term of the injunction in light of the time that has passed during the pendency of this appeal. View "Realogy Holdings Corp. v. Jongebloed" on Justia Law