Takeda sued Mylan for patent infringement based on Mylan’s Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) for a generic version of Takeda’s Colcrys® version of the drug colchicine. The parties settled, entering into a License Agreement that allows Mylan to sell a generic colchicine product on a specified date or under circumstances defined in Section 1.2, which refers the date of a final court decision holding that all unexpired claims of the licensed patents that were asserted and adjudicated against a third party are not infringed, invalid, or unenforceable. The parties stipulated that Mylar's breach of Section 1.2 “would cause Takeda irreparable harm.”Takeda also sued Hikma based on Hikma’s FDA-approved colchicine product Mitigare®. The district court granted summary judgment of non-infringement. After Mylan launched its product, Takeda sued, alleging breach of contract and patent infringement.The Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction. Takeda failed to show it is likely to succeed on the merits or that it will suffer irreparable harm. Section 1.2(d) was triggered by the third-party litigation; all unexpired claims of the three patents that were “asserted and adjudicated” were held to be not infringed. An objective, reasonable third party would not read Section 1.2(d) to be limited to generic equivalents of Colcrys® excluding section 505(b)(2) products like Mitigare®. Because Takeda had not established that Mylan breached the Agreement, the irreparable harm stipulation did not apply. Money damages would remedy any harm Takeda would suffer as a result of Mylan launching its generic product. View "Takeda Pharmaceuticals U.S.A. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc." on Justia Law

Robert Stratton, Sr. owned an antique truck and, in 2006, delivered it to John Shivers’s vehicle repair and restoration business in Liberty, Mississippi. Stratton and Shivers contemplated that Shivers would restore the truck at some point in the future, but they made no firm plans for the restoration, and they never agreed that Shivers would charge a storage fee. Stratton’s truck remained at Shivers’s shop until Jerry McKey bought the business from Shivers in May 2009. Shivers told McKey that Stratton owned the truck, but neither Shivers nor McKey notified Stratton of the change in the business’ ownership. When Stratton learned that the business had changed hands, he contacted McKey and requested possession of the truck. But McKey refused to let Stratton have his truck unless he paid storage fees. Stratton sued McKey for replevin, and the circuit court ruled that Stratton was entitled to possession of the truck conditioned upon his paying McKey $880 for storage fees within thirty days. Stratton appealed; the Court of Appeals affirmed. But the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed both the trial and appellate courts, rendering judgment for Stratton. When McKey failed to relinquish possession of the truck, Stratton filed another complaint against him, and McKey filed a counterclaim for fees for storing the truck. McKey conceded that because he had sold the truck during the pendency of Stratton’s appeal, he owed Stratton the truck’s value. After a bench trial, the Circuit Court of awarded Stratton $350, which represented the value of the truck after the deduction of $1,000 in storage fees owed to McKey. Stratton appealed, challenging the amount of damages and challenging the circuit court’s award of storage fees to McKey. McKey did not file an appellee’s brief. In this case's second trip before the Mississippi Supreme Court, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court found McKey's counterclaim for storage fees was untimely, and the circuit court erred in awarding storage fees. View "Stratton v. McKey" on Justia Law

In this case arising from a failed attempt to restore and reopen the historic Cal Neva Lodge, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to deny relief on the claims brought by Plaintiff, an investor, against the developers and others involved in setting up Plaintiff's investment on the project, but reversed the damages award for Defendants, holding that the record did not support upholding the damages award.Plaintiff sued Defendants for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligence, conversion, and securities fraud. After a bench trial, the trial judge ordered judgment in favor of Defendants and sua sponte awarded Defendants damages, along with attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in awarding damages to Defendants in the absence of an express or implied counterclaim; and (2) the record supported the district court's denial of relief on Plaintiff's claims. View "Yount v. Criswell Radovan, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the California Public Employees' Pension Reform Act's (PEPRA), Stats. 2012, ch. 296, 1, amendment of the County Employees Retirement Law (CERL), Cal. Gov. Code 31450 et seq., did not violate the contract clause under a proper application of the California Rule and declined to reexamine and revise the California Rule.At issue was whether a provision of PEPRA amending CERL's definition of "compensation earnable," which affected the pensions of persons who were first employed by a county prior to the effective date of PEPRA, violated the contract clause. The Supreme Court held (1) county employees have no express contractual right to the calculation of their pension benefits in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the PEPRA amendment; (2) the challenged provisions added by PEPRA met contract clause requirements; and (3) the test announced in Allen v. City of Long Beach, 45 Cal.2d 128 (1955), as explained and applied in this case, remains the law of California. View "Alameda County Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n v. Alameda County Employees' Retirement Ass'n" on Justia Law

This appeal involved the enforceability of a premarital agreement between Julie Neustadt and Mark Colafranceschi. Before the two were married, they entered into a premarital agreement that required Neustadt to obtain a two-million-dollar life insurance policy naming Colafranceschi as the beneficiary. The agreement required Neustadt to keep the policy in force after termination of the marriage. During the divorce proceedings, Neustadt challenged the enforceability of this provision, arguing that the insurance clause was void as against public policy to the extent it applied after divorce. The magistrate court agreed that the contractual provision was void as against public policy. However, on appeal, the district court reversed, concluding the insurance clause did not violate any public policy in Idaho. Neustadt appealrf, arguing that the district court erred in finding the insurance clause valid and enforceable because, following the parties’ divorce, Colafranceschi had no insurable interest in Neustadt’s life. Colafranceschi also filed a cross-appeal, arguing: (1) the magistrate court erred in denying certain discovery requests; (2) the lower court erred by failing to address his objection to Neustadt’s motion in limine; and (3) the lower courts’ erred in their findings that Colafranceschi failed to prove he was fraudulently induced to sign the premarital agreement to get him to return to the couple’s marital home. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court decision in its entirety: (1) the Insurance Clause was not void as against public policy; (2) any error regarding discovery was forfeited; (3) there was no evidence that the magistrate court coerced Colafranceschi into withdrawing his extreme cruelty claim; and (4) substantial and competent evidence supported the magistrate court’s conclusions that Colafranceschi was not fraudulently induced regarding equity in the Osprey home. View "Neustadt v. Colafranceschi" on Justia Law

After plaintiff lost an investment property to foreclosure, he filed suit against the lender and its assignee, as well as the loan servicer, alleging breach of contract, wrongful foreclosure and three fraud claims. Plaintiff's claims were based on his assertion that, before the parties executed the credit agreement and deed of trust securing it in 2005, the lender made a verbal commitment that, at the end of the 10-year term, plaintiff could refinance or re-amortize the loan with a new 20-year repayment period.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the verbal agreement to refinance or reamortize plaintiff's loan is subject to the statute of frauds and is unenforceable on that ground. Furthermore, the oral agreement is too indefinite to be enforceable. Therefore, plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to state a breach of contract claim. The court also held that plaintiff's allegations are the very sort of general and conclusory allegations that are insufficient to support a fraud claim, promissory or otherwise; because the alleged oral agreement is not an enforceable contract, its breach cannot support a claim of wrongful foreclosure; and plaintiff has not shown how he can amend to cure the defects in the complaint. View "Reeder v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a provision in the Office of the State Public Defender's contract with private attorneys specifying that hourly compensation rates can unilaterally be changed by the State permits prospective changes in a contract attorney's compensation rate for existing cases.Appellants, private attorneys who contract with OPD to provide legal services for indigent clients, filed a class action complaint against the State, the Governor, and the Director of the Office of the State Public Defender (OPD) alleging that Defendants were liable for breach of contract or in violation of the Contract Clause stemming from the OPD's act of reducing rates for all contracted services and reducing pay for case-related travel. The district court granted the State's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the OPD did not breach its contract with Appellants because the contract specifically identified that the fee arrangement was subject to change by the Director. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that summary judgment was properly granted for the State. View "Brooke v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court made permanent its preliminary writ of prohibition prohibiting the circuit court from ordering certain defendants to be joined as necessary parties, holding that Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.04(a) did not mandate that the added defendants be joined.After deficiencies in the construction of an independent senior living facility (the Project) were discovered, Plaintiff brought contract and tort claims against the architect, the structural engineer, the construction company, the framer, and the supplier, alleging construction defects. The masonry company hired to perform brick masonry work was not included as a defendant. Certain defendants moved to add the masonry company, arguing that the company must be added pursuant to Rule 52.04. The circuit court ordered the masonry company be joined. Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to direct the circuit court to dismiss and remove the masonry company. The court of appeals denied the petition. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the masonry company was not a "necessary" defendant, and therefore, the circuit court did not have the authority to require joinder. View "State ex rel. Woodco, Inc. v. Honorable Jennifer Phillips" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court granting summary judgment to Northeastern University on Plaintiff's negligence-related claims stemming from a nonconsensual encounter with a fellow student, holding that, under the circumstances, Northeastern had no duty to protect Plaintiff.In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Northeastern negligently failed to prevent and contributed to the occurrence of the sexual assault. Plaintiff further asserted tort, contract, and statutory claims alleging that Northeastern failed adequately to respond to the incident. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) a special student-university relationship between Plaintiff and Northeastern existed, but Northeastern owed no duty to protect Plaintiff because Northeastern could not reasonably have foreseen that, absent some intervention on its part, Plaintiff would be subjected to a criminal act or other harm; and (2) there was no error in the motion judge's conclusions regarding Plaintiff's statutory or contract claims. View "Helfman v. Northeastern University" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint seeking to recoup assets purportedly gifted to a charitable institution for less than adequate consideration by Plaintiff's ex-husband, holding that the district court erred by dismissing Plaintiff's claims on the basis that she lacked standing.Janet and Robert Foisie entered into a divorce settlement agreement in which each party agreed to a mutually acceptable split of assets. When Janet discovered that Robert had fraudulent transferred several million dollars to the Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI), Janet brought a civil action against WPI asserting claims of actual and constructive fraudulent transfers under both the common law and Connecticut's version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA). The district court dismissed the complaint. The First Circuit vacated the judgment, holding (1) Janet easily satisfied the three elements of Article III standing, and her claims were ripe; (2) a choice-of-law analysis would be better performed on a more fully developed factual record; (3) the district court erred by dismissing Janet's UFTA claims on the basis that she lacked standing as a creditor; (4) the dismissal of Janet's common law claims on preemption grounds cannot stand; and (5) Janet's UFTA and common law claims were adequately pleaded. View "Foisie v. Worcester Polytechnic Institute" on Justia Law