The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court declaring that the School the City of Richmond's School Board's UM/UIM motorist coverage was $1 million, as provided in the contract between the School Board and the Virginia Association of Counties Group Self-Insurance Risk Pool (VACORP), holding that the $1 million in UM/UIM coverage the School Board contracted for was the amount of available UM/UIM coverage.Maisia Young was injured while riding a school bus. Young filed suit against the School Board seeking damages for her personal injuries. The School Board was self-insured through a self-insurance risk pool managed by VACORP. Young filed a declaratory judgment action to determine the extent of the coverage available to the School Board under the UM/UIM provisions of its contract. VACORP argued that $50,000 was the maximum amount of coverage available, as set by statute. In response, Young argued that the statutes set a minimum, not a cap, and that the maximum available was what was specified in the contract. The circuit court agreed with Young. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the School Board's UM/UIM coverage was $1 million, as provided in the contract between the School Board and VACORP. View "VACORP v. Young" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court awarding FoxFire Towing damages in the amount of $56,595, holding that the doctrine of quantum merit was not applicable in this case and that while FoxFire was entitled to relief under a theory of unjust enrichment it was only to the extent that T. Musgrove Construction Company was benefitted.Musgrove owned a truck that was involved in an accident. FoxFire returned the truck to an upright position, towed the damaged truck away and stored it, and cleaned up the scene. FoxFire sent Musgrove a bill for $12,380. When Musgrove did not pay, FoxFire sued. By the time the suit was filed the storage fees had risen to $28,980. The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $56,595. Musgrove appealed, arguing that most of the charges FoxFire impressed were unjustified because they constituted a recovery that was not warranted under the doctrine of unjust enrichment. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) a cause of action for quantum merit did not apply; and (2) established principles governing the unjust enrichment remedy foreclosed recovery for some of the charges FoxFire sought to obtain. View "Musgrove Construction Co. v. Young" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting a preliminary junction to Defendant's former employer (Plaintiff), a healthcare company incorporated in Delaware, that enforced a nonsolicitation clause in the employment contract between the parties, holding that the district court did not err in applying Delaware law to assess whether Plaintiff had satisfied the "likelihood of success" requirement.The injunction sought by Plaintiff enforced a nonsolicitation clause in the parties' contract barring Defendant from engaging in certain work for his new employer, one of Plaintiff's competitors. The choice-of-law provision set forth in the employment contract explicitly stated that the agreement should be interpreted and enforced in accordance with Delaware law, without giving effect to its laws pertaining to conflict of las. The district court held that Massachusetts' choice-of-law rules permitted it to enforce the choice-of-law provision, thus premising its issuance of the preliminary injunction on its application of Delaware law. Defendant appealed, arguing that Massachusetts and not Delaware law applied to Plaintiff's breach of contract claims, and therefore, Plaintiff could not satisfy the likelihood-of-success requirement in seeking a preliminary injunction based on those claims. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no merit in Defendant's challenge to the issuance of the preliminary injunction against him. View "NuVasive, Inc. v. Day" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Golden Spread and Westport's tort claims against Emerson. The claims arose after Emerson installed a new control system for Golden Spread and the control system's software had been programmed incorrectly.The court held that the economic loss rule, which prevents recovery in tort for purely economic damage unaccompanied by injury to persons or property, is applicable in this case. The court reasoned that the Texas Supreme Court would conclude that the risk suffered here is better addressed in contract than in tort. In this case, the parties are sophisticated, commercial actors that actually did negotiate over the allocation of risk. Furthermore, the parties themselves were in the best position to understand and allocate the risks of their transaction ahead of time to resolve any ambiguities in the application of that rule to their circumstances. View "Golden Spread Electric Cooperative v. Emerson Process Management Power & Water Solutions" on Justia Law

Travelers Property Casualty Company of America (“Travelers”) filed suit against SRM Group, Inc. (“SRM”), seeking to recover unpaid premiums due under a workers’ compensation insurance policy. In response, SRM asserted counterclaims against Travelers for breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, and attorney fees based on Travelers’ audit of SRM’s employee risk classifications and subsequent refusal to reclassify those employees, which resulted in a substantial retroactive increase in the premium. A jury awarded Travelers damages based on SRM's failure to pay some of the alleged increased premium due under the policy. However, the jury found that Travelers had also breached the contract and acted in bad faith in conducting the audit and failing to reclassify certain SRM employees. The issue this case presented for the Georgia Supreme Court's review centered on whether a counterclaimant asserting an independent compulsory counterclaim could seek attorney fees and litigation expenses under Georgia case law. The Supreme Court overruled Byers v. McGuire Properties, Inc, 679 SE2d 1 (2009), and Sponsler v. Sponsler, 699 SE2d 22 (2010). "Thus, a plaintiff-in-counterclaim asserting an independent claim may seek, along with that claim, attorney fees and litigation expenses under OCGA 13-6-11, regardless of whether the independent claim is permissive or compulsory." In this case, the Court reversed that part of the Court of Appeals' opinion that followed Byers. View "SRM Group, Inc. v. Travelers Property Cas. Co. of America" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, alleging disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. At issue in this appeal is the enforceability of the parties' settlement agreement.The Fifth Circuit held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction to decide the motions to enforce and subsequent motion for reconsideration; the district court did not err in concluding that the settlement agreement does not allow plaintiff to receive $150,000 because she has not elected disability retirement; and the district court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the settlement agreement is enforceable. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to consider whether the settlement is valid and enforceable, or whether a mutual mistake warrants rescinding it. View "Wise v. Wilkie" on Justia Law

Beginning in 1965, Honeywell and the labor union negotiated a series of collective bargaining agreements (CBAs). Honeywell agreed to pay “the full [healthcare benefit] premium or subscription charge applicable to the coverages of [its] pensioner[s]” and their surviving spouses. Each CBA contained a general durational clause stating that the agreement would expire on a specified date, after which the parties would negotiate a new CBA. In 2003, the parties negotiated a CBA obligating Honeywell to pay “not . . . less than” a specified amount beginning in 2008. The retirees filed suit, arguing that the pre-2003 CBAs vested lifetime, full-premium benefits for all pre-2003 retirees and that the CBAs of 2003, 2007, and 2011 vested, at a minimum, lifetime, floor-level benefits for the remaining retirees.The Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court that none of the CBAs vested lifetime benefits. Without an unambiguous vesting clause, the general durational clause controls. Reversing in part, the court held that the “not . . . less than” language unambiguously limited Honeywell’s obligation to pay only the floor-level contributions during the life of the 2011 CBA. The court rejected a claim that Honeywell acquired a "windfall" at the retirees' expense. View "International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Honeywell International, Inc." on Justia Law

In this complaint seeking to have the Attorney General preliminarily and permanently enjoined from distributing monies received pursuant to an agreement between the Attorney General and Smithfield Foods, Inc. and several of its subsidiaries regarding the operation of hog farms to any recipient other than the Civil Penalty and Forfeiture Fund, the Supreme Court held that the payments contemplated by the agreement did not constitute penalties for purposes of N.C. Const. art. IX, 7.In their complaint, Plaintiffs argued that payments made pursuant to the agreement constituted penalties under article IX, section 7 and that the Attorney General lacked the authority to enter into the agreement. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Attorney General, concluding that even if Smithfield and its subsidiaries had entered into the agreement in hope of avoiding future penalties, the payments made under the agreement were not penalties, forfeitures or fines collected for any breach of the penal laws of the State. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed precluding summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the payments contemplated by the agreement did not constitute penalties for purposes of article IX, section 7. View "New Hanover County Board of Education v. Stein" on Justia Law

Top Rank and Middendorf are boxing promoters and parties to an Agreement and Release regarding a successful boxer's promotional rights. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Middendorf in part, holding that the Agreement and Release contemplates that Middendorf is entitled to a fee so long as Top Rank promotes the boxer's title defenses pursuant to a promotional rights agreement. However, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Middendorf in part, holding that the term "purse," as used in the Agreement and Release, does not include a boxer's share of gate revenues. View "Middendorf Sports v. Top Rank, Inc." on Justia Law

In this appeal from the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration the Supreme Court held that the court-appointed liquidator of a now-insolvent health insurer pursuing common law tort claims against a third-party contractor is bound by an arbitration provision in a preinsolvency agreement between the health insurer and the third-party contractor.Prior to its insolvency, the health insurance provider entered into an agreement with a third-party contractor for consulting services. The provider was later declared insolvent and placed into liquidation. Plaintiff, the provider's court-appointed liquidator, brought an action against the contractor, asserting common law tort damages. The contractor filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration on the grounds that the parties' agreement contained an arbitration clause. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration provision did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the liquidator was bound by the arbitration provision because the liquidator stood in the shoes of the provider; (2) the liquidator could not use Iowa Code 507C.21(k) to disavow a preinsolvency agreement that the contractor already performed; and (3) the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not permit reverse preemption of the Federal Arbitration Act when the liquidator asserts common law tort damages against a third-party contractor. View "Ommen v. MilliMan, Inc." on Justia Law