Taylor fell behind on his mortgage payments during the 2008 financial crisis and sought help under the Home Affordable Mortgage Program (HAMP), which allowed eligible homeowners to reduce their monthly mortgage payments to avoid foreclosure. The first step toward a permanent loan modification was for qualifying borrowers to enter into a Trial Period Plan (TPP, 12 U.S.C. 5219(a)(1)) with their lenders and make lower payments on a provisional basis. Taylor’s lender, Chase, sent him a proposed TPP agreement to be signed and returned to Chase to start the process. That agreement stated that the trial period would not begin until both parties signed the TPP and Chase returned to Taylor a copy bearing its signature. Taylor signed the proposed agreement, but Chase never did. Taylor’s loan was never modified. Taylor sued Chase.The district court granted Chase judgment on the pleadings. The breach of contract claim failed because Taylor failed to allege that Chase had signed and returned a copy of the TPP. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Chase never pre-committed to sending Taylor a countersigned copy of the TPP; it expressly reserved the right not to The return of the signed copy was a condition precedent to contract formation. Taylor alleged no actions by Chase from which it could be reasonably inferred that Chase intended to proceed with the trial modification absent a countersignature. View "Taylor v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction Appellants' appeal from the circuit court's order granting summary judgment dismissing some but not resolving all of the parties' claims, holding that the circuit court's summary judgment order was indisputably not final.The circuit court's order granting summary judgment did not resolve all of the parties' claims, and it was not certified as a final decision prior to Appellants' appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits of the appeal, holding that because the circuit court resolved only part of the case and the summary judgment order did not cite S.D. Codified Laws 15-6-54(b) (Rule 54(b)), did not designate the order as final, and was not accompanied by a reasoned statement supporting a Rule 54(b) certification, this Court lacked appellate jurisdiction. View "Huls v. Meyer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the order of the superior court finding that Defendant committed a breach of contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and awarding $10.2 million in damages, holding that the superior court did not abuse its discretion.The jury awarded Plaintiff in excess of $22 million in damages after Defendant withdrew its support for Plaintiff's research laboratory. The judge conditionally ordered a new trial unless Plaintiff agreed to remit all but $10.2 million of the awarded damages, which represented in part $10 million that Plaintiff testified was necessary to reestablish her laboratory. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial evidence supported the finding that Defendant committed a breach of both the express terms of the contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (2) the cost of reestablishing the laboratory was a permissible element of the damages; and (3) the judge did not abuse her discretion in adding a remittitur of all but $10.2 million of the award of damages. The judges were equally divided as to whether the $10 million should go to Plaintiff outright or subject to a restriction, and therefore, the award of damages stood without any restriction. View "Hlatky v. Steward Health Care System, LLC" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's award of $64 million to Utica. In this case, the jury found that the Fireman's Fund breached its obligations under reinsurance contracts issued to Utica. The court agreed with Fireman's Fund that the reinsurance contracts, by their terms, demonstrate as a matter of law that Fireman's Fund did not owe to Utica the obligations allegedly breached. The court explained that the umbrella policies unambiguously define their attachment point by reference to the underlying limits of liability "as stated in the Schedule[s]." Therefore, where the losses in question did not exceed the limits stated for bodily injury in the Schedules, Fireman's Fund had no obligation under the reinsurance contracts to pay for those losses. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fireman's Fund Inc." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunction enforcing a non-competition agreement between defendant and her former employer Realogy. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion and its decision satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52. In this case, the district court properly concluded that Realogy had a substantial likelihood of success regarding the enforceability of its non-competition agreement with defendant under Texas law. The court lifted the stay previously imposed and remanded this matter, instructing the district court to conduct a trial on the permanent injunction as soon as possible and, when rendering its judgment, to reweigh the equities with respect to the term of the injunction in light of the time that has passed during the pendency of this appeal. View "Realogy Holdings Corp. v. Jongebloed" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review in this case to determine whether the Louisiana Commissioner of Insurance was bound by an arbitration clause in an agreement between a health insurance cooperative and a third-party contractor. The Louisiana Health Cooperative, Inc. (“LAHC”), a health insurance cooperative created in 2011 pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, entered an agreement with Milliman, Inc. for actuarial and other services. By July 2015, the LAHC was out of business and allegedly insolvent. The Insurance Commissioner sought a permanent order of rehabilitation relative to LAHC. The district court entered an order confirming the Commissioner as rehabilitator and vesting him with authority to enforce contract performance by any party who had contracted with the LAHC. The Commissioner then sued multiple defendants in district court, asserting claims against Milliman for professional negligence, breach of contract, and negligent misrepresentation. According to that suit, the acts or omissions of Milliman caused or contributed to the LAHC’s insolvency. Milliman responded by filing a declinatory exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing the Commissioner must arbitrate his claims pursuant to an arbitration clause in the agreement between the LAHC and Milliman. The Supreme Court concluded, however, the Commissioner was not bound by the arbitration agreement and accordingly could not be compelled to arbitrate its claims against Millman. The Court reversed the appellate court's judgment holding to the contrary, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Donelon v. Shilling" on Justia Law

In this case involving an order compelling Plaintiff to arbitrate her dispute with an investment firm the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's order to the extent that it included language that invaded the province of the arbitrator but otherwise affirmed the order dismissing Plaintiff's suit and compelling her to arbitrate.Plaintiff's deceased husband created two accounts with an investment firm, and the documents he signed required the arbitration of any account disputes. After the investment company paid the proceeds of both accounts to two other individuals, Plaintiff brought this suit, asserting her right to the proceeds of the accounts. The circuit court concluded that Plaintiff was required to comply with the arbitration agreements even though she was a nonsignatory. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court properly determined that Plaintiff was required to arbitrate her claims to the proceeds of both accounts; but (2) the circuit court erred in including improper language in its order that exceeded the court's authority. View "Bayles v. Evans" on Justia Law

Teed promoted himself online as a real estate agent with “over 25 years of experience as a building contractor” with “an extensive background in historic restorations.” Moore believed that Teed was a general contractor. Moore toured homes that Teed had renovated and retained Teed as his agent. Moore bought a large San Francisco fixer-upper house for $4.8 million. The home was built in 1912 and was last updated in the 1950s. Moore borrowed significantly. Teed received a commission from the sale. Teed was not a licensed contractor; his team of contractors gutted large parts of the house and excavated the lot but the foundation was defective. After Moore became aware of the defects, he halted all work and engaged consultants, who concluded, despite Teed's strong resistance, that the foundation had to be torn out and replaced. Teed’s structural engineer agreed and privately apologized to Moore. Moore had paid about $265,000 of the $900,000 promised cost for Teed’s renovations. A jury awarded Moore his out-of-pocket expenses for replacing the foundation and benefit-of-the-bargain damages for the additional cost he incurred in obtaining the promised renovations. Conceding liability, Teed challenged the award. The court of appeal affirmed that benefit-of-the-bargain damages are available to fully compensate a plaintiff for all the detriment proximately caused by a fraudulent fiduciary’s actions and the award of statutory attorney fees and costs based on the jury’s special verdict finding that Teed violated the Contractors’ State License Law. View "Moore v. Teed" on Justia Law

The National Credit Union Administration Board ("NCUAB"), the self-appointed conservator of Citizens Community Credit Union ("Citizens"), repudiated a letter of credit Citizens issued to Granite Re, Inc. Granite filed a complaint for damages against the NCUAB, claiming wrongful repudiation and wrongful dishonor of a letter of credit. The NCUAB moved to dismiss with prejudice, arguing 12 U.S.C. 1787(c) authorized it to repudiate the letter of credit with no liability for damages, and section 1787(c) preempted conflicting North Dakota Law. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The Eighth Circuit determined that were it to adopt the NCUAB's construction of section 1787(c), the NCUAB could "quietly appoint itself conservator and repudiate letters of credit with no liability to the injured beneficiary. Absent the ability to predict an impending conservatorship, a clean letter-of-credit beneficiary like Granite is subject to repudiation with no recourse." The Court determined NCUAB's construction was inconsistent with the language of the statue, which provided a limited remedy for damages determinable at the point of conservatorship, but did not negate recovery entirely. The Court also determined it was premature to declare section 1787(c) preempted North Dakota law. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Granite Re, Inc. v. Nat'l Credit Union Adm. Board" on Justia Law

In this case arising from an inflated appraisal of certain property and governed by New York law, the Supreme Court reversed in part the court of appeals' decision affirming the jtrial court's judgment awarding Claymore Holdings $211 million in equitable relief, holding that there was no valid basis in New York law for this large award of equitable monetary relief.The subject property was a real estate project. Claymore loaned the project $250 million and took the real estate as collateral. After the borrower defaulted and the collateral's value declined, Claymore sued Credit Suisse, which helped arrange the transaction, alleging that Credit Suisse fraudulently inflated the appraisal of the real estate, inducing Claymore to make the loan, and that the faulty appraisal amounted to a breach of contract. A jury found for Claymore on the fraudulent inducement claim and awarded $40 million. The court found Credit Suisse liable for breach of contract and other theories but concluded that Claymore's damages on all claims could not be calculated with reasonable certainty. The court then awarded Claymore $211 million in equitable relief. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that the jury's $40 million fraud verdict must stand but that the court's award of $211 million in equitable relief must not. View "Credit Suisse AG v. Claymore Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law