In 1854, the Washington Territory and nine Native American tribes, including the Squaxin Island Tribe (the Tribe), entered into the 1854 Treaty of Medicine Creek (the Treaty), under which the Tribe relinquished their rights to land but retained “the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations . . . , in common with all citizens of the Territory.” The District Court for the Western District of Washington has interpreted “fish” under the Treaty to include shellfish. In 1978, Leslie and Harlene Robbins (Robbins) purchased property in Mason County, Washington that included tidelands with manila clam beds. In connection with the purchase of the property, Robbins obtained a standard policy of title insurance from Mason County Title Insurance Company (MCTI) which provided MCTI would insure Robbins “against loss or damage sustained by reason of: . . . [a]ny defect in, or lien or encumbrance on, said title existing at the date hereof.” For years Robbins had contracted with commercial shellfish harvesters to enter Robbins’s property to harvest shellfish from the tidelands. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review was whether MCTI had a duty to defend Robbins when the Tribe announced it planned to assert its treaty right to harvest shellfish from the property. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the superior court for further proceedings. The Supreme Court held that because the insurance policy conceivably covered the treaty right and no exceptions to coverage applied, MCTI owed the property owners a duty to defend and, in failing to do so, breached the duty. Because this breach was unreasonable given the uncertainty in the law, MCTI acted in bad faith. Further, because the property owners did not seek summary judgment on MCTI’s affirmative defenses, the Supreme Court remanded to the superior court for consideration of the defenses. View "Robbins v. Mason County Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Shadow Industries, LLP, appealed a district court judgment dismissing its eviction action and holding the tenants David and Chris Hoffman had timely exercised their option to extend the term of the parties’ lease agreement. Shadow argued the district court erred in finding the parties’ lease agreement to be ambiguous, finding the option to extend the lease expired on February 1, 2019, and finding the Hoffmans timely exercised their option to extend the lease. The North Dakota Supreme Court found the district court’s interpretation of the lease as having ambiguity as to when the lease terminated was premised upon the court’s observation that “[w]hen ‘crop years’ end and begin is undefined.” To this, the Supreme Court disagreed that the lease was ambiguous and failed to define the end of the lease. The Supreme Court found the lease terminated at the end of the 2018 crop year. "While determining when the end of the 2018 crop year occurred may be a question of fact, the term is not ambiguous simply because it requires a future event or contingency." There was testimony that the crop year ended no later than October 2018; following the harvesting of their crops and still in 2018, the Hoffmans deep ripped the land, tilled to create fall bedding, and applied fertilizer to prepare for the 2019 crop year. "On the basis of these facts, and the absence of any contrary facts in the record, we conclude as a matter of law the 2018 crop year ended and the lease terminated in 2018." Because the facts of this case compelled a finding the 2018 crop year ended in 2018 and the lease terminated at the end of the 2018 crop year, the Court found the exercise of the option in January 2019 was not timely and the lease terminated. It therefore reversed judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Shadow Industries, LLP v. Hoffman, et al." on Justia Law

In 2014, Cook Medical entered a five-year agreement for Acheron to serve as the distributor of Cook medical devices and products to VA and Department of Defense Medical Centers. Sales to Defense are primarily made through a Distribution and Pricing Agreement (DAPA); sales to the VA require a Federal Supply Schedule (FSS). Cook already had a DAPA, but not an FSS; the agreement required Acheron to obtain an FSS. Cook refused to submit to a required audit of its commercial sales records as required by 48 CFR 515.408(b)(5) to obtain an FSS and refused to deactivate its DAPA, preventing Acheron from selling Cook products to Defense through Acheron’s own DAPA. Cook sent notice that Acheron was in material breach and terminated the agreement 30 days later due to Acheron’s failure to cure. Acheron filed suit.The district court granted Cook summary judgment; Acheron materially breached its obligation to obtain an FSS but owed no damages because the breach was excused by the force majeure clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Agreement does not expressly obligate Cook to submit to the VA audit or to deactivate its DAPA. The duty of good faith requires that a party perform its obligations under the contract in good faith but does not require a party to undertake a new, affirmative obligation. Neither party actively sought to sabotage the other party’s performance to escape its own obligations or obtain an unfair advantage. View "Acheron Medical Supply, LLC v. Cook Medical Inc." on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision vacating the bankruptcy court's determination concerning whether General Motors assumed liability, through a judicial admission, for claims like appellant's. Appellant filed a wrongful death lawsuit against New GM after his wife was involved in an accident that left her incapacitated. She was driving a 2004 Pontiac Grand Am, a vehicle manufactured by Old GM, which allegedly had a faulty ignition switch.The Second Circuit held that for a statement to constitute a judicial admission, it must be intentional, clear, and unambiguous. In this case, the court held that the inadvertent inclusion of language from an outdated, non-operative version of a sale agreement was not intentional, clear, and unambiguous, and thus was not a judicial admission. Therefore, General Motors was not bound by the language. View "In re Motors Liquidation Co. (Pillars)" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court denying the motion for attorney fees filed by Gold's Gym International, Inc. after it prevailed in a suit filed by members of a limited liability company (members) that had licensed Gold's Gym's name to operate a fitness center, holding that the issues properly before the Court did not convince the Court that the district court erred.In denying attorney fees, the district court reasoned that the members, as individuals, were not parties to the license agreement between Gold's Gym and the LLC that contained the fee provision and that the members' claims did not relate to or arise out of that agreement. On appeal, Gold's Gym argued that if someone who is not a party to a contract tries to enforce its terms, it must also assume the risks and obligations that the contract imposes. The Supreme Court affirmed without reaching the merits of the issue, holding (1) issues of preservation and waiver precluded the Court from reaching the heart of Gold's Gym's argument on appeal; and (2) Gold's Gym's remaining arguments were unavailing. View "Chamberlain v. Golds Gym International, Inc." on Justia Law

In this commercial forcible entry and detainer action brought by 20 Thames Street LLC and 122 PTIP LLC (collectively, 20 Thames) the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court concluding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to award lease-based attorney fees upon finding for Ocean State Job Lot of Maine 2017, LLC, holding that the superior court did not err.Ocean State rented a commercial retail space from 20 Thames. 20 Thames later filed its compliant for forcible entry and detainer, alleging that Ocean State breached the terms of its lease. The business and consumer docket found in favor of Ocean State. The court awarded Ocean State costs and $206,076 in attorney fees based on a provision in the lease. The superior route affirmed the judgment for Ocean State but vacated the attorney fee award, concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to award lease-based attorney fees. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that Me. Rev. Stat. 14, 6017 did not provide authority for the district court to award lease-based attorney fees. View "20 Thames Street LLC v. Ocean State Job Lot of Maine 2017, LLC" on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions of law to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Billy Hamilton, a small-business owner in Council Hill, Oklahoma, filed a claim in December 2015 with his insurer, Northfield Insurance Company, seeking coverage for his building's leaking roof. Northfield twice denied his claim: once in February 2016, and again in April 2016. Hamilton filed suit against Northfield in November of that year, alleging bad-faith denial of his insurance claim and breach by Northfield of the insurance contract. Hamilton rejected a proposed settlement, and the matter went to trial. A jury awarded him $10,652, the maximum amount of damages the judge instructed the jury it could award. Hamilton then sought attorney fees and statutory interest under 36 O.S. section 3629(B). Northfield responded that Hamilton was not the prevailing party under the statute, given that he had recovered less than its settlement offer to him. The federal district court agreed with Northfield, and Hamilton appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Initially, a panel of that court affirmed the district court's determination that Hamilton was not the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney fees under section 3629(B). Following a petition for en banc rehearing by Hamilton and additional briefing by amicus curiae, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals granted panel rehearing sua sponte, vacated its opinion as to the issues raised in Hamilton's appeal, and certified the two questions to the Oklahoma Court. The questions were: (1) in determining which is the prevailing party under 36 O.S. 3629(B), should a court consider settlement offers made by the insurer outside the sixty- (formerly, ninety-) day window for making such offers pursuant to the statute?; and (2) should a court add to the verdict costs and attorney fees incurred up until the offer of settlement for comparison with a settlement offer that contemplated costs and fees? The Oklahoma Court answered both questions "no:" (1) a court may consider only those timely offers of settlement of the underlying insurance claim--and not offers to resolve an ensuing lawsuit that results from the insurer's denial of the same; and (2) this is strictly limited to the specific context of determining prevailing-party status under section 3629(B) alone. The Oklahoma Court expressed no opinion on a trial court's evaluation of the form of settlement offer described in the certifying court's second question when made outside the section 3629(B) setting. View "Hamilton v. Northfield Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Under California law, the donor's intent controls the disposition of his or her gametic material upon death. Plaintiff appealed the trial court's judgment sustaining demurrers to her causes of action alleged against defendants. After plaintiff's husband entered into an irreversible coma, she arranged to extract his sperm in hopes of one day conceiving a child with it. Plaintiff stored the sperm in a tissue bank that ultimately came under the control of defendants, and, ten years later, when she requested the sperm, defendants disclosed that they could not locate it. Plaintiff filed suit, alleging contract and tort claims based on the loss of her ability to have a child biologically related to her deceased husband.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the complaint failed to adequately plead facts supporting tort damages. In this case, plaintiff's tort causes of action are all premised on the loss of her ability to conceive with her deceased husband's sperm. However, the court held that the complaint failed to allege facts establishing that plaintiff was legally entitled to use her husband's sperm to conceive a child after he died. In this case, plaintiff's status as his spouse did not entitle her to conceive with his sperm; absent an affirmative showing that the husband intended to allow plaintiff to conceive with his sperm, plaintiff was not entitled to do so; and thus the complaint failed to allege that it was the husband's intent that his sperm be used for posthumous conception. Finally, the court held that plaintiff cannot recover emotional distress damages on her breach of contract cause of action. View "Robertson v. Saadat" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order compelling arbitration of a labor dispute between a waste management company, NASA Services, and the union. The company and union signed a Labor Peace Agreement containing an arbitration clause, and the agreement's terms were expressly conditioned upon the City entering into an exclusive franchise agreement with NASA.The panel held that the agreement clearly and unambiguously contains a condition precedent to formation that is both ascertainable and lawful. Therefore, NASA and the union were parties to a proposed agreement that would become operative, effective, and enforceable if and only if the condition precedent therein was satisfied. Consequently, the condition failed and the district court may not compel arbitration. View "International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 396 v. NASA Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In August 2013 the Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (DOT) entered into a contract with Osborne Construction Company to upgrade the Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting building at the Fairbanks International Airport to withstand damage in the event of an earthquake. The DOT appealed a superior court decision reversing the agency's decision in an administrative appeal. The agency denied a contractor’s claim for additional compensation because the claim was filed outside the filing period allowed by the contract. After applying its independent judgment to interpret the contract, the Alaska Supreme Court agreed with the DOT that the contractor failed to file its claim within the period allowed. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the superior court’s decision and reinstated the agency’s. View "Alaska, Dept. of Transportation & Public Facilities v. Osborne Construction Co." on Justia Law