In this property dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court finding largely in favor of Larry Wagoner, holding that the oral contract between the parties in this case was void.Donald Fuger and Wagoner entered into an oral agreement to construct two buildings on a portion of the Fugers' property. When the buildings were completed Wagoner occupied one and rented the other for several years. Fuger and wife later sued Wagoner and his wife seeking to evict them from the property. Wagoner, in turn, sued the Fugers, alleging contract and equitable theories for ownership of one building and the underlying property. The district court held that an enforceable oral contract existed between Fuger and Wagoner and awarded Wagoner $302,234 plus post-judgment interest. The court did not reach Wagoner's equitable claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in finding that a valid oral contract between Wagoner and Fuger existed. The Court remanded for consideration of Wagoner's equitable claims. View "Fuger v. Wagoner" on Justia Law

Originally, Western Pacific Timber, LLC (WPT) was solely owned by Timothy Blixseth (Blixseth). Andrew Hawes contended Blixseth hired him to be general counsel for WPT in 2005, and that when he was hired, Blixseth agreed on behalf of WPT to provide him with a severance package based on the length of his employment. After 2012, Blixseth no longer retained any ownership interest or management responsibility in WPT. When WPT terminated Hawes’ employment in 2017, Hawes asserted that he had a severance agreement in place that had been negotiated with Blixseth on behalf of WPT, by which he would receive $100,000 for each year of employment, capped at five years, for a total of $500,000. However, Hawes could not produce a signed copy of any agreement. WPT refused to pay the claimed severance pay, and instead offered a significantly smaller severance package. Hawes rejected WPT’s offer. Hawes then sued WPT for breach of contract. The case proceeded to trial on Hawes’ claim of an oral contract. Ultimately, the jury returned a special verdict finding that WPT was liable to Hawes for $500,000 in severance pay, an award which was later trebled by the district court. The district court also awarded Hawes the full amount of his requested attorney fees which constituted 35% of Hawes’ gross recovery. WPT unsuccessfully moved for a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Hawes v. Western Pacific Timber LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of General Star Indemnity Company, the excess insurer of Performance Trans., Inc. and Utica Mutual Insurance Company (collectively PTI) in this Massachusetts breach of contract and unfair and deceptive insurance practices action under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, 11, holding that the district court erred in finding the relevant excess policy provisions unambiguously excluded coverage.In 2019, a PTI tanker-truck spilled approximately 4,300 gallons of gasoline, diesel fuel, and dyed diesel fuel onto the roadway and into a nearby reservoir. After cleanup costs exceeded PTI's primary insurance limit, PTI made a claim with General Star under the excess liability policy. General Star disclaimed any coverage obligation. When this suit was brought, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of General Star on the breach of contract claim and dismissed the chapter 93A, section 11 claim with prejudice. The First Circuit reversed, holding (1) the excess policy was ambiguous; and (2) because ambiguity in the policy must be construed in favor of the insured, coverage was available to PTI. View "Performance Trans., Inc. v. General Star Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded Petitioner's factual sufficiency complaint for the court's consideration, holding that the court of appeals erred in finding that Petitioner failed to preserve its complaint about the factual sufficiency of the evidence.Respondent filed a breach of contract claim against Petitioner, and the jury awarded Respondent actual damages of $361,295. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's verdict and that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain disposition testimony. The court of appeals held the evidence legally sufficient to support the trial court's judgment, concluded that the deposition testimony admission was not an abuse of discretion, and determined that the factually sufficiency complaint was inadequately briefed. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in sustaining the admission of the deposition testimony; but (2) the factual sufficiency issue was adequately briefed and argued and should have been considered. View "Lion Copolymer Holdings, LLC v. Lion Polymers, LLC" on Justia Law

In this dispute over the meaning of an oil and gas lease covering an 11,300-acre tract in Howard County, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Energen Resources Corp. and John Quinn, holding that the contested provision of the lease in this case was ambiguous.The lease at issue allowed Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P. to retain its leasehold interest in the parcel only by drilling a new well every 150 days, with the exception that Endeavor could "accumulate unused days in any 150-day term...in order to extend the next allowed 150-day term between the completion of one well and the drilling of a subsequent well." At issue on appeal was how to calculate the number of "unused days." Energen and Quinn argued that the contested provision unambiguously allowed unused days earned in any term to be carried forward only once to the next 150-day term. The trial court agreed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the disputed provision was ambiguous. View "Endeavor Energy Resources, LP v. Energen Resources Corp." on Justia Law

Discover Bank (Discover) appealed a district court order denying its motion for judgment and dismissing the case. Discover sued Bryan Hornbacher, alleging he was indebted to it on a credit card debt for $14,695.13. The parties entered into a stipulation and consent. The stipulation provided an acknowledgment by Hornbacher that he had been served with the summons and complaint and an admission that he had no defenses to the allegations in the complaint. Hornbacher consented to entry of judgment in the amount of $14,695.13 in exchange for Discover’s agreement to accept $10,080.00 payable over three years as full satisfaction of the judgment, and to forego execution on the judgment unless there were a default in the agreed-upon payment schedule. In its order, the trial court found that “[p]laintiff files a stipulation stating it will not move for judgment unless the terms of the agreement are [breached].” The North Dakota Supreme Court found this was an error, as was the trial court's focus on the lack of default under the stipulation having occurred: "Discover was not moving to execute the judgment, but rather was, by affidavit, moving for judgment to be entered against Hornbacher pursuant to the stipulation. The court misread the stipulation and misapplied the law." Because the plain language of the stipulation provided for judgment against Hornbacher to be entered, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment. View "Discover Bank v. Hornbacher" on Justia Law

Three Aces Properties LLC appealed, and United Rentals (North America), Inc., cross-appealed a judgment and orders denying their motions to amend the judgment. In 2017, Three Aces sued United Rentals for breach of contract and waste. Three Aces claimed United Rentals breached the lease by failing to pay rent after it vacated the property, failing to maintain and repair the parking area, and failing to maintain and repair the premises. Three Aces alleged United Rentals’ use of the premises resulted in destruction of the asphalt parking area and damages to the building and other areas of the property. Three Aces claimed United Rentals attempted to repair the parking area by replacing the asphalt paving with scoria, the City of Williston notified the parties that replacement of the asphalt with scoria violated zoning ordinances, and the parties disagreed about which party had an obligation to repair the parking area. Three Aces argued the district court erred by failing to award it damages for its breach of contract claims. United Rentals argued the court erred in dismissing its breach of contract and constructive eviction claim. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Three Aces Properties v. United Rentals" on Justia Law

Auge, an experienced industrial-equipment salesman, started with Fairchild in 2013, with a base salary of $50,000 and a commission of 30% on the gross profits from most new equipment sales. Days after the company’s plan for calculating compensation changed in 2017, Auge abruptly quit. Fairchild deposited his commissions into his bank account. He demanded more. He believed he was entitled to a 30% commission on all anticipated gross profits, not just those “booked” in 2017. He also requested immediate payment on several “rental purchase option[s],” even though Fairchild’s policy was not to pay commissions on these rent-to-own arrangements until the end of the rental term. In Fairchild’s view, Auge lost those commissions once he quit.Auge sued for breach of contract and for alleged violations of the Minnesota Payment of Wages Act. The district court dismissed the suit. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part but reversed with respect to “rental purchase options,” finding the contract provision ambiguous so that summary judgment was inappropriate. Fairchild owed Auge nothing for other commission, so the Act did not apply. View "Auge v. Fairchild Equipment, Inc." on Justia Law

Residents and businesses of Lumberton, North Carolina filed a putative class action alleging that CSX Transportation caused their property to be flooded during Hurricanes Matthew and Florence. The district court dismissed each claim as either insufficiently pleaded or preempted by federal law.The Fourth Circuit concluded that dismissal of the breach of contract claim was premature because plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the Tri-Party Agreement was intended to directly benefit the class of persons to which they belong—the residents and businesses of South and West Lumberton left vulnerable to flooding through the gap. However, the court's holding is limited to the Tri-Party Agreement. In this case, plaintiffs alleged the existence of a second, unnamed and undated agreement, but failed to produce it or to plead any of its essential terms. The court also concluded that plaintiffs' tort claims are preempted by the federal Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Edwards v. CSX Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

Tokiko Johnson's real property was damaged in a storm and she filed a claim with her insurance company. Johnson also executed an assignment of her insurance claim for the purpose of repairing the property with the execution in favor of Triple Diamond Construction LLC (the construction company). An appraiser retained by the construction company determined storm damage to the property in the amount of $36,346.06. The insurer determined the amount of damage due to the storm was $21,725.36. When sued, the insurer argued the insured property owner was required to obtain written consent from the insurer prior to making the assignment. The Oklahoma Supreme Court determined an insured's post-loss assignment of a property insurance claim was an assignment of a chose in action and not an assignment of the insured's policy. Therefore, the insured's assignment was not prohibited by either the insurance policy or 36 O.S. section 3624. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. The insurer's motion to dismiss the appeal was thus denied. View "Johnson v. CSAA General Insurance Co." on Justia Law