Boykin, a 73-year-old African-American veteran, worked in managerial roles for Family Dollar Stores. On July 8, 2018, Boykin had a dispute with a customer. Family Dollar fired Boykin weeks later. Boykin sued, alleging age and race discrimination. Family Dollar moved to compel arbitration, introducing a declaration that Family Dollar employees must take online training sessions, including a session about arbitration. When taking online courses, employees use their own unique ID and password. During the arbitration session, they must review and accept Family Dollar’s arbitration agreement. According to Family Dollar, Boykin completed the session on July 15, 2013. Boykin replied under oath that he did not consent to or acknowledge an arbitration agreement at any time, that he had no recollection of taking the arbitration session, and that no one ever told him that arbitration was a condition of his employment. Boykin requested his personnel file, which did not include an arbitration agreement. The district court granted Family Dollar’s motion.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Although the Federal Arbitration Act requires a court to summarily compel arbitration upon a party’s request, the court may do so only if the opposing side has not put the making of the arbitration contract “in issue.” 9 U.S.C. 4. Boykin’s evidence created a genuine issue of fact over whether he electronically accepted the contract or otherwise learned of Family Dollar’s arbitration policy. View "Boykin v. Family Dollar Stores of Michigan, LLC" on Justia Law

The Sellers bought an Oakland property to “flip.” After Vega renovated the property, they sold it to Vera, providing required disclosures, stating they were not aware of any water intrusion, leaks from the sewer system or any pipes, work, or repairs that had been done without permits or not in compliance with building codes, or any material facts or defects that had not otherwise been disclosed. Vera’s own inspectors revealed several problems. The Sellers agreed to several repairs Escrow closed in December 2011, but the sewer line had not been corrected. In January 2012, water flooded the basement. The Sellers admitted that earlier sewer work had been completed without a permit and that Vega was unlicensed. In 2014, the exterior stairs began collapsing. Three years and three days after the close of escrow, Vera filed suit, alleging negligence, breach of warranty, breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. Based on the three-year limitations period for actions based on fraud or mistake, the court dismissed and, based on a clause in the purchase contract, granted SNL attorney’s fees, including fees related to a cross-complaint against Vera’s broker and real estate agent.The court of appeal affirmed. Vera’s breach of contract claim was based on fraud and the undisputed facts demonstrated Vera’s claims based on fraud accrued more than three years before she filed suit. Vera has not shown the court abused its discretion in awarding fees related to the cross-complaint. View "Vera v. REL-BC, LLC" on Justia Law

The Stone parties appealed from the trial court's order removing their mechanic's lien on a property owned by Plaintiff Manela and his former wife. The Stone parties jointly filed the mechanic's lien to collect payment for work they performed on the Manela property pursuant to a construction contract executed by the Manelas and Stone (the Manela contract), the quality of which Manela challenged in a separate lawsuit. The trial court concluded that Business and Professions Code section 7031, subdivision (a) likely required the Stone parties to forfeit compensation for any work performed under the Manela contract.The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the order removing the mechanic's lien is appealable, and that the evidence does not support the trial court's conclusion that the Stone parties failed to show section 7031 probably does not require forfeiture. In this case, for the purposes of applying section 7031, the assignment agreement cannot establish that JDSS began performing under the contract before it was licensed. Furthermore, a reasonable trier of fact could not infer that any work had been performed at the request of or on behalf of JDSS before June 22, 2015. Nor does JDSS's mere issuance of a change order meet the definition of performance of the contract set forth in M.W. Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co., Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 412. Therefore, the record compels the conclusion that Stone was not performing under the contract on behalf of JDSS prior to JDSS becoming duly licensed, that JDSS therefore was not performing under the contract before it was licensed, and that section 7031 therefore does not apply. Finally, the court's conclusion is consistent with the policy rationale set forth in E. J. Franks Construction, Inc. v. Sahota (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1123, 1129-1130, which the court found persuasive. View "Manela v. Stone" on Justia Law

In this case involving the correct interpretation of provisions in the Prompt Pay Act, Tenn. Code Ann. 66-34-101 to -704, relating to retainage withheld on construction projects, the Supreme Court held that the $300 per day penalty is assessed each day retaining is not deposited in a statutorily-compliant escrow account.The Act requires the party withholding retain age to deposit the funds into a separate, interest-bearing escrow account, and failure to do so results in a $300 per day penalty. Here, Subcontractor's retainage was not placed into an interest-bearing escrow account, and the retainage was not timely remitted to Contractor. Three years after completing its contractual duties, Subcontractor sued Contractor for unpaid retainage plus amounts due under the Act. Thereafter, Contractor tendered the retainage. At issue was the statutory penalty. The trial court concluded that Subcontractor's claim under the Act was barred by Tenn. Code Ann.'s one-year statute of limitations. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that while Subcontractor's claim for the statutory penalty was subject to the one-year statute of limitations, if Subcontractor can establish that Contractor was required to deposit the retainage into an escrow account, Subcontractor was not precluded from recovering the penalty assessed each day during the period commencing one year before the complaint was filed. View "Snake Steel, Inc. v. Holladay Construction Group, LLC" on Justia Law

This dispute over uninsured motorist ("UM") coverage arose from a motor vehicle accident on Louisiana Highway 6 near Natchitoches. Martin Baack, an employee of Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation, was driving his work vehicle when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Michael McIntosh. The vehicle Baack was driving belonged to PPC Transportation Company. Both Pilgrim’s Pride and PPC Transportation were subsidiaries of JBS USA Holdings, Inc. (“JBS”). McIntosh was determined to be solely at fault for the accident and pled guilty to improper lane usage. Baack and his wife filed suit individually and on behalf of their minor daughter naming as defendants McIntosh, his insurer, and Zurich American Insurance Company (“Zurich”) in its capacity as the UM provider for PPC Transportation’s vehicle. In JBS’s policy with Zurich, PPC Transportation was listed as a Broad Named Insured. The Baacks sought damages under Zurich’s UM coverage as well as penalties and attorney fees based on Zurich’s failure to timely settle the claim. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted consolidated writs to determine whether an insured’s initial UM coverage waiver remains valid where, upon consecutive renewals, the insured submitted new signed and dated UM forms without initialing the blanks provided to reject UM coverage. Based on the Court's interpretation of the UM statute, it found such a subsequently submitted form changes the prior rejection and operated to provide UM coverage. Additionally, finding no error in the quantum of damages and denial of penalties and attorney fees by the court of appeal, the Court affirmed. View "Baack v. McIntosh et al." on Justia Law

Fuston, Petway & French, LLP ("the Firm"), appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of The Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham ("the Board") regarding the Board's termination of a contract between the parties. In September 2015, the Firm and the Board entered into a one-year contract in which the Firm agreed to provide legal representation for the Board. In 2016, the Firm and the Board entered into negotiations for a new contract. The chairman of the Board approached the Firm regarding the Board's need to have independent oversight and review of a program designed to attract "historically underutilized business entities" ("the HUB program"). Board meeting minutes at the end of 2016 reflected that the contract was approved. The contract between the Firm and the Board provided, in pertinent part, that the Firm would administer a Contract Compliance Program for the HUB program. Before the contract expired, the Board elected to terminate its contract with the Firm. The Firm sued for breach of contract and other theories. In its judgment, the trial court found, among other things, that the entirety of the Firm's obligations in the contract entailed legal services and that, as a result, the contract was terminable by the Board at any time. After review of the Firm's arguments appealing the trial court judgment, the Alabama Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Fuston, Petway & French, LLP v. Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court denying Plaintiff's claim for specific performance of a purchase and sale agreement (PSA) in favor of Defendants - Irene M. O'Malley Revocable Trust and John Brady, Katherine Brady Walker, and Mary Brad, as trustees of the Irene M. O'Malley Revocable Trust (collectively, the Trust) - holding that there was no error.Plaintiff filed an amended complaint seeking specific performance of the PSA and alleging that the Trust breached the PSA and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. After a bench trial, the trial justice denied Plaintiff's request for specific performance and granted the Trust's request to terminate the PSA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the trial justice misapplied the law, misconceived or overlooked material evidence or made factual findings that were clearly wrong. View "Terrapin Development, LLC v. Irene M. O'Malley Revocable Trust" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified a question of law to the Oklahoma Supreme Court on whether Progressive Northern Insurance Company's Underinsured Motorist (UM) Exclusion--which operated to deny uninsured motorist coverage to insureds who recover at least the statutorily mandated minimum in the form of liability coverage--contravened Oklahoma's Uninsured Motorist Statute, codified at 36 O.S. section 3636. The Supreme Court responded "yes:" Because of the sweeping nature of the UM Exclusion contained in the insurance policy at issue, Progressive found a way to entirely avoid providing the promised coverage. "[A]n insurer in Oklahoma cannot deprive its policyholder of uninsured-motorist coverage for which a premium has been paid through an exclusion that effectively erases its policyholder's choice to purchase that coverage in the first place. We conclude that Progressive's UM Exclusion contravenes section 3636 and is therefore void as against public policy." View "Lane v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After a jury returned a special verdict finding Norfolk Southern materially breached its contract with Drummond, the district court entered a declaratory judgment for Drummond and awarded limited equitable relief.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court properly denied Norfolk Southern's Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) Motion and did not abuse its discretion in denying Drummond's Rule 59(e) Motion seeking complete rescission. In this case, the court saw no evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that Norfolk Southern expressly breached Article 13 of the Agreement. Furthermore, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Norfolk Southern breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. The court noted that whether or not there was evidence of damages is beside the point. In this case, the jury was only asked whether Norfolk Southern materially breached its agreement with Drummond and, if so, when. Given the court's standard of review, the discretion afforded to courts under Virginia law in making decisions about equitable relief, and the district court's expansive reasoning assessing equities unique to this case, the court declined to find that the district court abused its discretion in denying Drummond complete rescission. View "Drummond Coal Sales, Inc. v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that no refund was due to Plaintiff after Defendant, Plaintiff's study abroad provider, cancelled the abroad portion of her program in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's complaint for breach of contract for failure to state a claim.Plaintiff was studying abroad in the Netherlands when the pandemic hit. In response to the pandemic, Defendant cancelled the abroad portion of Plaintiff's program and made arrangements for Plaintiff to complete her coursework online. Plaintiff brought this action for breach of contract because Defendant refused to provide a refund in lieu of experiences, excursions, activities, and services she would have otherwise enjoyed had the pandemic not occurred. The district court entered judgment for Defendant, concluding that no refund was due when the cancellation of a program occurred after it started. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the contract between the parties unambiguously did not require Defendant to provide Plaintiff with a refund when her program was cancelled following the start date. View "Zhao v. CIEE, Inc." on Justia Law