Uber’s wholly-owned Dutch subsidiaries retained Rattagan, an Argentinian attorney, to serve as their legal representative in Buenos Aires in connection with a new Uber subsidiary in Argentina. Uber representatives from San Francisco allegedly assumed responsibility for communicating with Rattagan. According to Rattagan, Uber launched its platform in Argentina before its subsidiary was registered with the proper tax authority, despite knowing that Rattagan, as the entities’ legal representative, could be subject to personal liability for Uber’s violations of Argentine law. Law enforcement authorities raided Rattagan’s office and the homes of his business colleagues; his offices were surrounded by protestors and he received negative press. Rattagan later was charged with aggravated tax evasion for his perceived involvement with the Uber launch.Rattagan sued for negligence, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent concealment, and aiding and abetting fraudulent concealment. Applying California law, the district court dismissed, as time-barred, Rattagan’s negligence and breach of the implied covenant claims, and held that the fraudulent concealment claims were foreclosed by the economic loss rule, which prevents a party to a contract from recovering economic damages resulting from breach of contract under tort theories. The Ninth Circuit noted that Rattagan’s appeal hinges on whether fraudulent concealment claims are exempt from California’s economic loss rule and certified that question to the California Supreme Court. View "Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

Sandra Gleason filed suit against Charles Halsey and Jim McDonough d/b/a Jim McDonough Home Inspection ("McDonough"), seeking to recover for damage that Gleason allegedly incurred as a result of defendants' allegedly negligent and/or fraudulent conduct associated with Gleason's purchase of a house from Halsey and McDonough's inspection of the house. Although Gleason's claims against Halsey and McDonough involve different legal theories, the issue underlying the claims was essentially the same: whether the house was inspected. The issue underlying Gleason's claims against Halsey was whether McDonough's inspection of the house could be credited to Gleason for purposes of determining whether Gleason may assert an argument under the health or safety exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor; the issue underlying Gleason's claims against McDonough appeared to be whether McDonough owed Gleason a duty in inspecting the house or in consulting with Gleason as she personally inspected the house. The Alabama Supreme Court found that Gleason's claims against Halsey, the judgment on which was certified as final under Rule 54(b), and Gleason's claims against McDonough that remain pending in the circuit court "are so closely intertwined that separate adjudication would pose an unreasonable risk of inconsistent results." As a result, the Court concluded that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in certifying the June 23, 2021, order granting Halsey's summary-judgment motion as final. The Court therefore dismissed the appeal. View "Gleason v. Halsey" on Justia Law

Mike Von Jones (“Jones”) appealed the denial of his motion to set aside a sheriff’s sale and the award of attorney fees to Safaris Unlimited LLC (“Safaris”) under Idaho Code section 12-120(5). A jury found there was an enforceable contract between Jones and Safaris, and that Jones breached the contract. Safaris petitioned for and obtained a writ of execution requiring the sheriff to execute upon Jones’s personal and real property, including a pending lawsuit against Jeremy Sligar and Overtime Garage, LLC. At the sheriff’s sale, Safaris (the only bidder present) bought the lawsuit for $2,500.00 via a credit bid. Although Jones received notice of the sheriff’s sale, neither Jones nor his representative attended. Jones did, however, file a motion to set aside the sheriff’s sale of the Sligar Lawsuit. Then Safaris executed on additional personal property of Jones. The sale returned $8,300.00. While both Jones’s and Safaris’ appeals were pending, Jones tendered a $119,238.04 check to the clerk of the court in an attempt to satisfy the remainder of the amended judgment. The district court granted Safaris’ motion for release of funds and determined that the deposited funds were sufficient to satisfy the amended judgment. However, the district court found that the deposited funds exceeded the amount owed by $2,500.00 because Jones’s tender did not account for Safaris’ credit bid to purchase the Sligar Lawsuit. The district court held that Jones had not demonstrated a gross inadequacy of consideration because he failed to establish the litigation’s approximate value. Similarly, Jones failed to show very slight additional circumstances because he could not point to any procedural irregularities “pertaining to either the notice or conduct of the sale.” After denying Jones’s motion to vacate the sheriff’s sale, the district court ordered the clerk of the court to release the remaining $2,500.00 from the tender back to Jones or his attorneys. Jones timely appealed, arguing: (1) the district court erred by concluding Jones’s monetary tender to the clerk of the court did not preclude Safaris from claiming ownership of Jones’s pending lawsuit; (2) the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to set aside the sheriff’s sale; and (3) the district court erred in awarding costs and fees pursuant to section 12-120(5) for actions taken after Jones’ tender to the clerk. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's orders. View "Safaris Unlimited, LLC v. Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court that the contractual default interest rate applied in this dispute over the redemption of farmland and affirmed the court of appeals' decision requiring timely full payment of the amount necessary, holding that remand was required in this case.An attorney representing an investor underpaid the amount necessary to redeem farmland by at least $1,798 below the minimum owed. After concluding that the redemption was timely the district court resolved the parties' dispute over the interest rate by ruling that the contract default rate of twenty-one percent controlled, not the 4.25 percent nondefault rate. The court of appeals affirmed the twenty-one percent interest rate but concluded that the attempted redemption was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and declined to grant equitable relief, holding that the court of appeals correctly held that the attempted redemption failed as untimely. View "Great Western Bank v. Clement" on Justia Law

Eight named plaintiffs, including two minors, brought a nationwide putative class action against e-commerce provider StockX for allegedly failing to protect millions of StockX users’ personal account information obtained through a cyber-attack in May 2019. Since 2015, StockX’s terms of service included an arbitration agreement, a delegation provision, a class action waiver, and instructions for how to opt-out of the arbitration agreement. Since 2017, StockX's website has stated: StockX may change these Terms without notice to you. “YOUR CONTINUED USE OF THE SITE AFTER WE CHANGE THESE TERMS CONSTITUTES YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE CHANGES. IF YOU DO NOT AGREE TO ANY CHANGES, YOU MUST CANCEL YOUR ACCOUNT.The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit and an order compelling arbitration. The court rejected arguments that there is an issue of fact as to whether four of the plaintiffs agreed to the current terms of service and that the defenses of infancy and unconscionability render the terms of service and the arbitration agreement (including the delegation provision) invalid and unenforceable. The arbitrator must decide in the first instance whether the defenses of infancy and unconscionability allow plaintiffs to avoid arbitrating the merits of their claims. View "I. C. v. StockX, LLC" on Justia Law

BillCutterz granted KGS a license to sell BillCutterz’s services and intellectual property. The parties agreed to arbitrate their disputes; BillCutterz was entitled to royalties and commissions based on KGS’s revenue. The Agreement automatically renews for successive five-year periods until terminated “for cause.” In 2017, a dispute arose. An arbitrator ordered KGS to pay BillCutterz all unpaid commissions and royalties through December 31, 2017, and from January 1, 2018 “for the duration of the License Agreement.” BillCutterz sought confirmation of the award. KGS moved to vacate the award. The district court confirmed the award. KGS filed numerous unsuccessful motions and an unsuccessful appeal but paid the retrospective relief and at least part of the prospective relief. The parties continue to disagree about whether the award’s order entitles BillCutterz to ongoing compensation and whether KGS incurred (and perhaps diverted) revenue after December 6, 2018.KGS sought relief from the judgment, arguing that it fully satisfied all obligations through December 6, 2018, that it ceased operating on that date, and had terminated the License Agreement. KGS sought “protection” from post-judgment discovery. BillCutterz suspected that KGS was still earning revenue under another trade name. The district court refused KGS relief and granted BillCutterz’s motion to compel discovery. The Fifth Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Pending discovery and adjudication based on such discovery of whether KGS has fully satisfied the arbitration award, there is no final judgment to consider. View "Gross v. Keen Group Solutions, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the circuit court erred in this case in awarding SustainedMED, LLC attorneys' fees as well as expenses and costs in excess of $24,999.94 on its indemnification claim because the award exceeded the maximum indemnification amount allowed under an indemnity agreement.Sellers entered into a stock purchase agreement (SPA) for the sale of their collective shares in Cyfluent, Inc. to SustainedMED. The total purchase price for the sale of the Cyfluent stock was $4,900,000. The SPA included an indemnity agreement requiring Sellers to indemnify Sustained MED for losses resulting from inaccuracies in or breach of any representations or warranties made by Sellers. SustainedMED filed suit against Sellers alleging misrepresentations and fraud in the inducement. The circuit court ruled in favor of SustainedMED and awarded SustainedMED $972,323.50 in attorneys' fees and $64,225 in litigation expenses and costs. The Supreme Court reversed as to the award of attorneys' fees and costs, holding that the circuit court erred in awarding attorneys' fees and costs in excess of $24,999.94 on SustainedMED's indemnification claim because of the SPA's indemnification cap of $4,900,000. View "Ehrhardt v. SustainedMED, LLC" on Justia Law

Tax sharing agreements between the County of San Benito and the City of Hollister require the city to pay the county a fixed fee (the “Additional Amount”) for each residential unit constructed on land that is annexed into the city from the county. Plaintiff entered into development agreements with the city to build residential units on land subject to the city-county tax sharing agreements, and agreed to satisfy certain obligations from the tax sharing agreements, but sued the city and the county seeking a declaration that payment of the Additional Amount is not among plaintiff’s obligations.The court of appeal affirmed a defense judgment. The plaintiff agreed to pay the city the Additional Amount fees as part of the development agreements. Nothing in the tax sharing agreement suggests that obligations created by it would cease to exist merely because a project annexed during its effective period was not constructed until after the agreement expired. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that because the Additional Amount is an obligation of the city to the county under the tax sharing agreement, it cannot be a “Developer’s obligation.” The reference to “Developer’s obligations” in the development agreement did not mean only the capital improvement and drainage fees discussed in the tax sharing agreement; the term includes the Additional Amount. View "Award Homes, Inc. v. County of San Benito" on Justia Law

A tax-sharing agreement between the County of San Benito and the City of Hollister requires the city to pay the county a fixed fee (Additional Amount) per residential unit constructed on land annexed into the city from the county during the period covered by that agreement. Plaintiff’s predecessor entered into an annexation agreement with the city, agreeing to comply with “all applicable provisions” of that tax sharing agreement. When the plaintiff purchased the annexed land and sought to develop it into subdivisions, the city informed the plaintiff that it was liable for the Additional Amount fees. Plaintiff paid the fees under protest, then sued, seeking a declaration of its rights and duties under various written instruments.The court of appeal affirmed a defense judgment. Plaintiff is contractually liable for the Additional Amount by the terms of the annexation agreement. Any challenge to the calculation of the Additional Amount is beyond the scope of a declaratory relief action and time-barred. The court rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that neither the annexation agreement nor the tax sharing agreement requires the plaintiff to pay the Additional Amount and that the fees violate the Mitigation Fee Act and federal constitutional constraints on development fees as monetary exactions. View "BMC Promise Way, LLC v. County of San Benito" on Justia Law

Hodroj, a passenger, was injured in a single-car collision. The driver was insured by CSAA. Hodroj’s attorney wrote to CSAA offering that Hodroj would settle his claim for bodily injuries in exchange for payment of the driver’s insurance policy limits if CSAA provided a sworn declaration confirming the policy limits and delivered a check within 21 days of acceptance. CSAA could condition its acceptance on Hodroj signing a written release of all bodily injury claims. CSAA responded: “We accept ... [and] are tendering ... $100,000[.]” Enclosed were a sworn declaration attesting to the policy limits, and a written release to be signed by Hodroj. A $100,000 check was sent separately, providing that it should not be presented until the release was signed. Hodroj reneged on the settlement because the release included a release of claims for property damage. Hodroj sued the driver. CSAA sued Hodroj for breach of contract.The court of appeal affirmed judgment in favor of CSAA. An objective observer would conclude that the parties intended to settle Hodroj’s bodily injury claim for the policy limits. That the proposed document contained terms materially different from what had been agreed did not change the binding effect of the agreement. Hodroj was not obliged to sign a release that was inconsistent with what he agreed to but a proposal that does not accurately reflect the agreement does not unwind the entire deal. Hodroj breached the contract by filing suit. View "CSAA Insurance Exchange v. Hodroj" on Justia Law