The Supreme Court answered a certified question under Nev. R. App. P. 5 concerning an insurer's right to reimbursement, holding that when a party to a contract performs a challenged obligation under protest and a court subsequently determines that the contract did not require performance, the party may generally recover in restitution, thus giving effect to the terms of the parties' bargain.Insurer filed this declaratory judgment action seeking reimbursement of expenses it had occurred in defending Insured against a suit by a third party. The district court concluded that Insurer was not entitled to reimbursement. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the suit did not trigger a duty to defend. The Supreme Court accepted a certified question from the Ninth Circuit regarding the issue. The Supreme Court then held (1) no contract governed the right to reimbursement in this case; and (2) under the principle of unjust enrichment, a party that performs a disputed obligation under protest and does not in fact have a duty to perform is entitled to reimbursement. View "Nautilus Insurance Co. v. Access Medical, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff treated children in the pediatric intensive care unit of a hospital owned by VHS under his professional services agreement with PICCS, which itself operated under a separate coverage agreement with VHS. After PICCS terminated plaintiff, he filed suit alleging claims of race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims against VHS.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's partial final judgment, concluding that plaintiff's Title VII claim fails for lack of an employment relationship with VHS under either integrated-enterprise or joint-employment theories. The court also concluded that plaintiff's section 1981 claim fails because he cannot identify an impaired contractual right enforceable against VHS. In this case, plaintiff failed to show any contractual right enforceable against VHS under his physician agreement. View "Perry v. VHS San Antonio Partners, LLC" on Justia Law

Hall filed various contract, statutory, and common-law claims against Old Republic in federal district court for failing to indemnify Hall under its title insurance policies. The district court concluded that, although the unpaid Penta pre-policy-date work is a defect under Covered Risk 2 and an encumbrance under Covered Risk 10, coverage is precluded by Exclusions 3(a) and 3(d), which bar claims for liens and work performed after the policy date. The district court found that Hall had not raised a genuine dispute of material fact that Penta's liens were for unpaid work before the policy date, and granted Old Republic's motion for summary judgment and denied Hall's motion for partial summary judgment.The Fifth Circuit concluded that the insuring clauses do not cover Hall's Penta lien losses. The court explained that any doubt about whether Covered Risks 2 and 10 could possibly be read to cover the Penta lien losses at issue here is removed by the fact that the parties also signed standard ALTA Form 32-06. In so doing, the parties specifically contracted to eliminate one coverage provision of the standard-form insurance policy—Covered Risk 11(a). Even assuming arguendo that the 32-06 endorsements and the Covered Risks conflict or result in an ambiguity about whether the Penta lien losses are covered, the court explained that it is the more general provisions that suggest that there may be coverage (under Hall's theory), while the more specific provisions instruct that there is no such coverage. Under basic principles of contract interpretation, the specific controls the general. Therefore, the court need not review the district court's conclusions regarding Exclusions 3(a) and 3(d) to affirm the judgment.The court also affirmed the district court's grant of Old Republic's motion for summary judgment on Hall's bad-faith and Texas Insurance Code claims. The court explained that, because Hall is not entitled to indemnification for the Penta lien losses, Hall cannot show that Old Republic acted in bad faith in denying its claim. Furthermore, because Hall alleges no other harm apart from the Penta lien losses, Hall cannot demonstrate that Old Republic caused it any harm in violating the Texas Insurance Code—assuming arguendo that the Texas Insurance Code applies, and that Old Republic ran afoul of its provisions. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's grant of Old Republic's motion for summary judgment on Hall's independent-counsel (or duty-to-defend) claim. View "Hall CA-NV, LLC v. Old Republic National Title Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The School terminated Pack's employment as a teacher after less than a year and published a press release about Pack on its website, allegedly criticizing Pack, which remains available on the School’s website. Pack sued the School. The Elkhart Truth ran an article later that month under the headline: “Fired Northridge teacher, an atheist, sues Middlebury Community Schools for religious discrimination.” Pack and the School settled that case. The School agreed to maintain a level of confidentiality and agreed to tell Pack’s prospective employers only limited information about him. The parties agreed that neither would disparage the other party. The settlement agreement did not mention the 2014 press release. Pack sued Elkhart Truth in state court, alleging defamation. School Superintendent Allen gave an affidavit supporting Truth’s motion to dismiss. Pack later recruited two acquaintances to call the School and pose as prospective employers. During one call, Allen said that Pack’s termination was “a matter of public record.” During another, Allen said Pack was terminated “for cause.”Pack sued for breach of the settlement agreement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the School on all claims. The School had no contractual obligation to remove the pre-existing press release from its website, enjoys absolute privilege for the affidavit submitted in the Truth litigation, and did not disclose contractually forbidden information to “prospective employers” because the callers were not “prospective employers.” View "Pack v. Middlebury Community Schools" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that pressure tactics used by Quicken Loans and TSI to influence home appraisers to raise appraisal values to obtain higher loan values on their homes constituted a breach of contract and unconscionable inducement under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs.The Fourth Circuit concluded that class certification is appropriate and that plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their claims for conspiracy and unconscionable inducement. However, the court concluded that the district court erred in its analysis of the breach-of-contract claim. The court explained that the district court will need to address defendants' contention that there were no damages suffered by those class members whose appraisals would have been the same whether or not the appraisers were aware of the borrowers' estimates of value—which one might expect, for example, if a borrower's estimate of value was accurate. The court agreed with plaintiffs that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to the parties' contract, but concluded that it cannot by itself sustain the district court's decision at this stage. The district court may consider the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to the extent that it is relevant for evaluating Quicken Loans' performance of the contracts. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. View "Alig v. Quicken Loans Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a civil action to collect a debt under a contract that contained an arbitration provision. The defendants appealed the master in equity's order refusing to set aside the entry of their default. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal on the basis that an order refusing to set aside an entry of default was not immediately appealable. The defendants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari claiming the order was immediately appealable because it had the effect of precluding their motion to compel arbitration, and in fact, the order states, "Defendants' motion to stay and compel arbitration is denied as [the defendants are] in default." Finding no reversible error, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. View "Palmetto Construction Group, LLC v. Restoration Specialists, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2008, severe storms hit Indiana. Columbus Hospital sustained significant damage. President Bush authorized FEMA assistance through disaster grants under the Stafford Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121–5206. The state agreed to be the grantee for all grant assistance, with the exception of assistance to individuals and households. FEMA reserved the right to recover assistance funds if they were spent inappropriately or distributed through error, misrepresentation, or fraud. Columbus apparently submitted its request directly to FEMA, instead of through the state. FEMA approved Columbus projects, totaling approximately $94 million. Funds were transmitted to Columbus through the state. In 2013, the DHS Inspector General issued an audit report finding that Columbus had committed procurement violations and recommended that FEMA recover $10.9 million. FEMA reduced that amount to $9,612,831.19 and denied Columbus’s appeal. Columbus did not seek judicial review. FEMA recovered the disputed costs from Columbus in 2014.In 2018, Columbus filed suit, alleging four counts of contract breach and illegal exaction. The Claims Court dismissed Columbus’s illegal exaction claim, holding that Columbus did not have a property interest in the disputed funds and that FEMA’s appeal process protected Columbus’s rights to due process, and dismissed Columbus’s contract-based claims, finding that Columbus had no rights against FEMA under that contract or otherwise. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the illegal exaction and express and implied contract claims. The court vacated the dismissal of the third-party beneficiary contract claim. View "Columbus Regional Hospital v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2009, Meidinger submitted whistleblower information to the IRS under 26 U.S.C. 7623, concerning “one million taxpayers in the healthcare industry that are involved in a kickback scheme.” The IRS acknowledged receipt of the information, but did not take action against the accused persons. The IRS notified Meidinger of that determination. Meidinger argued that the IRS created a contract when it confirmed receipt of his Form 211 Application, obligating it to investigate and to pay the statutory award. The Tax Court held that it lacked the authority to order the IRS to act and granted the IRS summary judgment. The D.C. Circuit affirmed that Meidinger was not eligible for a whistleblower award because the information did not result in initiation of an administrative or judicial action or collection of tax proceeds.In 2018, Meidinger filed another Form 211, with the same information as his previous submission. The IRS acknowledged receipt, but advised Meidinger that the information was “speculative” and “did not provide specific or credible information regarding tax underpayments or violations of internal revenue laws.” The Tax Court dismissed his suit for failure to state a claim; the D.C. Circuit affirmed, stating that a breach of contract claim against the IRS is properly filed in the Claims Court under the Tucker Act: 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1). The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal, agreeing that the submission of information did not create a contract. View "Meidinger v. United States" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Exeter and Exeter's parent company, Enzo, in an action brought by plaintiff, a former employee, for breach of contract, fraud, and quantum meruit. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance and plaintiff abandoned his remaining arguments challenging the exclusion of his evidence.The court also concluded that the district court correctly concluded that plaintiff's contract claim, based on the Profits Interest Units Agreement, failed as a matter of law; the district court correctly concluded that, absent evidence of a valid severance agreement, plaintiff's breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law; the district court properly adjudicated plaintiff's fraud claims as a matter of law; and the district court correctly determined that plaintiff's conduct in connection with the transactions before the district court was inequitable, precluding any equitable remedy.The court noted that three-quarters of the record in this case was sealed from the public and that the public's right of access to judicial proceedings is fundamental. The court urged litigants and the court's judicial colleagues to zealously guard the public's right of access to judicial records. View "Binh Hoa Le v. Exeter Finance Corp." on Justia Law

In 1989, the Plaintiffs opened Money Market Investment Accounts (MMIAs) with FNB. FNB guaranteed that the MMIAs’ annual rate of interest would “never fall below 6.5%.” The original contract did not limit an account holder’s right to enforce the agreement in court but stated: Changes in the terms of this agreement may be made by the financial institution from time to time and shall become effective upon the earlier of (a) the expiration of a thirty-day period of posting of such changes in the financial institution, or (b) the making or delivery of notice thereof to the depositor by the notice in the depositor’s monthly statement for one month.In 1997, FNB merged with BankFirst. In 2001, BankFirst merged with BB&T, which sent a Bank Services Agreement (BSA) to each account holder, which included an arbitration provision. A 2004 BSA amendment added a class action waiver. A 2017 Amendment made massive changes to the BSA, including an extensive arbitration provision and stating that continued use of the account after receiving notice constituted acceptance of the changes. The Plaintiffs maintained their accounts. In 2018, the Plaintiffs were notified that the annual percentage rate applicable to their accounts would drop from 6.5% to 1.05%.The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the Plaintiffs' breach of contract suit. Because there was no mutual assent, the 2001 BSA and its subsequent amendments are invalid to the extent that they materially changed the terms of the original agreement. BB&T gave the Plaintiffs no choice other than to acquiesce or to close their high-yield savings accounts. BB&T did not act reasonably when it added the arbitration provision years after the Plaintiffs’ accounts were established, thus violating the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. View "Sevier County Schools Federal Credit Union v. Branch Banking & Trust Co." on Justia Law