The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal affirming the judgment of the trial court granting Plaintiff's postural motion seeking attorney's fees in the amount of $169,602 under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code 1795, subd. (d), after awarding her $21,957.25 in damages on her claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff purchased a used vehicle from a dealership pursuant to an installment sales contract that was later assigned to TD Auto Finance (TDAF). Plaintiff filed suit against the dealership and TDAF, alleging misconduct in the sale of the car. A jury found that Defendants breached the implied warranty of merchantability under the Song-Beverly Act and awarded damages and attorney's fees under the Song-Beverly Act. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that recovery under the Federal Trade Commission's Holder Rule does not limit the award of attorney's fees where, as a here, a buyer seeks fees from a holder under a state prevailing party statute. View "Pulliam v. HNL Automotive, Inc." on Justia Law

Two questions of law were certified to the Delaware Supreme Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit: (1) when faced with an action brought by an estate under 18 Del. C. 2704(b), an innocent downstream investor in a stranger-originated life insurance (“STOLI”) policy, or its securities intermediary, could assert certain defenses under the Delaware Uniform Commercial Code; and (2) whether downstream investors in a STOLI policy could sue to recover any premiums they paid. The Court answered question one in the negative: in the sui generis context of STOLI schemes, these defenses are not available. The Court answered question two in the affirmative: yes, if the party being sued can prove its entitlement to those premiums under a viable legal theory. View "Wells Fargo Bank v. Estate of Phyllis M. Malkin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the superior court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all eight counts set forth in Plaintiffs' third amended complaint, holding that the hearing justice correctly granted summary judgment with respect to all counts except count eight.Plaintiffs filed a complaint containing counts sounding in, inter alia, breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and tortious interference with contractual relations. The hearing justice granted summary judgment against Plaintiffs on all counts, commenting that Plaintiffs' complaint was an attempt to circumvent the Statute of Frauds. The Supreme Court vacated in part, holding (1) the hearing justice erred in granting summary judgment on count eight since there were issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment; and (2) the judgment was otherwise without error. View "Loffredo v. Shapiro" on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery denied Defendants' motion to dismiss this complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, holding that Plaintiff's claims were ripe and that the complaint stated claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment.Plaintiff, a stockholder of a company, brought this lawsuit alleging that Defendants breached the terms of an equity compensation plan, that Defendants breached their fiduciary duties, and unjust enrichment. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety, arguing that none of Plaintiff's claims were ripe and that Plaintiff failed to state a claim. The Court of Chancery denied the motion to dismiss, holding that Defendants' attacks on the complaint were unavailing. View "Garfield v. Allen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Alabama granite processing business, worked with Defendant, a corporation that represents manufacturers in the sale of equipment used in the granite industry. Five years after the plant was completed, Plaintiff sued Defendant in Alabama state court, arguing, among other things, that Defendant breached its contract with Plaintiff. The district court granted summary judgment on the breach of contract claims. As to Defendant’s counterclaim, the district court determined Plaintiff had to pay the unpaid invoices and granted summary judgment on the counterclaim as well. Plaintiff appealed the district court’s orders   On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment finding that Plaintiff’s claim was time-barred. The court also affirmed the grant of summary judgment and denial of reconsideration as to Defendant’s counterclaim for unpaid invoices.     The court held that summary judgment is appropriate, because this is a contract for goods, and the UCC’s applicable four-year statute of limitations has passed. The court reasoned that Plaintiff has cited no record document or case to suggest that the contracting parties agreed to the markups as disguised service charges, and it seems more logical to conclude that a sale of equipment will include a margin of profit for the seller.   Further, the court held that Plaintiff’s argument on the statute of limitations defense is forfeited. The court reasoned that Plaintiff’s failure to raise the statute of limitations defense in its response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is not an “exceptional condition” that merits the court using its discretion. View "Wadley Crushed Stone Company, LLC v. Positive Step, Inc." on Justia Law

A husband and wife, both residents of Missouri, filed a lawsuit in Missouri state court against a California resident and California corporation for making deceptive and fraudulent representations to the couple in the course of providing them with adoption facilitation services. Although the California defendants were properly served with notice of the action, they did not respond, and a default judgment was entered. The couple then applied in San Diego Superior Court for entry of judgment on the sister state judgment. In response, the California defendants (also judgment debtors), moved to vacate entry of judgment, claiming the Missouri court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over them violated their right to federal due process because they had insufficient minimum contacts with Missouri. The trial court agreed and granted the motion to vacate entry of the Missouri judgment. The California Court of Appeal reversed, concluding Missouri’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the California defendants in this case was constitutional. Furthermore, the Court concluded the other defenses raised by the California defendants against recognition of the sister state judgment lacked merit. Accordingly, the case was remanded with instructions to the trial court to enter a new order denying the motion to vacate entry of the Missouri judgment. View "Casey v. Hill" on Justia Law

James P. Key, Jr. appealed a circuit court order denying his motion to compel arbitration of his claims against Warren Averett, LLC, and Warren Averett Companies, LLC (collectively, "WA"). Key alleged that he was a certified public accountant who had been employed by WA for 25 years and had been a member of WA for 15 years; that he had executed a personal-services agreement ("PSA") with WA that included a noncompete clause; and that WA had sent him a letter terminating his employment. Key sought a judgment declaring "that the Non-Compete Clause and the financial penalty provision contained in the PSA is not applicable to Key and is an unlawful restraint of Key's ability to serve his clients as a professional." The Alabama Supreme Court found that whether Key's claims against WA had to be arbitrated was a threshold issue that should not have been decided by the circuit court; nor was it appropriate for the Supreme Court to settle the issue in this appeal. Accordingly, the circuit court's order was reversed, and the case was remanded for the circuit court to enter an order sending the case to arbitration for a determination of the threshold issue of arbitrability and staying proceedings in the circuit court during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings. View "Key v. Warren Averett, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that the "procuring-cause doctrine" did not apply to the facts of this case, holding that the procuring-cause doctrine applied to the parties' contractual relationship.If a seller agrees to pay sales commissions to a broker or other agent and their contract says nothing more than that commissions will be paid for sales, Texas law applies a default rule called the procuring-cause doctrine. When the seller refused to pay the broker in this case commissions on sales that were finalized after his termination, the broker sued the seller for breach of contract. The jury found for the broker. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the procuring-cause doctrine applied to the contractual relationship in this case. View "Pesthuis v. Baylor Miraca Genetics Laboratories, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case arising out of a construction contract dispute involving competing claims of breach between the owner and the contractor, the Supreme Court reversed in part the court of appeals' judgment affirming the portion of the trial court's judgment awarding damages to the owner but reversing as to the contractor, holding that the judgment awarding certain expenses to the owner could not stand.The jury found that both the owner and the contractor breached the contract and awarded damages as to both parties. At issue was whether the owner's entitlement to recover contract damages associated with a termination of the contractor for default hinged on strict compliance with the written-notice conditions precedent to such recovery, whether sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding of compliance, and whether a contractual provision governing consequential damages was liability waiver or a covenant not to sue. The Supreme Court held (1) when a contract mandates written notice, a writing is a necessary part of complying with contractual notice conditions, substantially or otherwise; (2) because the owner failed to provide the requisite written notices to be entitled to recover expenses associated with a termination for default, the judgment awarding them to the owner could not stand; and (3) the contract did not contain a covenant not to sue for consequential damages. View "James Construction Group, LLC v. Westlake Chemical Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court finding Plaintiffs responsible for failing to complete a project by the parties' agreed-upon deadline and awarding Defendant $335,000 in liquidated damages on its counterclaim, holding that the trial court's pretrial interpretation of various agreements between the parties was erroneous.At issue was which party was responsible for delays in constructing Dunkin Donuts Park in the City of Hartford. Plaintiffs, the project's developer and the design-builder, sued the City claiming breach of contract, and the City counterclaimed for breach of contract. The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that Plaintiffs controlled the architect and were therefore liable for changes to and mistakes in the ballpark's design. Thereafter, the jury found Plaintiffs responsible for failing to complete the stadium by the agreed-upon deadline. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the parties' contracts did not unambiguously grant Plaintiffs legal control of the architect and the stadium's design across all relevant time periods. View "Centerplan Construction Co. v. Hartford" on Justia Law