After plaintiffs lost their home in a fire, they promptly submitted a claim under their homeowner’s insurance policy to their insurer, Mid-Century. Mid-Century denied the claim on the ground that the policy had been canceled for nonpayment of premium six days before the fire. Plaintiffs immediately paid the past due premium, the policy was reinstated, but Mid-Century continued to deny the claim. Plaintiffs filed suit for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court granted summary adjudication for plaintiffs on the issue of Mid-Century's duty to provide coverage and denied Mid-Century's motion for summary judgment in its entirety.The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court properly denied Mid-Century's motion for summary judgment but improperly granted plaintiff's motion for summary adjudication. The court rejected Mid-Century's argument that the loss-in-progress rule precludes coverage. Rather, the court concluded that the law allowed Mid-Century to retroactively reinstate the policy with no lapse in coverage. However, the court concluded that there exists a triable issue of material fact regarding Mid-Century's intent when it reinstated the policy that precludes summary adjudication for either party. View "Antonopoulos v. Mid-Century Insurance Co." on Justia Law

This case presented an issue of first impression for the Alabama Supreme Court: whether a noncompetition agreement executed ancillary to the sale of a business terminates upon the death of the individual subject to the covenant not to compete. The Court found that based the specific facts of this case, the noncompetition agreement here did not impose any affirmative obligations on the decedent, and was executed separately from the other agreements relating to the sale of the business. Accordingly, the Court held the noncompetition agreement did not terminate. View "Boyd v. Mills" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief in these actions challenging rulings on a Rule 91a motion to dismiss, holding that the the trial court abused its discretion in denying Insurer's motion to dismiss Insured's claim for negligent failure to settle.A liability insurer (Insurer) settled claims against its insured (Insured) within policy limits but obtained a release that was contingent on Insured paying a portion of the settlement. Insured paid and then brought this action seeking reimbursement, alleging claims for negligent failure to settle and for breach of contract. Insurer filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. Insurer sought mandamus relief. The court of appeals granted relief as to the breach of contract claim but concluded that the trial court properly refused to dismiss the claim for negligent failure to settle. Both parties sought mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief to both parties, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Insurer's motion to dismiss Insured's Stowers claim for negligent failure to settle; and (2) the court of appeals erred in ordering the trial court to dismiss Insured's claim for breach of the contractual obligation to indemnify. View "In re Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on appeal entered by the intermediate court of appeals affirming the circuit court's final judgment in this compensation dispute based on an oral agreement, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants' motion filed under Haw. R. Civ. P. (HRCP) 55(c) to set aside entry of default.In this dispute between an independent contractor dentist, Dr. Grace Chen, and the dentist who retained Chen's services, Dr. Jonathan Mah and his corporation (collectively, Defendants), default and subsequent default judgment as to certain claims were entered against Defendants, and a bench trial was held regarding damages on some claims. Defendants appealed the denial of their motion to set aside entry of default and their motion for reconsideration and/or for new trial. The ICA affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court correctly denied Defendants' HRCP Rule 55(c) on the grounds that they failed to satisfy the second and third prongs of the test governing HRCP Rule 60(b) motions to set aside default judgments; and (2) the circuit court did not err in its remaining rulings. View "Chen v. Mah" on Justia Law

Rexing sought a ruling that Rexing was excused from its obligations to purchase eggs under its contract with Rembrandt. Rembrandt filed a counterclaim seeking damages for Rexing’s repudiation of the contract, attorneys’ fees, and interest. Following discovery, the district court granted Rembrandt summary judgment on liability but concluded that there were genuine issues of triable fact as to damages. A jury awarded Rembrandt $1,268,481 for losses on eggs it had resold and another $193,752 for losses on eggs that it was not able to resell. The court determined that the interest term in the parties’ agreement was usurious, so that Rembrandt was not entitled to contractual interest or attorneys’ fees.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the damages award. The district court properly concluded that the resale remedy under Iowa’s version of the Uniform Commercial Code, Iowa Code 554.2706, was the appropriate mechanism for calculating Rembrandt’s damages and Rexing waived its arguments challenging the award by not presenting them to the district court in a post-verdict motion. Reversing in part, the court held that the parties’ agreement fell within the “Business Credit Exception” to Iowa’s usury statute, Iowa Code 535.5(2)(a)(5), and remanded the denial of Rembrandt’s request for interest and fees. View "Rexing Quality Eggs v. Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing in part the circuit court's determination that the price for certain property was $16.6 million and granting County Visions Cooperative fifteen days to exercise its right of first refusal at that price, holding that a circuit court may set an exercise price that exceeds the appraised value of the burdened property.The circuit court granted Country Visions specific performance of its right of first refusal to a property that Archer-Daniel-Midland Co. was attempting to sell. At issue was whether the circuit court correctly set the price at which Country Visions could exercise its right of first refusal. The court of appeals concluded that the circuit court did not err in how it determined the appropriate right of first refusal exercise price but remanded the case for a determination of whether the $16.6 million price included personal property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly considered the unique synergies that the property provided when it set the exercise price higher than the appraised value; but (2) remand was necessary to determine whether the $16.6 million exercise price included more than what was called for in the right of first refusal contract. View "Country Visions Cooperative v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging six claims under Iowa law: (1) fraudulent or intentional misrepresentation; (2) negligent misrepresentation; (3) breach of contract; (4) unjust enrichment; (5) misappropriation of trade secrets; and (6) breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiff's claims arose from statements and actions that followed the sudden death of plaintiff's husband and involved defendant, the husband's business partner. The district court dismissed all claims.The Eighth Circuit concluded that plaintiff sufficiently state a claim for breach of contract as to the sale of life insurance to RK where plaintiff's accusations were sufficient to plead consideration in support of the contract. In this case, there was consideration for the agreement in that defendant was to receive an override commission upon sale of the insurance products and plaintiff agreed not to take her client's insurance business to another agent. The court also concluded that the district court erred in granting defendant's motion to dismiss on plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim as related to the RK insurance sale; plaintiffs sufficiently stated a claim for breach of fiduciary duty; and, to the extent plaintiff's claims for fraud or negligent misrepresentation related to the sale of life insurance products to plaintiff's client, the claims were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Meardon v. Register" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified to three questions of law to the Georgia Supreme Court relating to a lawsuit brought in federal district court by Fife Whiteside, the trustee of the bankruptcy estate of Bonnie Winslett. Whiteside sued GEICO to recover the value of Winslett’s failure-to-settle tort claim against GEICO so that the bankruptcy estate could pay creditor Terry Guthrie, who was injured in an accident caused by Winslett. The certified questions certified asked the Supreme Court to analyze how Georgia law applied to an unusual set of circumstances that implicated both Winslett’s duty to give GEICO notice of suit and GEICO’s duty to settle the claim brought against Winslett. The Supreme Court was unable to give unqualified “yes” or “no” answers to two of the certified questions as they were posed; rather, the Court answered the questions only in the context of the circumstances of this particular case. "Winslett remains liable to Guthrie, even if her bankruptcy trustee succeeds on the failure-to-settle claim against GEICO; therefore, if the bankruptcy estate does not recover enough from GEICO to satisfy Guthrie’s judgment, the estate would not be fully compensated for Winslett’s damages, and GEICO would escape responsibility for breaching its settlement duty to Winslett. Such an outcome would deny Winslett the full measure of compensatory damages allowed under Georgia law." View "GEICO Indemnity Co. v. Whiteside" on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the district court's determination that the insurance policy at issue covered all of the claimed property damage and that a Miller-Shugart settlement agreement was reasonable and unenforceable against Insurer, holding that the policy did not cover all of the claimed property damage.The court of appeals concluded that the settlement agreement was "unreasonable as a matter of law and unenforceable" against the insurer because the agreement failed to allocate between covered and uncovered claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the policies in this case covered some, but not all, of the property damage claimed by the insured; and (2) determining the reasonableness of an unallocated Miller-Shugart settlement agreement involves a two-step inquiry set forth in this opinion. View "King's Cove Marina, LLC v. Lambert Commercial Construction LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of the West Virginia University Board of Governors (WVU BOG) on Plaintiff's claims alleging that the West Virginia University Institute of Technology (WVUIT) breached its agreement to pay him a supplementary salary for serving as director of a research center, holding that summary judgment was improper on Plaintiff's claim brought under the West Virginia Wage Payment Collection Act (WPCA), W. Va. Code 21-5-1 through 18.Plaintiff, a professor at WVUIT, brought this action against WVU BOG, which manages the educational operations of WVUIT, bringing a common law claim for breach of contract, alternative equitable claims of quantum merit and unjust enrichment, and a statutory cause of action under WPCA. WVU BOG, a state agency, moved for summary judgment, invoking the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The circuit court granted summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) sovereign immunity did not bar Plaintiff's claims under the WPCA, and genuine issues of disputed fact existed as to whether WVU BOG violated the WPCA; and (2) summary judgment was properly granted on the remaining claims. View "Davari v. West Virginia University Board of Governors" on Justia Law