Wye sued Iraq. The district court denied Iraq’s motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds and entered judgment in Wye’s favor years later. An intervening Fourth Circuit ruling rejected Iraq’s contention that none of the exceptions in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1602, applied to Wye’s breach of contract claims; because Wye alleged that it had engaged in acts inside the U.S. under the contract, the lawsuit could proceed under the second clause of the FSIA’s commercial activities exception, which abrogates foreign sovereign immunity with respect to claims that are “based upon . . . an act performed in the United States in connection with commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere.”The D.C. Circuit vacated. Iraq’s participation in the trial did not implicitly waive its sovereign immunity. The law of the case doctrine does not require adherence to the Fourth Circuit’s conclusions. The D.C. Circuit concluded that section 1605(a)(2) does not apply to this case. A plausible basis for sustaining the district court’s jurisdictional ruling can be found in the commercial activity exception’s third clause, abrogating immunity if the action is “based upon . . . an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.” The district court is best positioned to determine whether Iraq’s breach of contract caused “direct effects” in the U.S. View "Wye Oak Technology, Inc. v. Republic of Iraq" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals rendering judgment that delivery of the grantor's fractional share in the pipeline occurred in the gathering pipeline rather than the transportation pipeline, holding that the court of appeals did not err.A deed conveying the mineral estate in this case reserved a nonparticipating royalty interest in kind, meaning that the grantor retained ownership of a fractional share of all minerals in place. The deed required delivery of the grantor's fractional share "free of cost in the pipe line, if any, otherwise free of cost at the mouth of the well or mine[.]" The parties agreed that the royalty did not include production and postproduction costs incurred before delivery into the existing gas pipeline but disagreed about the pipeline's location under the terms of the deed. The trial court concluded that delivery occurred in the transportation pipeline. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that delivery occurs in the gathering pipeline. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly interpreted the deed in this case. View "Nettye Engler Energy, LP v. Bluestone Natural Resources II, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court that overruled Community First Bank's motion for summary judgment, sustaining First Central Bank McCook's motion for summary judgments and dismissing Community First's breach of contract claims, holding that genuine issues of fact existed precluding summary judgment.On appeal, Community First argued that the district court erred in determining that the contract between Community First and First Central was a participation agreement that did not create a debtor-creditor relationship between the two banks. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) the contract between the parties was ambiguous; and (2) a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the provisions of the contract between the parties. View "Community First Bank v. First Central Bank McCook" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals vacating the order of the district court entering judgment on an arbitrator's award, holding that the court of appeals erred in finding the award ambiguous and ordering a remand to the arbitrator for further clarification.Signal 88, LLC brought this contract action against Lyconic, LLC. The district court ordered the dispute to be submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator issued a decision, after which Lyconic applied for an order confirming the arbitration award. The district court confirmed the award but, in the process, modified it. The court of appeals vacated the judgment, determining that the arbitrator's award was ambiguous. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in modifying rather than confirming the award; and (2) the court of appeals erred in finding that the arbitrator's award was ambiguous. View "Signal 88, LLC v. Lyconic, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the district court's judgment concluding that Tennis Sanitation, LLC breached the contract between the parties and that, as a result of the breach, Vermillion State Bank suffered $1.92 million in damages, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Tennis repudiated an alleged oral contract it negotiated with Vermillion for its purchase of certain assets, including garbage trucks and customer routes, of a trash collection business in bankruptcy. After Tennis's repudiation, Vermillion sold the assets to another company at a significantly lower price. Vermillion then sued Tennis for breach of contract. The district court entered judgment for Vermillion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that hybrid contract involving goods and non-goods should be interpreted based on the predominant purpose of the contract. View "Vermillion State Bank v. Tennis Sanitation, LLC" on Justia Law

A contract by a public agency that exceeds the agency's statutory powers is void and will not support an award of attorney fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (a).The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's award of fees, concluding that section 1717 does not apply to a void contract. In LAFCO I, the court had concluded that LAFCO was not authorized by statute to make the indemnity agreement. The court explained that, where a public agency is not authorized to make an agreement, the agreement is void and the public agency may neither enforce nor be liable on the contract. It follows that the public agency is not liable for attorney fees based on section 1717. The court rejected Central Coast's contention that the doctrine of in pari delicto applies to allow enforcement of the contract. View "San Luis Obispo Local Agency Formation Commission v. Central Coast Development Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased tickets for Defendant’s commercial flights from Miami to Venezuela. Plaintiffs allege that their ticket prices reflected the “fully-paid contract” and that Defendant failed to sufficiently disclose any other fees required for passage. When checking in for their flights at the airport, however, Defendant informed Plaintiffs that they had to pay an additional $80 “Exit Fee” before being allowed to board their flights. Plaintiffs filed a breach of contract putative class action.The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that the Airline Deregulation Act preempted Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim because it related to the price of the airline ticket and the Act’s preemption provision identifies actions relating to price as preempted. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, first holding that the Plaintiffs plausibly alleged facts that would establish diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim seeks merely to enforce the parties’ private agreements regarding the cost of passage and does not invoke state laws or regulations to alter the agreed-upon price. The statute, 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1), provides: “[A] State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier..” The suit falls within the category of cases protected from preemption by Supreme Court precedent. View "Cavalieri v. Avior Airlines C.A." on Justia Law

Landmark issued a “deductible buyback” insurance policy, covering SCD properties. SCD’s high-deductible primary insurance policy was issued by Lexington. The Landmark policy covers damage also covered by Lexington and states: “Perils Covered: Windstorm or Hail associated with a Named Storm,” following the Lexington policy's Named Storm definition: “a storm that has been declared by the National Weather Service to be a Hurricane, Typhoon, Tropical Cyclone, Tropical Storm, or Tropical Depression.” In August 2017, Hurricane Harvey, a “Named Storm,” under the Lexington and Landmark policies, caused tremendous flooding damage to one of SCD’s insured properties. There was no reported wind damage to the property nor evidence that the property suffered damage from hail. The Lexington policy paid out millions of dollars for loss in excess of the “Windstorm deductible” in that policy,Landmark sought a declaration that SCD’s policy did not apply to the loss sustained. The Fifth Circuit reversed a judgment in favor of SCD and rendered judgment for Landmark. If SCD’s interpretation of the policy were correct, then the Landmark policy simply could have stated that all damage from a Named Storm is covered (regardless of the peril that caused the damage). The policy does not state that but frames its coverage as applying to specific “[c]overed perils.” View "Landmark American Insurance Co. v. SCD Memorial Place II, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a defendant seeking an award of attorney fees and costs in a lawsuit filed by a married plaintiff does not need to join the plaintiff's spouse to later execute a judgment for fees and costs against the plaintiff's community assets.The trial court entered judgment judgment for Shamrock Materials, LLC and an LLC member and her husband (collectively, Shamrock) in this action brought by Kristi Lattin, "a married woman dealing with her own separate property." The court further awarded Shamrock attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party. Shamrock sought to garnish a bank account jointly owned by Lattin and her husband, Robert DeRuiter, a non-party. The trial court quashed Shamrock's garnishment on Wells Fargo Bank to pay funds held in the joint bank account because the judgment was not entered against DeRuiter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Ariz. Rev. Stat. 25-215(D) did not require Shamrock to join DeRuiter in the case to execute its judgment for attorney fees and costs against community assets. View "Lattin v. Shamrock Materials LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Ahhmigo, LLC's motion to vacate the arbitrator's ruling in favor of The Synergy Company of Utah, LLC in this breach of contract proceeding, holding that the district court did not err.Ahhmigo filed a complaint and demand for arbitration against Synergy, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and other climes. Synergy agreed to arbitrate Ahhmigo's claims, and the arbitrator ruled in favor of Synergy. Ahhmigo moved the district court to vacate the arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator had manifestly disregarded the law. The district court denied the motion and confirmed the arbitration award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that this Court will not reach the question presented on appeal because Ahhmigo did not raise it in the district court. View "Ahhmigo, LLC v. Synergy Co. of Utah, LLC" on Justia Law