The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court refusing to compel arbitration in this case alleging violations of the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va. Code 5-11-1 to -20, holding that the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) could not enforce the arbitration agreement.Plaintiff, a nurse who formerly worked for Sunbelt Staffing, LLC, signed an employment agreement containing an arbitration provision. Plaintiff was assigned to work at a hospital under DHHR's direction but later was informed she was not eligible to return to work for DHHR. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against DHHR and others, alleging violations of the Act. DHHR moved to dismiss the amended complaint and to compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) DHHR had no right to invoke arbitration contained in the employment agreement; and (2) the theory of estoppel did not require arbitration. View "W. Va. Department of Health & Human Resources v. Denise" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against HealthEast and others, alleging multiple causes of action related to peer review determinations stemming from his practice of neurosurgery. After the district court granted defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, three claims remained against appellees: defamation, tortious interference with prospective economic relationship, and tortious interference with contract. Appellees moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims and the district court granted their motion.As to the defamation claims, the Eighth Circuit concluded that only three statements are before the court on appeal because plaintiff did not amend his complaint to incorporate the additional allegedly defamatory statements identified during discovery and, given the requirement that defamation claims be pleaded with specificity, only the statements included in the amended complaint can form the basis of plaintiff's claim. As to the first remaining statement, the court concluded that it was waived. In regard to the two remaining statements, the court concluded that Minnesota peer review immunity applies.As to the tortious interference claims, the court concluded that to the extent these alleged interferences occurred solely through the peer review process itself, appellees are entitled to peer review immunity. In the event peer review immunity does not fully shield appellees, these claims failed on the merits. Accordingly, the district court properly concluded that appellees were entitled to summary judgment on all of plaintiff's claims, and the court affirmed its judgment. View "Sherr v. HealthEast Care System" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the superior court denying Defendants' appeal of a superior court order denying their "motion to vacate" a foreign judgment rendered in New York, which was brought in accordance with the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, chapter 32 of title 9 of the Rhode Island General Laws, holding that the superior court did not err.In denying Defendants' motion to vacate, the hearing justice concluded that Defendants did not meet their "heavy burden" to overturn the New York default judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) New York law must be applied in addressing the forgery argument presented by Defendants; (2) applying New York law, Defendants failed to meet their burden of rebutting the presumption of due execution accompanying acknowledgements and notarial signatures, and therefore, the subject forum selection clause was valid; and (3) the New York court had personal jurisdiction over Defendants. View "Aspen American Insurance Co. v. East Coast Precast & Rigging LLC" on Justia Law

Donald Zucker appealed a summary-judgment decision awarding attorney’s fees to Gregory Wark, because Zucker refused to mediate a dispute arising out of a real estate purchase and sale agreement. On appeal, Zucker argued he was not required to mediate because the purchase and sale agreement was not an enforceable contract. To this, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed, reversed the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment, and vacated the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. View "Zucker v. Wark" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court denying Aerotek, Inc.'s motion to compel arbitration, holding that an alleged signatory's simple denial that he signed the record was insufficient to prevent attribution of an electronic signature to him.Plaintiffs, four individuals, were hired by Aerotek to work as contractors on a construction project. After all four were terminated, they sued Aerotek and others for racial discrimination and retaliation. Aerotek moved to compel arbitration based on an online-only hiring application that each employee had completed. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that they had completed the online hiring application but denying that they had ever seen or signed a mutual arbitration agreement (MAA) within the application. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting Aerotek's argument that it had conclusively established the validity of the MAAs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Aerotek conclusively established that Plaintiffs signed, and therefore consented to, the MAAs; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred in denying Aerotek's motion to compel arbitration. View "Aerotek, Inc. v. Boyd" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing in part the ruling of the district court that Plaintiff was the prevailing party entitled to fees, holding that when a plaintiff recovers less at trial than the amount of a rejected offer to confess judgment, Iowa Code 677.10.bars recovery of the plaintiff's attorney fees incurred after the offer.The parties litigated claims over the breach of a farm lease entitling the "prevailing party" to recover reasonable attorney fees. Plaintiff's presuit demand was $190,564, and Defendant made a pretrial offer to confess judgment for $75,000. Plaintiff rejected the offer. The case proceeded to trial, and the jury awarded Plaintiff just over $41,000. Both sides sought attorney fees, and the district court granted them to Plaintiff. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that a plaintiff recovering less than the amount of the offer to confess cannot recover postoffer attorney attorney fees that are taxed as costs under Iowa Code 625.25. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) prevailing party contractual fees are considered "costs" when determining the effect of an offer to confess judgment; and (2) Iowa Code sections 677.10 and 625.22 operated together to preclude recover of Plaintiff's attorney fees incurred after it rejected the offer to confess judgment. View "NCJC, Inc. v. WMG, L.C." on Justia Law

In 2009, Carhartt contracted with Innovative to create a flame-resistant fleece fabric for use in its line of flame-resistant garments. The fabric that Innovative developed for Carhartt, “Style 2015," contained a modacrylic fiber, “Protex-C.” Innovative agreed that it would conduct flame-resistance testing on the Style 2015 fabric before shipping it to Carhartt, using the industry-standard test, ASTM D6413. Carhartt sent Innovative emails in 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 stating that Carhartt would do “regular, random testing on the product that is received.” Carhartt performed visual inspections but did not conduct flame-resistance testing until 2016. The Style 2015 fabric failed the D6413 test. Carhartt notified Innovative, which then conducted its own testing and concluded that Style 2015 fabrics dating back to 2014 did not pass flame-resistance testing. In 2013, Innovative stopped using Protex-C and began using a different modacrylic fiber without notice to Carhartt.The district court granted Innovative summary judgment on Carhartt’s negligence, fraud, misrepresentation, false advertising claims. breach of contract and warranty claims. The court reasoned that Carhartt did not notify Innovative of the suspected breach within a reasonable amount of time after Carhartt should have discovered the defect, as required by Michigan’s Uniform Commercial Code. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Reasonable minds could differ as to whether Carhartt should have discovered the breach sooner by performing regular, destructive fire-resistance testing on the fabric. View "Carhartt, Inc. v. Innovative Textiles, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court awarding Appellees attorney fees pursuant to a provision of a contract under which they sued, holding that the claim for contractual attorney fees was governed in this case by Georgia law.The contract at issue in this case contained a choice of law provision requiring contractual disputes to be governed by Georgia law. Appellants sued Appellees in Utah, alleging breach of contract. Appellees moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. Appellees then filed a motion seeking recovery of attorney fees. In response, Appellants argued that Georgia law should govern the attorney fee provision just as it did the rest of the contract. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Appellees were entitled to attorney fees under the law of either jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the matter of contractual attorney fees is substantive for choice of law purposes; and (2) applying Georgia law, Appellants failed to show that the district court erred in awarding Appellees attorney fees. View "1600 Barberry Lane 8 LLC v. Cottonwood Residential L.P." on Justia Law

Pillar hired Epiphyte to convert its cryptocurrency into Euros. Epiphyte informed Pillar that it used Payward’s online exchange to convert its clients’ cryptocurrencies. Pillar transferred its cryptocurrency into Epiphyte’s account on Payward’s platform. After Epiphyte converted the currency but before the exchanged funds were transferred to Pillar’s bank account, four million Euros belonging to Pillar were stolen from Epiphyte’s account.Pillar sued Payward, alleging Payward knew or should have known that Epiphyte was using its Payward account on Pillar's behalf, failed to use standard security measures that would have prevented the theft, and falsely advertised that it provided the best security in the business. Payward moved to compel arbitration, claiming that Epiphyte agreed to Payward’s “Terms of Service” when it created an account, as required for all users, that those Terms included an arbitration agreement, and that Pillar was bound by that agreement.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of Payward’s motion. There is no evidence Epiphyte was acting as Pillar’s agent when it agreed to the Terms two years before Pillar hired it or that the agency relationship automatically bound the principal to the agent’s prior acts. There is no evidence Pillar knew the arbitration agreements existed or had a right to rescind them. No ratification occurred. There was no intent to benefit Pillar or similar parties. Pillar’s claims are not inextricably intertwined with the Terms. View "Pillar Project AG v. Payward Ventures, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging that he improperly obtained money and property from plaintiffs' deceased parents. The trial court concluded that defendant was unjustly enriched and entered judgment in plaintiffs' favor for more than $34 million. The parents had executed powers of attorney granting defendant authority to act on their behalf in reclaiming and selling properties in Iran. Plaintiffs contend that defendant conspired with another individual to steal their parents' properties and defraud them out of tens of millions of dollars.The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the trial court properly denied defendant's renewed motion for inconvenient forum where the law of the case doctrine applies here; plaintiffs' claims are not barred by the statute of limitations; the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing discovery sanctions on defendant; and the trial court properly awarded plaintiffs equitable relief. View "Aghaian v. Minassian" on Justia Law