The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court finding that Lola Urban had superior title to certain real estate and was entitled to have her son, Richard Urban, ejected from the property, holding that the district court erred.Francis and Lola Urban sold a quarter section of land to Richard by means of an installment land contract. Years later, Lola, as trustee of Francis' testamentary trust and as an individual, filed suit against Richard seeking to compel Richard to specifically perform his obligations under the contract. Lola requested that if Richard failed to pay the balance owed the property be foreclosed. Lola then amended her complaint to assert an alternative claim for ejection of Richard from the property. The district court found that Lola was barred from foreclosing on the property under the applicable statute of limitations but was entitled to have Richard ejected from the property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute of limitations and the doctrine of adverse possession precluded the use of ejectment. View "Beckner v. Urban" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's judgment dismissing Plaintiff's second lawsuit, holding that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar the lawsuit.Plaintiff originally filed suit against Defendant in the Circuit Court for Shelby County, but, unbeknownst to the parties, the trial court sua sponte dismissed the lawsuit for failure to prosecute. Ten months later, Plaintiff learned of the dismissal and filed a motion to set aside the dismissal. The trial court denied the motion but entered an order stating that the dismissal did not bar Plaintiff from refiling its lawsuit. When Plaintiff subsequently refiled its lawsuit, the trial court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of res judicata. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and vacated the judgment of the trial court, holding that the involuntary dismissal of the first suit for failure to prosecute did not operate as an adjudication on the merits, and therefore, the present lawsuit was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. View "Regions Bank v. Prager" on Justia Law

The city of Puyallup (City) hired Conway Construction Company to build a road. The contract allowed the City to terminate the contract early either for its convenience or on Conway’s default, but a termination for convenience would result in more costs for the City. The City ended up terminating the contract partway through construction, claiming Conway defaulted. After a lengthy bench trial, the trial court concluded that Conway was not in default when the City terminated the contract and converted the termination into one for convenience. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. Further, the Court held that the City was not entitled to an offset for any defective work discovered after termination because the City did not provide Conway with the contractually required notice and opportunity to cure. View "Conway Constr. Co. v. City of Puyallup" on Justia Law

After he sent a sexually explicit text message to a customer, the other members of Synergies expelled Jeffery White as a member of the company. White and White Communications filed suit against Synergies, claiming that the expulsion was a breach of the assumption agreement and the operating agreement between the parties. At trial, the jury found in favor of White Communications on its breach of implied contract claim, but found in favor of Synergies on all other claims.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of White's motion for judgment as a matter of law because the jury had a legally-sufficient basis to find that Synergies terminated him for cause. In this case, it was within the purview of the jury to determine whether White's actions led to instant or deferred irreparable harm to Synergies' reputation or its economic interests. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting prior bad acts evidence of defendant's previously-sent texts of the same nature. Furthermore, there was no abuse of discretion in permitting alleged hearsay evidence to show its impact on the listener. The court further concluded that the district court did not err by denying White's motion for a new trial where there is more than sufficient evidence to support the finding in favor of Synergies on the breach of contract claim. Finally, the court upheld the jury's award of damages on plaintiff's breach of implied contract claim. View "White Communications, LLC v. Synergies3 Tec Services, LLC" on Justia Law

In this dispute regarding a $10.5 million loan from Comerica Bank to Masters Group International, Inc. and Masters' eventually default on that loan, the Supreme Court reversed the June 12, 2020 decision and order on attorney fees and affirmed the November 8, 2019 decision of the district court and the accompanying June 17, 2020 judgment, holding that the attorney fees award was in error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court's determination under Michigan law that Comerica breached the parties' forbearance agreement causing Masters to suffer contract damages was supported by substantial evidence; (2) the district court correctly found that Comerica did not affirmatively plead a defense of setoff or recoupment; (3) the district court's determination under Michigan law that Masters was entitled to prejudgment interest was legally correct; (4) because the parties' agreement did not provide for Masters to recover attorney fees and because Michigan did not have a reciprocal attorney fees statute, the district court erred by awarding Masters attorney fees; (5) Masters was not entitled under Michigan law to recover damages for lost profits or the lost value of a United Kingdom business; and (6) the district court did not err in limiting Masters' award of costs to the amount allowed by statute. View "Masters Group v. Comerica Bank" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that the district court, and not the arbitrator, was to decide whether the parties' dispute was subject to arbitration, holding that the district court correctly concluded that the parties' dispute was not subject to arbitration.Glacier Park Iron Ore Properties, LLC alleged that United States Steel Corporation (U.S. Steel) aided and abetted a breach of the fiduciary duty of Great Northern Iron Ore Properties Trust and sought recession of a lease that U.S. Steel signed with the Trust. Glacier Park filed a motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration and to compel the parties to engage in arbitration. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the court, not arbitrators, should decide the meaning of the arbitration clause at issue in this case and, thus, the arbitrability of the dispute. The district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because there was not clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended to delegate arbitrability to the arbitrator, whether the parties' breach of fiduciary claim was arbitrable was a question for the court. View "Glacier Park Iron Ore Properties, LLC, v. United States Steel Corp." on Justia Law

National filed suit against Universal and its parent company, Ally, for breach of contract and other claims after Universal terminated National's non-exclusive right to represent Universal's vehicle warranty program. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Universal and dismissed National's claims.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the termination provision and the representative-fee provision in the 2003 Universal Rep. Agreement unambiguously ended National's entitlement to post-termination representative fees. The court also rejected National's attempt to prove its entitlement to ongoing post-termination representative fees under the 2003 Universal Rep. Agreement via extrinsic evidence—Universal's continued payment of post-termination representative fees under the 2003 VehicleOne Rep. Agreement. The court further concluded that National's fraudulent concealment and negligent misrepresentation claims fail where the terms of the contracts created non-exclusive, limited grants of authority to National, as an independent contractor, that could be terminated at will by either party with sixty days' notice. Therefore, to the extent the alleged statements contradicted these terms, National could not reasonably rely on them under Nebraska law. Finally, National's claims for unjust enrichment and breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing failed because they both depend on its assertion that the district court misinterpreted the effect of termination of the 2003 Universal Rep. Agreement. View "B. Thomas and Co. v. Universal Warranty Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying doTERRA International, LLC's motion for partial summary judgment asserting that Jessica Kruger, who sought, among other things, punitive damages based on doTERRA's failure to warn about the potential dangers of its product, waived the right to seek punitive damages, holding that the trial court correctly denied doTERRA's motion for summary judgment.Kruger, a doTERRA International, LLC distributor, applied a doTERRA product to her skin before visiting a tanning salon and was later diagnosed with second and third-degree chemical burns. doTERRA filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Kruger was contractually restricted from seeking punitive damages because she had waived her ability to claim punitive damages in the agreement she signed to become a doTERRA distributor. The Supreme Court affirmed but vacated the district court's reference to doTERRA's contract as one of adhesion, holding that because the waiver in doTERRA's agreement was neither clear nor unambiguous Kruger did not waive her right to sue doTERRA for punitive damages arising out of a personal injury. View "doTERRA v. Kruger" on Justia Law

Boykin, a 73-year-old African-American veteran, worked in managerial roles for Family Dollar Stores. On July 8, 2018, Boykin had a dispute with a customer. Family Dollar fired Boykin weeks later. Boykin sued, alleging age and race discrimination. Family Dollar moved to compel arbitration, introducing a declaration that Family Dollar employees must take online training sessions, including a session about arbitration. When taking online courses, employees use their own unique ID and password. During the arbitration session, they must review and accept Family Dollar’s arbitration agreement. According to Family Dollar, Boykin completed the session on July 15, 2013. Boykin replied under oath that he did not consent to or acknowledge an arbitration agreement at any time, that he had no recollection of taking the arbitration session, and that no one ever told him that arbitration was a condition of his employment. Boykin requested his personnel file, which did not include an arbitration agreement. The district court granted Family Dollar’s motion.The Sixth Circuit reversed. Although the Federal Arbitration Act requires a court to summarily compel arbitration upon a party’s request, the court may do so only if the opposing side has not put the making of the arbitration contract “in issue.” 9 U.S.C. 4. Boykin’s evidence created a genuine issue of fact over whether he electronically accepted the contract or otherwise learned of Family Dollar’s arbitration policy. View "Boykin v. Family Dollar Stores of Michigan, LLC" on Justia Law

The Sellers bought an Oakland property to “flip.” After Vega renovated the property, they sold it to Vera, providing required disclosures, stating they were not aware of any water intrusion, leaks from the sewer system or any pipes, work, or repairs that had been done without permits or not in compliance with building codes, or any material facts or defects that had not otherwise been disclosed. Vera’s own inspectors revealed several problems. The Sellers agreed to several repairs Escrow closed in December 2011, but the sewer line had not been corrected. In January 2012, water flooded the basement. The Sellers admitted that earlier sewer work had been completed without a permit and that Vega was unlicensed. In 2014, the exterior stairs began collapsing. Three years and three days after the close of escrow, Vera filed suit, alleging negligence, breach of warranty, breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. Based on the three-year limitations period for actions based on fraud or mistake, the court dismissed and, based on a clause in the purchase contract, granted SNL attorney’s fees, including fees related to a cross-complaint against Vera’s broker and real estate agent.The court of appeal affirmed. Vera’s breach of contract claim was based on fraud and the undisputed facts demonstrated Vera’s claims based on fraud accrued more than three years before she filed suit. Vera has not shown the court abused its discretion in awarding fees related to the cross-complaint. View "Vera v. REL-BC, LLC" on Justia Law