When the first Covid-19 cases appeared in Georgia, the governor declared a public state of emergency. Plaintiff’s restaurant played its part by suspending dine-in service. To recover the income, it was losing by closing its doors, Plaintiff quickly filed a claim with its insurer, Allied Insurance Company of America. Under Plaintiff’s “Premier Businessowners Property Coverage” policy, Allied agreed to “pay for direct physical loss of or damage to Covered Property” if it was “caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause of Loss.”   Allied denied coverage. It found that Plaintiff’s closure was not caused by any “direct physical loss or damage.” And under the policy’s Virus or Bacteria exclusion, Allied refused to “pay for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly” by any “virus.” The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. It held that no “direct physical loss of or damage to” property occurred because the restaurant and its dining room “underwent no physical change.”   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that the harm does not extend to the intangible harm caused by Covid-19 or by a declaration of public emergency issued in its wake. Plaintiff alleged no actual change to its property. Even if the court assumed that the governor’s Covid-19 order caused loss because it deprived the restaurant of the use of its property, that does not result in a win for Plainitff. Allied agreed to provide for only one manner of loss—the physical loss of Henry’s property and to be physical it must be “tangible or concrete.” View "Henry's Louisiana Grill, Inc., et al v. Allied Insurance Company of America" on Justia Law

After a construction project fell through, Plaintiff sued Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration. At issue in this case is whether the party who signed the contract on behalf of Plaintiff had authority to do so. The district court concluded they did not and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.The Eighth Circuit found that the signing party neither had actual or apparent authority to sign the contract containing the arbitration agreement. Apparent authority is created by the conduct of the principal, not of the agent. View "GP3 II, LLC v. Litong Capital, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the application the Fair Practices of Equipment Manufacturers, Distributors, Wholesalers, and Dealers Act, Tex. Bus. & Com. Code 57.001-.402, in this case did not violate the constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws in Tex. Const. art. I, 16.In the 1990s, Fire Protection Service, Inc. (FPS), orally agreed to be an authorized dealer and servicer of the life rafts manufactured by Survitec Survival Products, Inc. Nearly six years after the promulgation of the Act, which prohibits a supplier from terminating a dealer agreement without good cause, Survitec notified FPS that it was terminating their relationship. FPS sued for a violation of the Act. The district court entered judgment for Survitec. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that the application of the Act to the parties' agreement does not violate the retroactivity clause in article I, section 16. View "Fire Protection Service, Inc. v. Survitec Survival Products, Inc." on Justia Law

Daniel Hsu (Daniel) asked the Court of Appeal to reverse the trial court’s decision denying him need-based attorney fees under California Family Code section 2030. This case was a marriage dissolution proceeding between Daniel and Christine Nakamoto (Christine; together, the spouses). But the dispute at issue was between Daniel and his two siblings, Charleson Hsu (Chau) and Melissa Hsu See (Melissa). After their parents passed away, Daniel claimed Chau was concealing a portion of his inheritance. The siblings met to discuss Daniel’s claims and reached an agreement at the meeting, which Daniel documented on a two-page handwritten memorandum. Among other things, the Handwritten Agreement stated Daniel was to be paid $4 million. Several months later, the three siblings executed a formal Compromise Agreement for Structured Settlement. The Compromise Agreement contained many of the terms set forth in the Handwritten Agreement but did not mention the $4 million payment. The spouses claimed Daniel was never paid the $4 million, which would have been a community asset, and that it was still owed to Daniel under the Handwritten Agreement. Chau and Melissa argued the Handwritten Agreement was not a binding contract and that Daniel had already been paid $4 million through a separate transaction outside the Compromise Agreement. Chau, Melissa, and several business entities they owned (together, claimants) were involuntarily joined to this dissolution proceeding to settle this dispute. At trial, the primary question facing the lower court was whether the Handwritten Agreement or the Compromise Agreement was the enforceable contract. The court found in favor of claimants, ruling the Compromise Agreement was enforceable while the Handwritten Agreement was not. Meanwhile, over the course of Daniel’s litigation against claimants, the court awarded him $140,000 in attorney fees under section 2030. After the court issued a tentative ruling finding the Handwritten Agreement was not enforceable, Daniel requested an additional $50,000 for attorney fees incurred during trial plus another $30,000 to appeal. The court denied his request. The Court of Appeal found no error in the attorney fees ruling. View "Marriage of Nakamoto and Hsu" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying SR Construction, Inc.'s motion to compel arbitration because its master subcontract agreement (MSA) with Peek Brothers Construction, Inc. constituted a valid arbitration provision that applied to the parties' underlying dispute, holding that the dispute was arbitrable.On appeal, SR argued that the district court erred in holding that the underlying dispute fell outside the bounds of the parties' arbitration agreement.The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding (1) as applied, the MSA provision was broad, and an attendant presumption of arbitrability applied; and (2) Peek's dispute was presumptively arbitrable under the parties' agreement. View "SR Construction, Inc. v. Peek Brothers Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

The Knights of Columbus (“the Order” or “the KCs”) offers insurance products to its members. To promote and sell these insurance products, the Order contracts with Field Agents (“FAs”) and General Agents (“GAs”). FAs promote and sell insurance products to prospective customers, and GAs recruit and oversee FAs within a specified territory.  Plaintiff began selling insurance for the Order in 2006 as an FA. He worked in that capacity until he became a GA.   He brought suit against the KCs alleging breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith, and wage payment law violations. The district court dismissed each of the claims for failure to state a claim.   The Fifth Circuit partly disagreed and thus reversed in part and affirmed in part.  The court reversed the district court’s holding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon relief which can be granted regarding a breach of contract in relation to Section 4 of the GA contract, Section 6 of the FA contracts to which he was a party, and Section 7(c) of Plaintiff’s original FA contract reversed the district court’s holding that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in relation to the performance of Section 4 of the GA contract and Section 6 of the FA contracts. The court also reversed the district court’s holdings that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under both the Connecticut and Louisiana wage payment laws. The court affirmed the remainder of the district court’s judgment, including the dismissal of Plaintiff’s equitable claims. View "Ottemann v. Knights of Columbus" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s summary judgment dismissal of the breach of contract claims that he has asserted, as a third-party beneficiary, against Defendant. The district court determined that the insurer’s duty to defend its insured, on which Plaintiff’s claims were based, was never triggered, relative to Plaintiff’s underlying personal injury suit, because the insured, N.F. Painting, Inc., never requested a defense or sought coverage.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed finding no error in the district court’s assessment under Texas law. The court explained that it is well-established, that under Texas law, despite having knowledge and opportunity, an insurer is not required to simply interject itself into a proceeding on its insured’s behalf.   Here, as stated, N.F. Painting did not seek defense or coverage from Defendant when it was served with Plaintiff’s original state court petition. The undisputed facts show that N.F. Painting chose, with the assistance of counsel, to handle Plaintiff’s personal injury claims in its own way, without involving Defendantin its defense, as it was entitled to do. And Plaintiff has put forth no evidence suggesting that Defendant was not entitled to rely on that decision. Having made that decision, it is N.F. Painting, and thus Plaintiff, as third-party beneficiary, not Defendant who must bear responsibility for any resulting adverse consequences. In other words, the law will not permit a third-party beneficiary to simply disregard an insured’s litigation decisions, i.e., essentially re-write history, merely because he has no other means of satisfying his judgment against the insured. View "Moreno v. Sentinel Ins" on Justia Law

Defendant, owner and developer of two undeveloped parcels of land, entered into a consulting services agreement with Plaintiff for each parcel. After Plaintiff obtained the necessary approvals from the City of Frederick and otherwise performed the services he was hired to do, Defendant refused payment because it had neither sold the parcels nor elected to build on them, which, it claimed, were conditions precedent to payment. The district court rejected Defendant’s argument and others similar to it and found that it had breached the agreements in refusing payment.   On appeal, Defendant argued that he district court erred (1) in finding that the developer breached the consulting agreements when conditions precedent to compensation were not satisfied; (2) in rejecting its impossibility of performance defense; (3) in applying principles of unjust enrichment in connection with a claim based on a contract; and (4) in calculating unjust enrichment damages.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling and rejected each of Defendant’s challenges. The court concluded that a reasonably prudent person would read the relevant provisions to give them one meaning as relevant to the issues here — that Plaintiff was to be compensated for his “obtaining the Approvals for the Proposed Use,” and that there was no other conditions precedent for earning compensation. Further, the impossibility doctrine is irrelevant to Defendant’s obligation to compensate Plaintiff. Further, Maryland courts provide several exceptions to the unjust enrichment bar, one of which addresses the circumstances here “when the express contract does not fully address a subject matter.” View "Byron Martz v. Day Development Company, L.C." on Justia Law

Ernest Jones appealed a circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Board of Trustees of the State of Institutions of Higher Learning of the State of Mississippi (IHL) because the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred his claims. Jones became the head football coach at Alcorn State University. Subsequently, he filed a breach of contract action against the IHL on in 2008. Jones was fired in January 2009. In October 2015, Jones petitioned a bankruptcy court in Florida for protection from his creditors. Jones failed to disclose the breach of contract suit against the IHL in the bankruptcy schedule’s “list of suits and administrative proceedings to which the debtor was a party within one year immediately preceding the filing of this bankruptcy case.” A jury returned a verdict in Jones’ favor in his breach of contract suit. On the day of the verdict, he voluntarily dismissed his bankruptcy proceeding. IHL moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the circuit court set aside the verdict. Then in April 2017, while Jones’s appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, he filed a second bankruptcy petition, this time, Jones proposed and filed a Chapter 13 plan. Despite the pending appeal, Jones again failed to disclose the IHL suit to the bankruptcy court, attesting under oath that no such claims existed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the IHL suit. Back at the circuit court, IHL moved for summary judgment, arguing judicial estoppel barred Jones from recovery. Within ten days of the IHL’s seeking dismissal, Jones moved to amend his bankruptcy plan and for the first time disclosed the IHL lawsuit. Thereafter, the circuit court held a hearing on the IHL’s motion for summary judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court found no abuse of the circuit court’s discretion in applying judicial estoppel to the facts found in this record. View "Jones v. Alcorn State University, et al." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment for Arch Insurance Co. and dismissing this diversity case brought by Graphic Builders, LLC, a general contractor, seeking to enforce a performance bond issued by Arch as surety for a subcontractor hired to work on a major project for Graphic, holding that the district court did not err.On appeal, Graphic argued that the district court erred in concluding that Arch's obligation to provide the warranty performance it sought was conditioned on termination of the subcontractor and that both the bond's language and relevant precedent supported its position. The First Circuit disagreed and affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment for Arch. View "Arch Insurance Co. v. Graphic Builders LLC" on Justia Law