Anderson, the lead plaintiff in a putative class action against her life insurance provider, Wilco, alleged that in 2011-2016, the company breached the terms of her universal life insurance policy by increasing her monthly rate for impermissible reasons. Her policy provides for a “guaranteed maximum monthly cost of insurance rate” and a “current monthly cost of insurance rate.” The guaranteed rate is calculated “based on” Anderson’s “age, sex, and premium class.” The current rate, by contrast, “will be determined by the Company” but cannot exceed the guaranteed rate. As a typical universal life insurance policy, Anderson’s policy was a hybrid investment vehicle and life insurance policy. As her policy aged, Wilco began to increase Anderson’s current rate sharply; her policy’s accumulation value (essentially the investment earnings from which Anderson could cover her monthly payments) was wiped out, and Anderson failed to make the monthly payments out-of-pocket. Her policy lapsed, and Anderson sued.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her complaint. The policy gave Wilco discretion to set Anderson’s current rate as long as that rate was less than the guaranteed rate and unambiguously gave Wilco discretion to set Anderson’s current monthly rate. View "Anderson v. Wilco Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

One beverage distributorship sued another and ultimately narrowed its lawsuit to a single tort claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage premised solely on the theory that the defendant had engaged in independently wrongful conduct by breaching a nondisclosure and non-circumvention agreement. This is an invalid theory as a matter of law under California Supreme Court precedent; an actor’s breach of contract, without more, is not “wrongful conduct” capable of supporting a tort, including the tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. No one caught the error until the jury returned a special verdict in the plaintiff’s favor that was premised solely on the breach of the agreement.The court of appeal reversed. A jury’s special verdict for the plaintiff, based on conduct that does not constitute an actionable tort, cannot stand. Just as a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to enter judgment for conduct that does not violate a criminal or civil statute, a trial court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction to enter judgment for allegedly tortious conduct, fashioned by common law, that the state’s highest court has determined is not tortious. A party’s conduct cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon a court, so the defendant’s delay in objecting is irrelevant. View "Drink Tank Ventures LLC v. Real Soda in Real Bottles, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of felony sexual intercourse without consent, holding that Defendant received constitutionally effective assistance of counsel.At issue was whether Defendant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when counsel allowed prior consistent statements from a forensic interview into evidence without challenge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the record before the Court implied at least a plausible justification for counsel's actions; and (2) without more evidence, it cannot be determined whether defense counsel did not perform effectively for Defendant. View "State v. Mikesell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the district court concluding that Appellant was not entitled to underinsured motorist (UIM) and medical payment (MP) coverages under his automobile policy with USAA Casualty Insurance Company, holding that the court erred in part.The district court granted summary judgment for USAA on both coverages. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) as to the UIM coverage, the district court erred by interpreting the contract and determining its terms were not contrary to public policy; and (2) as to the MP coverage, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of USAA. View "Goss v. USAA Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellees Darrell Reeves and James King worked as welding inspectors for Enterprise Products Partners through third party staffing companies, Cypress Environmental Management and Kestrel Field Services. Reeves brought a collective action claim to recover unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act. King later consented to join the putative collective action and was added as a named plaintiff. Enterprise argued that both Reeves and King signed employment contracts with their respective staffing companies that contained arbitration clauses for disputes. The Tenth Circuit found that indeed both plaintiffs’ respective contracts contained arbitration clauses, and that under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, these agreements require the claims to be resolved in arbitration. “Because Reeves and James’s claims allege substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by Enterprise and non-defendant signatories, Cypress and Kestrel, arbitration should be compelled for these claims.” The Court reversed the district court’s denial of Enterprise’s motions to compel. View "Reeves, et al. v. Enterprise Products Partners" on Justia Law

In case no. 1190816, appellant-plaintiff SE Property Holdings, LLC ("SEPH"), appealed a circuit court's denial of its petition seeking to hold appellee-defendant David Harrell in contempt for failing to comply with the trial court's postjudgment charging order entered in a previous action involving the parties and its failure to hold a hearing on its contempt petition. In case no. 1190814, SEPH petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, seeking the same relief. The Supreme Court consolidated the proceedings ex mero motu. In case no. 1190816, the Supreme Court found nothing in the record indicating that a hearing was held or that, if one was held, Harrell was "notified ... of the time and place for the hearing on the petition." Thus, in case no. 1190816, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. Case 1190814 was dismissed. View "Ex parte SE Property Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against Intermountain GeoEnvironmental Services, Inc. (IGES), holding that the court of appeals correctly construed the Economic Loss Statute, Utah Code 78B-4-513(1) to (2), to reach Plaintiffs' negligence claims.After moving into their home, Plaintiffs discovered that the walls and foundation were cracking due to "failure surfaces" in the soil approximately sixty-five feet beneath their home. Plaintiffs brought suit against IGES, a geotechnical engineering firm that provided a geotechnical report stating that the site was safe for residential construction, asserting a variety of tort and contract claims. The district court dismissed the claims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiffs brought an action for defective design, and therefore, the Economic Loss Statute applied and barred Plaintiffs' negligence claims; and (2) the court of appeals did not err in failing to analyze whether a common law independent duty exception applied to their claims because no common law exception was available. View "Hayes v. Intermountain GeoEnvironmental Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Union Square owns the San Francisco building where Saks has operated a store since 1991. The lease's initial 25-year term was followed by successive options to renew; it mandates arbitration to determine Fair Market Rent for renewals. Section 3.1(c)(iv) states that “[e]ach party shall share equally the fees and expenses of the arbitrator. The attorneys’ fees and expenses of counsel for the respective parties and of witnesses shall be paid by the respective party engaging such counsel or calling such witnesses.” Section 23.10 permits a prevailing party to recover costs, expenses, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, “Should either party institute any action or proceeding to enforce this Lease ... or for damages by reason of any alleged breach ... or for a declaration of rights hereunder,The parties arbitrated a rent dispute in 2017. The trial court vacated the First Award, in favor of Union Square. To avoid re-arbitration, Union Square sought mandamus relief, which was summarily denied. While discussions concerning another arbitration were pending, Union Square filed a superior court motion to appoint the second arbitrator. The court-appointed arbitrator ruled in favor of Saks.The court of appeal affirmed the orders vacating the First Award and confirming the Second Award. Saks sought $1 million in attorneys’ fees for “litigation proceedings arising out of the arbitration,” not for the arbitrations themselves, citing Section 23.10. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the motion. Each party agreed to bear its own attorneys’ fees for all proceedings related to settling any disagreement around Fair Market Rent under Section 3.1(c). View "California Union Square L.P. v. Saks & Company LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the outcome relating to litigation concerning a loan agreement in the District of Puerto Rico in which the district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiff on its Puerto Rico law claims and dismissed Defendant's Puerto Rico law counterclaims for failure to state a claim, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.Specifically, the First Circuit held (1) this Court had appellate jurisdiction to hear this case under 28 U.S.C. 1291, and there was no other jurisdictional hurdle as to this appeal; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion for jurisdictional discovery; and (3) the district court did not err in dismissing one of Defendant's counterclaims. View "Bautista Cayman Asset Co. v. Asociacion De Miembros De La Policía De Puerto Rico" on Justia Law

In 1993, the County and the Orange County Employee Retirement System (OCERS) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), allowing the County to access surplus investment earnings controlled by OCERS and depositing a portion of the surplus into an account to pay for county retirees' health insurance. The county adopted the Retiree Medical Plan, funded by those investment earnings and mandatory employee deductions. The Plan explicitly provided that it did not create any vested rights. The labor unions then entered into MOUs, requiring the county to administer the Plan and that retirees receive a Medical Insurance Grant. In 1993-2007, retired employees received a monthly grant benefit to defray the cost of health insurance. In 2004, the county negotiated with its unions to restructure the underfunded program, reducing benefits for retirees.Plaintiffs filed suit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the county. The 1993 Plan explicitly provided that it did not create any vested right to benefits. The Plan was adopted by resolution and became law with respect to Grant Benefits, part of the MOUs. The MOUs expired on their own terms by a specific date. Absent express language providing that the Grant Benefits vested, the right to the benefits expired when the MOUs expired. The Plan was not unilaterally imposed on the unions and their employees without collective bargaining; the unions executed MOUs adopting the Plan. The court rejected an assertion that the Grant Benefit was deferred compensation and vested upon retirement, similar to pension benefits. View "Harris v. County of Orange" on Justia Law