Plaintiff filed a class action complaint against Farm Bureau, alleging breach of contract and seeking a declaratory judgment. Plaintiff's breach of contract claim was based, in part, on an alleged violation of Arkansas Insurance Rule and Regulation 43, which he claimed was incorporated into the policy. The district court granted Farm Bureau's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff then filed a motion to clarify whether the order also disposed of the common law breach of contract theory, which the district court dismissed.The Eighth Circuit agreed that the Arkansas regulation that Farm Bureau allegedly violated is not incorporated into plaintiff's policy, and thus he cannot use it as the basis for a breach of contract claim. However, because plaintiff also states a breach of contract claim based on the policy language, the court reversed in part. In this case, plaintiff alleges that "a 9% reduction on a used vehicle is not typical and does not reflect market realities," and that dealers' actual practice is not to inflate prices above market value because of the "intense competition in the context of internet pricing and comparison shopping." The court explained that, if this is true, then Farm Bureau did not consider the truck's fair market value. Rather, it considered an artificially lower value, in breach of its contractual duty and thus plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract based on the policy language. Finally, the court denied plaintiff's motion to certify questions of law to the Arkansas Supreme Court. View "Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's judgment entered upon a jury verdict awarding future damages of $50,000 for breach of a terminable-at-will rental contract, holding that no evidence supported the amount awarded by the jury.The jury in this case found that Pura-Flo breached its indefinite agreement to make monthly rental payments to Donald Clanton and failed to find that Pura-Flo had terminated the contract. The jury awarded $19,500 in past losses and future damages of $50,000. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that both the fact and amount of future damages lacked reasonable certainty. View "Pura-Flo Corp. v. Clanton" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented centered on the aftermath of an Indian tribal casino’s unsuccessful suit in tribal court against appellant James Acres following a contract dispute. After dismissal of the tribal case, Acres filed his own suit in state court against two officials of the casino, the casino’s attorneys, a tribal court judge, the clerk of the tribal court, and various other individuals and entities. He alleged, among other things, that the parties he sued (collectively, respondents) wrongfully conspired to file the lawsuit against him in tribal court. He then sought monetary relief from respondents as redress for this alleged conduct. The trial court, however, found Acres’s claims against all respondents barred by sovereign immunity and, as to the tribal judge and several others, also barred by judicial or quasi-judicial immunity. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed in part. Because Acres’s suit, if successful, would bind only the individual respondents, and not the tribe or its casino, the Court found those respondents were not entitled to sovereign immunity. But, as to those respondents who asserted personal immunity from suit (e.g., judicial immunity), the Court agreed those respondents, with one exception, were immune from suit. View "Acres v. Marston" on Justia Law

In 2015, JKB and the Army entered into a three-year indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract. JKB agreed to provide instructional services up to 14 classes per year. The contract incorporates Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 52.212-4, which includes a termination for convenience clause for the government, and incorporates Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 252.216-7006, which requires all supplies and services furnished under the contract to be ordered by issuance of delivery or task orders. The Army issued three year-long task orders, each listing one lot of training-instructor services, the price per class, and a total price corresponding to the price of 14 classes. Each year, the Army used JKB for fewer than 14 classes and paid for each class actually taught, refusing to pay the total price listed in the task orders.JKB sued for breach of contract. The Claims Court ultimately granted the government summary judgment based on FAR 52.212-4 and the doctrine of constructive termination for convenience. The Federal Circuit vacated. FAR 52.212-4 governs the termination of commercial item contracts for the government’s convenience; it does not apply to service contracts, such as the contract at issue. On remand, the Claims Court may consider whether the “Christian doctrine” applies to incorporate a termination for convenience clause and whether the doctrine of constructive termination for convenience applies. View "JKB Solutions and Services, LLC v. United States" on Justia Law

Brent Meyer appealed pro se a district court’s judgment granting Adam Walker’s breach of contract claim against him. Walker hired Meyer to assist him with the demolition and remodel of a home he had purchased in Soda Springs, Idaho. Walker alleged that in June 2018, the parties entered into an agreement in which Walker agreed to pay Meyer $18,000 in exchange for Meyer’s labor on the home. This contract was subsequently modified by the parties as Meyer performed work on other areas of the home not covered by the contract and Walker paid Meyer more money than provided in the original contract – roughly $60,000. On October 16, 2018, Walker fired Meyer from the job, alleging the labor was not up to industry standards and did not add value to the home. Walker hired another contractor to fix or redo the work completed by Meyer and his subcontractors. Meyer argued the district court erred in concluding he was not a “construction professional” as defined by Idaho’s Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act (“NORA”), Idaho Code sections 6-2501–04, and claimed the case should have been dismissed because Walker failed to comply with the notice requirement of NORA. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Walker v. Meyer" on Justia Law

In 2001, Lavastone Capital LLC (Lavastone) entered into an agreement with Coventry First LLC (Coventry) to purchase “life settlements” – life-insurance policies sold on the secondary market. One was that of Beverly Berland. Lincoln Financial (Lincoln) issued the policy to Berland in 2006. But Berland did not act alone in acquiring it. A few months before, she approached a business called “Simba.” As Simba pitched it, the transaction allowed clients to “create dollars today by using a paper asset, (a life insurance policy not yet issued from a major insurance carrier insuring your life)” by selling it on the secondary market. Clients did not need to put up any money upfront. Instead, they got nonrecourse loans to finance the transactions, which allowed them to make all necessary payments without tapping into personal funds. The only collateral for the loan was the life-insurance policy itself. Berland agreed to participate in several transactions with Simba, profiting greatly. Lavastone kept the policy in force, paying all relevant premiums to Lincoln Financial. Upon Berland’s death more than seven years later, Lincoln paid Lavastone $5,041,032.06 in death benefits under the policy. In December 2018, Berland’s estate filed a complaint against Lavastone in the District Court, seeking to recover the death benefits that Lavastone received under 18 Del C. 2704(b). In 2020, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In 2021, the District Court certified the three questions of law to the Delaware Supreme Court. The Supreme Court responded: (1) a death-benefit payment made on a policy that is void ab initio under 18 Del. C. 2704(a) and PHL Variable Insurance Co. v. Price Dawe 2006 Insurance Trust was made “under [a] contract” within the meaning of 18 Del. C. 2704(b); (2) so long as the use of nonrecourse funding did not allow the insured or his or her trust to obtain the policy “without actually paying the premiums” and the insured or his or her trust procured or effected the policy in good faith, for a lawful insurance purpose, and not as a cover for a wagering contract; and (3) an estate could profit under 18 Del. C. 2704(b) where the policy was procured in part by fraud on the part of the decedent and the decedent profited from the previous sale of the policy, if the recipient of the policy benefits cannot establish that it was a victim of the fraud. View "Lavastone Capital LLC v. Estate of Beverly E. Berland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a county solid waste authority has no power to enter into a fixed-term employment contract with a non-civil service employee.In 2008, The Nicholas County Solid Waste Authority (NCSWA) entered into an employment contract with employee Larry Bradford under which Bradford was to continue in his position for a fixed term. In 2014, the West Virginia Solid Waste Management Board (WVSWMB) exercised its statutory power of supersedure over the NCSWA. The next day, the WVSWMB terminated Bradford's employment. Bradford brought suit, asserting causes of action for violation of the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act and for breach of contract. After five years of litigation, the parties jointly moved the circuit court to certify questions to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court accepted one certified question, which rendered the remaining three questions moot, answering that a county solid waste authority has no authority to enter into a fixed-term employment contract with a non-civil service employee and that any such contract is unenforceable and void as a matter of law. View "Bradford v. W. Va. Solid Waste Management Board" on Justia Law

The federally-recognized Native American Tribe (in California) started an online lending business, allegedly operated by non-tribal companies owned by non-tribal Defendants on non-tribal land. The Plaintiffs are Virginia consumers who received online loans from tribal lenders while living in Virginia. Although Virginia usury law generally prohibits interest rates over 12%, the interest rates on Plaintiffs’ loans ranged from 544% to 920%. The Plaintiffs each electronically signed a “loan agreement,” “governed by applicable tribal law,” and containing an “Arbitration Provision.” The borrowers defaulted and brought a putative class action against tribal officials and two non-members affiliated with the tribal lenders.The district court denied the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration and motions to dismiss on the ground of tribal sovereign immunity except for a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The choice-of-law clauses of this arbitration provision, which mandate exclusive application of tribal law during any arbitration, operate as prospective waivers that would require the arbitrator to determine whether the arbitration provision impermissibly waives federal substantive rights without recourse to federal substantive law. The arbitration provisions are unenforceable as violating public policy. Substantive state law applies to off-reservation conduct, and although the Tribe itself cannot be sued for its commercial activities, its members and officers can be. Citing Virginia’s interest in prohibiting usurious lending, the court refused to enforce the choice-of-law provision. RICO does not give private plaintiffs a right to injunctive relief. View "Hengle v. Treppa" on Justia Law

The Reefer arrived at the Port of Wilmington, Delaware for what its owner, Nederland, expected to be a short stay. Upon inspection, the Coast Guard suspected that the vessel had discharged dirty bilge water directly overboard and misrepresented in its record book that the ship’s oil water separator had been used to clean the bilge water prior to discharge. Nederland, wanting to get the ship back to sea as rapidly as possible, entered into an agreement with the government for the release of the Reefer in exchange for a surety bond to cover potential fines. Although Nederland delivered the bond and met other requirements, the vessel was detained in Wilmington for at least two additional weeks.Nederland sued. The Delaware district court dismissed the complaint, holding that Nederland’s claims had to be brought in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims because the breach of contract claim did not invoke admiralty jurisdiction a claim under the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS) failed because of sovereign immunity. The Third Circuit reversed. The agreement is maritime in nature and invokes the district court’s admiralty jurisdiction. The primary objective of the agreement was to secure the vessel's departure clearance so that it could continue its maritime trade. APPS explicitly waives the government’s sovereign immunity. View "Nederland Shipping Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

This appeal presented an issue of first impression for the Court of Appeals: does a commercial property insurance policy provide coverage for a business’s lost income due to the COVID-19 pandemic? After review of the specific insurance policy that California Mutual Insurance Company (California Mutual) issued to The Inns by the Sea (Inns) for its five lodging facilities, the Court determined Inns could not recover from California Mutual for its lost business income resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. Further, Inns did not identify any manner in which it could amend its complaint to state a claim for coverage. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s order sustaining California Mutual’s demurrer without leave to amend. View "The Inns by the Sea v. Cal. Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law